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CASE NO. C tf...-d- O(at ...-,_5 -t 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
I. INTRODUCTION: 
1. Petitioner, Marc Klein, is currently incarcerated at the Idaho State Correctional 
Institution in Boise, Idaho. 
2. Mr. Klein is serving a sentence imposed by the District Court of the Seventh Judicial 
District, State of Idaho, County of Custer, the Honorable Dane Watkins, Jr., presiding. 
3. The Custer County District Court Number for that case is CR-2010-729. 
4. Mr. Klein was charged with vehicular manslaughter, a felony, in violation ofidaho 
Code § 18-4006(3 )(b), and driving under the influence of alcohol (excessive), a misdemeanor, in 
violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004( 1 )(a). 
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5. Mr. Klein pleaded guilty pursuant to A(ford v. North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), to 
the charge ofvehicular manslaughter, a felony, in violation ofldaho Code§ 18-4006(3)(b). 
6. Mr. Klein was represented at the trial by attorney Justin B. Oleson. 
7. The State was represented by Custer County Prosecuting Attorney Shawn Glen. 
8. The District Court sentenced Mr. Klein to four ( 4) years determinate and eleven (11) 
years indeterminate for a unified sentence of fifteen (15) years. 
9. Mr. Klein has not previously filed a petition for post-conviction relief. 
II. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS: 
10. On March 13, 2009, in the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, County of 
Kootenai, the Honorable John P. Luster found that Fred Rice with the Idaho State Police had 
provided testimony at the jury trial in State of Idaho v. Jonathan Wade Ellington, Kootenai 
County Case No. F-06-1497 that was inconsistent and wholly contradictory to testimony 
previously provided by Fred Rice in an Elmore County case, State v. Ciccone, two and a half 
years earlier. See Affidavit of Jeffrey Brownson in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief, Exhibit A. 
11. This information is impeachment evidence and goes directly to Fred Rice's 
credibility and reliability as a witness. 
12. The State ofldaho had knowledge of this decision by District Judge Luster as it was 
served on the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney on March 16,2009. 
13. On November 11, 2010, at approximately 6:45p.m. on U.S. Highway 93 near 
milepost 118 in Custer County, Idaho, there was a two vehicle crash involving Jory Twitchell 
and Marc Klein. 
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14. Following the accident, Mr. Klein informed law enforcement that he did not see the 
other car prior to the accident. 
I5. Following the accident, Mr. Klein informed law enforcement he believed the other 
vehicle came into his lane of travel. 
I6. Mr. Twitchell died shortly after the accident as a result ofhis injuries. 
17. The accident was investigated by the Idaho State Police, Custer County Sheriff's 
Office and the Butte County Sheriff's Office. 
18. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident. 
19. The State's case was premised upon the accident reconstructions conducted by the 
Idaho State Police. 
20. On November I2, 20IO, Custer County Prosecuting Attorney Shawn M. Glen filed a 
Criminal Complaint in Case No. CR-20I0-729 charging Marc Klein with vehicular 
manslaughter, a felony, in violation of Idaho Code § I8-4006(3 )(b), and driving under the 
influence of alcohol (excessive), a misdemeanor, in violation ofldaho Code§ 18-8004(l)(a). 
21. On November I7, 20IO, Idaho State Police Corporal Allen Bivins completed his 
Idaho State Police Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report ("Bivins Accident 
Reconstruction Report") regarding the November II, 20 I 0 accident involving Jory Twitchell and 
Marc Klein. See Affidavit of Jeffrey Brownson in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief, Exhibit B. 
22. The Bivins Accident Reconstruction Report was approved by Fred Rice on 
November 30, 20IO. 
23. The Bivins Accident Reconstruction Report opined, among other things: 
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i) Mr. Klein was traveling north on US 93 and Mr. Twitchell was traveling south 
on US 93 at the time of the accident. 
ii) Mr. Klein was driving a white 1988 Toyota pickup. 
iii) Mr. Twitchell was driving a red 1995 Lincoln Continental. 
iv) Mr. Klein crossed the centerline into the southbound lane as he was preparing 
to tum left onto Fish Hatchery Road and collided head-on with Mr. Twitchell. 
v) Mr. Twitchell's vehicle rotated counter-clockwise after the collision and 
traveled approximately 77 feet south of the point of impact. 
vi) Mr. Twitchell's vehicle came to rest facing northeast approximately 21 feet 
west of US 93. 
vii) Mr. Klein's vehicle rotated counter-clockwise after the collision and traveled 
approximately 36 feet southeast ofthe point of impact. 
viii) Mr. Klein's vehicle came to rest facing south in the southbound lane. 
ix) The Idaho State Police Forensics Laboratory tested Mr. Klein's blood samples 
with test results of0.279%. 
x) Mr. Klein failed to maintain his designated lane as he was preparing to tum left 
onto Fish Hatchery Road from US 93. 
24. On December 13,2010, a preliminary hearing was held with the Honorable 
Magistrate Charles L. Roos presiding. 
25. Idaho State Police Corporal Allen Bivins testified at the preliminary hearing that, 
among other things (See Affidavit of Jeffrey Brownson in Support of Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief, Exhibit C): 
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i) After the collision, both vehicles rotated counterclockwise. 
ii) The Toyota was traveling slower than the Lincoln. 
iii) That it is possible the Toyota was not moving or was stopped. 
iii) That he was not able to estimate the speed of the vehicles based on the 
evidence at the accident site. 
iv) That the white Toyota pickup as it was traveling north, crossed into the 
southbound lane and struck or collided with the Lincoln nearly head-on. 
26. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing Magistrate Charles L. Roos found 
sufficient evidence to bind Mr. Klein over to stand to answer the charges in district court. 
27. On December I5, 20II, Mark Klein appeared before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey 
for a felony arraignment and the Court on behalf of Mr. Klein entered a plea of not guilty to the 
charges. 
28. On February 4, 20 II, Fred Rice with the Idaho State Police completed his Idaho 
State Police Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report ("Rice Accident 
Reconstruction Report") regarding the November II, 2010 accident involving Jory Twitchell and 
Marc Klein. See Affidavit of Jeffrey Brownson in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief, Exhibit D. 
29. The Rice Accident Reconstruction Report opined, among other things: 
i) A Momentum Analysis and a Vector Sum Analysis ofthis collision clearly 
illustrates that both vehicles were moving at the time of the impact. 
ii) The speed of the I995 Lincoln driven by Jory Twitchell was 53 miles per hour 
at impact, plus or minus 2.65 miles per hour. 
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iii) The speed of the 1988 Toyota driven by Marc Klein was 31 miles per hour at 
impact, plus or minus 1.55 miles per hour. 
iv) The 1995 Lincoln rotated clockwise while scuffing 30.8 feet on a surface with 
a drag factor of. 7 and 61 feet on a surface with a drag factor of .4. 
v) The I 988 Toyota rotated counterclockwise while scuffing 38.8 feet on a 
surface with a drag factor of .7. 
vi) Mr. Klein is responsible for this collision as he failed to yield to Mr. Twitchell 
while attempting to tum left onto Fish Hatchery Road. 
vii) Mr. Twitchell did not have enough time to even perceive that the 1988 Toyota 
was turning prior to the collision. 
30. Relying upon Attorney Justin Oleson's representations and the Rice Accident 
Reconstruction Report, on February 16, 2011, Mr. Klein pleaded guilty pursuant to Alford v. 
North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) to the charge ofvehicular manslaughter, a felony, in 
violation of Idaho Code § 18-4006(3 )(b). 
31. On February 22, 2011, Attorney Justin Oleson wrote a letter to Mr. Klein stating in 
relevant part, "[t]his confirms that based upon the new report of Fred Rice, my discussions with 
Mr. Rice and our inability to find anyone that would be creditable in disputing Mr. Rice's 
analysis and you [sic] inability to have any memory ofthe accident and the State's plea 
agreement, you wished to pled [sic] guilty to vehicular manslaughter and the excessive DUI will 
be dismissed." See Affidavit of Jeffrey Brownson in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief, Exhibit E. 
32. Attorney Justin Oleson made no efforts to conduct an independent investigation. 
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33. Attorney Justin Oleson made no efforts to have an independent accident 
reconstructionist review the Rice Accident Reconstruction Report. 
34. On April20, 2011, a sentencing hearing was held and the Honorable Dane Watkins, 
Jr. sentenced Mr. Klein to four (4) years determinate and eleven (11) years indeterminate for a 
unified sentence of fifteen ( 15) years. 
35. On April22, 2011, the Judgment of Conviction was filed by the clerk of the court. 
36. On May 27, 2011, the Supreme Court of Idaho issued its decision in State of Idaho v. 
Jonathan WEllington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727 (2011), finding that Fred Rice provided false 
testimony in that matter. 
37. On June 3, 2011, the Judgment of Conviction became final pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 14. 
38. On June 27, 2011, Attorney Justin Oleson filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
and Affidavit in Support of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea based upon the recent opinion in 
State of Idaho v. Jonathan WEllington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d ?27 (2011). 
39. In the Affidavit in Support of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, Attorney Justin 
Oleson claims he "contacted other accident reconstructionists to attempt to rebut Cpl. Rice's 
testimony and I was told that if Cpl. Rice had made the determination, that it would be irrefutable 
and that it would be a waste of time and resources to attempt to rebut his testimony in any 
aspect." 
40. In the Affidavit in Support of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, Attorney Justin 
Oleson claims that "[b]ased upon my own personal experience with Cpl. Rice and my own belief 
that he was wholly credible, and my specific conversations with him about this case, the 
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determination was made to plead guilty. Even though there was no other independent evidence 
supporting the allegations." 
41. On July 27,2011, a hearing was held on the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
42. Because the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea was filed after the Judgment of 
Conviction became final, the district court lacked jurisdiction to withdraw the guilty plea 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 33 and therefore, an Order Denying Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea was entered on August 8, 2011. 
43. On March 30,2012, Dave Jakovac, P.E., with FDJ Engineering, PC, an independent 
accident reconstructionist completed his accident reconstruction and analysis report ("FDJ 
Accident Reconstruction Report") regarding the November 11, 2010 accident involving Jory 
Twitchell and Marc Klein. See Affidavit of Jeffrey Brownson in Support of Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief, Exhibit F. 
44. The FDJ Accident Reconstruction Report opined, among other things: 
i) The more likely cause of the accident was due to the excessive speed of Mr. 
Twitchell, whereas both Mr. Twitchell and Mr. Klein collided near the centerline of the 
US 93 roadway. 
ii) Mr. Twitchell's pre-impact velocity was approximately 75-78 miles per hour 
and may have been faster if Mr. Twitchell had applied the brakes but did not leave tire 
skid marks. 
iii) The Idaho State Police calculations were found to have errors of gross 
magnitude and employed the use of vector analysis equations that did not apply to the 
accident conditions and physical constraints. 
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iv) The Idaho State Police knowingly documented and did not evaluate field 
evidence and infom1ation relevant to the accident reconstruction analysis results. 
v) The Idaho State Police reports were generated by using linear momentum and 
vector analysis which would not be a viable application in a case where vehicles have 
collided with angular acceleration causing rotation as well as the rollover event of Mr. 
Twitchell's vehicle. 
vi) The Idaho State Police angle of approach for the two vehicles and the impact 
engagement diagram was not utilized in the calculations consistently. 
vii) There was not a common ordinate with 0-degrees used with the stated 
azimuth of engagement between the two vehicles. 
viii) The standard co-efficient of friction values used by Idaho State Police on 
asphalt concrete pavement and gravel were reduced by 50% without explanation or 
evidence to support this large correction to a standard factor. 
ix) The Idaho State Police results were not supported by physical evidence that 
the Idaho State Police documented at the site. 
x) The Idaho State Police investigation omitted evaluation of mechanical failure, 
electrical failures, and did not address any need for corrective eyewear or night vision 
issues. 
xi) The point of impact that the Idaho State Police sited was not accurate and may 
be as much as 8 to 16 feet off from where the initial impact occurred. 
xii) The collision may have initiated near, if not within, the northbound lane. 
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xiii) The apparent focus of the Idaho State Police was to convict the driver that 
was impaired from excessive alcohol consumption and not an objective and thorough 
accident reconstruction. 
45. Had Attorney Justin Oleson made efforts to consult with an independent accident 
reconstructionist, he would have learned of the errors of gross magnitude in the Rice Accident 
Reconstruction Report. 
46. Mr. Klein would not have entered a plea of guilty to the charge of vehicular 
manslaughter, a felony, in violation ofldaho Code§ 18-4006(3)(b) had he known of errors of 
gross magnitude in the Rice Accident Reconstruction Report. 
47. Mr. Klein would not have entered a plea of guilty to the charge of vehicular 
manslaughter, a felony, in violation of Idaho Code§ 18-4006(3)(b) had he known Fred Rice was 
found to have previously given false, inconsistent, and contradictory testimony in other cases. 
48. The State, Custer County Prosecuting Attorney Shawn Glen, nor Fred Rice has ever 
disclosed to the defense in Custer County Case No. CR-2010-729 that Fred Rice was previously 
found to have provided false, inconsistent, and contradictory testimony in other cases. 
III. WHY RELIEF SHOULD BE GRANTED: 
A prosecutor in a criminal case must disclose to the defendant all exculpatory material, 
that is, all evidence that is favorable to the accused. This duty on the part of the prosecutor was 
established in the seminal case of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and is grounded in the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as Article 1, § 13 of 
the Idaho Constitution. "[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
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punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." !d. at 87. In addition 
to exculpatory evidence, Brady requires the disclosure of evidence impeaching the testimony of a 
state witness when the reliability of that witness may be determinative of a criminal defendant's 
guilt or innocence. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
A defendant in a criminal case is also guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under 
both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13 
of the Idaho Constitution. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the 
state or federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 ( 1984) standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that 
counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional 
performance, and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong of the test is shown ifthere is a reasonable 
probability that a different result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted 
properly. !d. "[I]n order to satisfY the "prejudice" requirement, the defendant must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 
and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 
In this case, Mr. Klein's right to due process was violated when the prosecuting attorney 
and Fred Rice failed to disclose that Fred Rice, the state's key witness and accident 
reconstructionist, had previously provided false, inconsistent, and contradictory testimony under 
oath. Mr. Klein also did not receive the effective assistance of counsel from Attorney Justin 
Oleson because counsel failed to independently investigate the accident or consult with an 
11 • VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
11 
independent accident reconstructionist. Attorney Oleson also failed to timely file a motion to 
withdraw Mr. Klein's guilty plea. These deficiencies prejudiced Mr. Klein. 
A. Mr. Klein's Constitutional Right to Due Process was Violated When the 
Prosecuting Attorney Failed to Disclose Impeachment Evidence Regarding the 
Credibility and Reliability of Fred Rice. 
Brady v. Maryland, supra, holds that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either 
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. The 
Brady doctrine has been expanded to include instances where the exculpatory evidence was 
never requested, or requested only in a general way. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 
(1985). Impeachment evidence also falls within the Brady rule. See id. at 676 and Giglio v. 
United Staes, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). 
The duty of disclosure under Brady extends to all persons working as part of the 
prosecution team or intimately connected with the government's case. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 
U.S. 419, 454 (1995) (declining state's request to hold that prosecutor not responsible to disclose 
information not known by prosecutor although known by police). In order to comply with 
Brady, therefore, 'the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known 
to the others acting on the government's behalf in this case, including the police." Strickler v. 
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999), quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437 (1995) (internal 
citation omitted). "Because prosecutors rely so heavily on the police and other law enforcement 
authorities, the obligations imposed under Brady would be largely ineffective if those other 
members of the prosecution team had no responsibility to inform the prosecutor about evidence 
that undermined the state's preferred theory of the crime." Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 
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F.3d 351, 3 77 (61h Cir. 2009). Finally, the state's obligation under Brady continued past the entry 
of a plea and sentencing. Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749-750 (9th Cir. 1992) (Brady 
duty continues into post-conviction proceedings). 
In order to establish a Brady violation, only three things need be shown: "The evidence at 
issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is 
impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or 
inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 
(1999). Thus, constitutional error results when favorable evidence is withheld from the 
defendant "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result ofthe proceedings would have been different." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 
419,437 (1995). "On a Brady challenge to a guilty plea, the test of materiality (i.e., prejudice) is 
whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the state's failure to produce the 
information, the defendant would not have entered the plea but instead would have insisted on 
going to trial." Roeder v. State, 144 Idaho 415,418, 162 P.3d 794, 797 (Ct. App. 2007) (citation 
omitted). 
First, there can be no question the evidence that Fred Rice previously provided false, 
inconsistent, and contradictory testimony in other cases is impeaching. There were no witnesses 
to the accident involving Mr. Twitchell and Mr. Klein. The only evidence of what occurred and 
the State's theory in this case is based upon the accident reconstruction by Fred Rice, who was 
asked to perform a reconstruction analysis after significant errors were discovered in the 
preliminary hearing testimony and initial accident reconstruction performed by Corporal Allen 
Bivins. 
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Unbeknownst to Mr. Klein however, Fred Rice had previously provided testimony that 
was found to be inconsistent and contradictory to his testimony in prior cases. It had been 
previously established that on at least two separate issues Fred Rice advanced under oath "wholly 
opposite opinions." State of Idaho v. Jonathan Wade Ellington, Kootenai County Case No. F-
06-1497, Decision on Motion for New Trial: Newly Discovered Evidence, p.8. District Judge 
John P. Luster noted in his written decision that "[t]he evidence in question is testimony from the 
same witness in a prior proceeding that contradicts the testimony given at trial [in this matter]." 
Id. at 9. Judge Luster, referring to Fred Rice, went further to say, "[t]his court would be remiss 
not to express some concern about the integrity of this witness that has been called into question 
in this case. This is especially true when it pertains to a trained professional with the Idaho State 
Police." !d. at 12. This evidence that a district court in the State ofldaho had found Fred Rice 
unreliable and not credible is undeniably impeachment evidence. 
Second, this evidence that Fred Rice had previously provided inconsistent and 
contradictory testimony under oath was never disclosed by the State in this matter. Whether 
inadvertently or willfully, this evidence was never provided to the defense. Neither the 
prosecuting attorney nor Fred Rice himself informed Mr. Klein that approximately twenty 
months prior to the accident in this case, Judge Luster in Kootenai County unequivocally called 
into question the credibility and reliability of Fred Rice. 1 
Finally, Mr. Klein was prejudiced by the suppression of this favorable evidence because 
there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense the result of 
1The veracity of Fred Rice was affirmed when the Supreme Court ofldaho issued its 
decision in State of Idaho v. Jonathan WEllington, 151 Idaho 53,253 P.3d 727 (2011) finding 
that Fred Rice had provided false testimony. 
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the proceedings would have been different. Had Mr. Klein been made aware of the fact that Fred 
Rice had previously provided false testimony and had significant credibility issues, he would not 
have entered a plea of guilty to vehicular manslaughter. This is further evidenced by Attorney 
Oleson's attempt, though untimely, to withdraw Mr. Klein's guilty plea after the Supreme Court 
ofldaho issued its Ellington decision. 
Here, all three Brady requirements have been met. The withheld evidence regarding Fred 
Rice was obvious impeachment evidence. The evidence was never disclosed to the defense. 
And Mr. Klein would not have pled guilty had he been made aware ofthe evidence. As a result, 
Mr. Klein's conviction must be vacated because it was obtained in violation ofhis right to due 
process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as 
Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. 
B. Mr. Klein Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Because Defense Counsel 
Failed to Conduct an Independent Investigation or Consult With an Independent 
Accident Recontructionist. 
Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to investigate the 
circumstances surrounding the accident, including consulting with an independent accident 
reconstructionist and having them review and analyze the Rice Accident Reconstruction Report. 
Reasonable professional performance requires defense counsel in a criminal case to conduct 
adequate investigation of the allegations. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; Kimmelman v. 
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986). In an attempt to provide some guidance as to what sort of 
investigation is required, the Strickland Court referred to the "(p ]revailing norms of practice as 
reflected in American Bar Association [ABA] standards and the like" as guides for determining 
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what is reasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Those ABA standards require defense counsel 
to: 
Conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and to explore all 
avenues . . . . The investigation should always include efforts to secure 
information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities. 
The duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or statements 
to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead 
guilty. 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense Function, Rule 4-4.1 (2d ed.1986). 
Had Attorney Oleson investigated the circumstances surrounding the accident, including 
consulting with an independent accident reconstructionist, he would have learned the Rice 
Accident Reconstruction Report contains catastrophic errors and results that are not supported by 
the physical evidence that was documented by the Idaho State Police at the accident location. 
Had Attorney Oleson consulted with an accident reconstructionist he would have learned that the 
likely cause of the accident was actually Mr. Twitchell's excessive speed and not Mr. Klein's 
impairment or his failure to yield. 
Attorney Oleson's failure to investigate the accident and have an independent accident 
reconstructionist review the Rice Accident Reconstruction Report was based upon Attorney 
Oleson's personal belief that Fred Rice was credible and the apparent opinion of another 
unnamed accident reconstructionist who claimed Fred Rice was irrefutable, neither of which is 
premised upon an objective review ofthe evidence. Attorney Oleson blindly accepted as true 
the representations and calculation in the Rice Accident Reconstruction Report and in turn 
advised Mr. Klein to enter a plea of guilty. In reality, the Rice Accident Reconstruction Report 
contains catastrophic errors and omissions and even employs the wrong application to ascertain 
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the correct speed and direction of travel for both vehicles. Had Attorney Oleson consulted with 
an accident reconstructionist, this crucial information would have been known to him. His 
failure to do so was deficient. 
As a result, Mr. Klein's plea in this case, relying upon the advice of his attorney and the 
Rice Accident Reconstruction Report, cannot be considered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 
plea. "Where, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters 
his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's 
advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Griffith v. 
State, 121 Idaho 371,373, 825 P.2d 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1992); see also State v. Soto, 121 Idaho 53, 
55, 822 P.2d 572, 574 (Ct. App. 1991); and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court just recently made clear that a criminal 
defendant's right under the Sixth Amendment to the effective assistance of competent counsel 
extends to the plea-bargaining process and in deciding whether to accept or reject a plea offer 
from the state. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012); and Missouri v. Frye, 
566 U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012). 
The prejudice here is self-evident. Mr. Klein, accepting the representations made to him 
that there was sufficient evidence to find him guilty at trial, entered an Alford plea to a crime he 
did not recall committing and likely did not commit. Attorney Oleson advised Mr. Klein that he 
was unable to "find anyone that would be credible in disputing Mr. Rice's analysis" when, in 
fact, Fred Rice's analysis contains "errors of gross magnitude." The FJD Accident 
Reconstruction Report unequivocally disputes Fred Rice's analysis. 
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C. Mr. Klein Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Because Defense Counsel 
Failed to Timely File a Motion to Withdraw His Guilty Plea. 
Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to timely file a motion to 
withdraw Mr. Klein's guilty plea. Reasonable professional performance requires counsel to be 
aware ofthe governing rules of procedure and to file motions in a timely fashion. Here, even 
though there existed sufficient time for Attorney Oleson to file a motion to withdraw guilty plea 
prior to the district court losing jurisdiction, he failed to do so. 
Here, Attorney Oleson's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
On April22, 2011, the Judgment of Conviction in the underlying criminal case was file stamped 
by the clerk of the court. Based upon the time frames set forth in Idaho Appellate Rule 14, the 
Judgment of Conviction became final forty-two days later- or on June 3, 2011. Because the 
district court loses jurisdiction once the judgment becomes final, any motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) needed to be filed on or before June 3, 2011. See 
State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352 (2003). 
Attorney Oleson filed a motion seeking to withdraw Mr. Klein's guilty plea on June 27, 
2011, more than three weeks after the district court no longer had jurisdiction of the matter. The 
basis for the motion as set forth by Attorney Oleson was: 
[T]that the Defendant entered an Alford Plea admitting that based upon the 
evidence the State had there would be sufficient evidence that the jury could 
convict him in this case. The initial officer at the preliminary hearing could not 
confirm that the Defendant had drove across the center line and caused the 
accident. However, based upon the report of Fred Rice and the conclusions made 
by him, the Defendant agreed to plead guilty to the offense. 
However, based upon the newly discovery evidence and the recent opinion in 
State ofldaho v. Jonathan W. Ellington, recently decided by the Idaho Supreme 
Court and filed on May 27, 2011, Fred Rice provided false testimony in that trial 
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which went to the Defendant's sole defense. Ifthe Defendant would have know 
[sic] that at the time of his plea the Cpl. Rice's testimony was suspect, he would 
not have entered the plea. 
Motion for Rule 35, pp. I-2. Attorney Oleson in the motion itself acknowledges that the 
Ellington decision was issued on May 27, 20 II. Inexplicably however Attorney Oleson does not 
file the motion until June 27, 201I. There were seven days between the issuance of the Ellington 
decision and the judgment becoming final in the underlying case, yet no motion was timely filed. 
The motion to withdraw guilty plea should have been timely filed and in failing to do so 
Attorney Oleson was deficient. There simply is no strategic reason or valid excuse not to timely 
file the motion when sufficient time to do so existed. 
Mr. Klein was also prejudiced as a result of his counsel's deficiency. In order to establish 
prejudice, all Mr. Klein must show is a reasonable probability that, but for Attorney Oleson's 
inadequate performance, the outcome of the proceeding before the district court would have been 
different. "Furthermore, in a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to 
pursue a motion in the underlying criminal action, the court properly may consider the 
probability of success of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's inactivity 
constituted incompetent performance." Huck v. State, I24 Idaho I 55, 158, 857 P.2d 634,637 
(Ct. App. I993). Had the motion to withdraw guilty plea been timely filed, it was likely Mr. 
Klein would have prevailed on that motion. Because Mr. Klein would have been withdrawing 
his guilty plea after he was sentenced, he would have needed to establish that doing so would 
have corrected a "manifest injustice." State v. Freeman, II 0 Idaho II7 (Ct. App. I986). Even 
with that stricter standard applied, Mr. Klein would have likely prevailed. 
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Again, there were no witnesses to the accident. Based solely upon the Rice Accident 
Reconstruction Report and his attorney's representations, Mr. Klein entered an Alford plea to the 
charge of vehicular manslaughter. Now however, there is "very strong evidence that Cpl. Rice 
perjured himself during the Ellington trial." State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.Jd 727, 749 
(2011). According to the Supreme Court ofldaho, the State's proverbial star-witness is: 
[A] police officer with twenty five years of experience, who teaches accident 
reconstruction to other Idaho police officers and who has testified for the State on 
many other occasions regarding accident reconstruction, to the stand and ... 
testified falsely according to the well-established principles of accident 
reconstruction ... as well as his own testimony in the Ciccone case and his own 
training materials. 
!d. There is no longer any way Fred Rice could be considered credible or reliable. In light of the 
circumstances, including the fact that Mr. Klein entered a guilty plea pursuant to Alford v. North 
Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), upholding a conviction relying solely upon a perjurer's report 
constitutes a manifest injustice and the motion to withdraw his guilty plea would have been 
granted had it been timely filed. 
IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF: Petitioner requests the following relief: 
A. That Mr. Klein's conviction be set aside and the case dismissed or a new trial be held, 
and/or: 
B. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
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Respectfully submitted this 17th day of April 2012. 
VERIFICATION OF PETITION 
I, Marc E. Klein, being duly sworn under oath, state: 
I. I know of the contents of the foregoing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and that 
the matters and allegations set forth are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
Jeffrey nson 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise 
Marc Klein 
My commission expires: I -r~__,­
~-""· 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \? day of April, 2012, I caused a true and correct 




to: Val Siegel, Custer County Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 630, Challis, ID 83226 
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ISBA# 7474 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
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(208) 343- I 000 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
MARC EDWARD KLEIN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 










AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY 
BROWNSON IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF 
I, Jeffrey Brownson, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby depose and say: 
1. That I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Decision on Motion for 
New Trial: Newly Discovery Evidence, State of Idaho v. Jonathan Wade Ellington, Kootenai 
County Case No. F-06-1497. 
1 • AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY BROWNSON IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF 
23 0 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Idaho State Police 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report prepared by Idaho State Police Corporal 
Allen Bivins. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit Cis a true and correct copy of the transcript ofthe 
Preliminary Hearing held on December 13, 2010, in State of Idaho v. Marc Edward Klein, Custer 
County Case No. CR-2010-729. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit Dis a true and correct copy of the Idaho State Police 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report prepared by Idaho State Police Corporal 
Fred Rice. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of a letter to Marc Edward 
Klein from Justin B. Oleson dated February 22, 2011. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy ofthe Accident Reconstruction 
Report prepared by Dave Jakovac, P.E., with FDJ Engineering. (Exhibits to the Accident 
Reconstruction Report by Dave Jakovac, P.E. are omitted and will be provided upon request.) 
This ends my affidavit. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _1_l day of April, 2012, I caused a true and correct 




to: Val Siegel, Custer County Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 630, Challis, ID 83226 








IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JONATHAN WADE ELLINGTON, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. F-06-1497 
DECISION ON MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL: NEWLY DISCOVERED 
EVIDENCE 
Jonathan Wade Ellington was charged by Information with three 
felony crimes arising out of an incident occurring on the roadways of 
Kootenai County on the morning of January 1, 2006 that resulted in the 
death of Vonette Larsen. A trial was conducted over a period of three 
weeks commencing on Augus~ 22, 2006. The jury returned guilty 
verdicts on the charge of Second Degree Murder in connection with the 
death of Vonette Larson as well as two counts of Aggravated Battery 
upon Jolene and Jovon -Larson. On December 4, 2006 -Ellington was 
sentenced to concurrent fixed terms of twelve years on the murder 
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conviction and seven years each on the battery charges with 
indeterminate terms of thirteen years and eight years. 
Ellington filed various post trial motions including a Motion for a 
New Trial under Rule 34 and I.C. § 19-2406. These motions were denied 
by the district court and an appeal followed. On June 24, 2008 Ellington 
filed a subsequent Motion for a New Trial. This motion was based on 
grounds and for reasons that the defense had discovered new, material, 
and exculpatory evidence. On July 11, 2008 the Idaho Supreme Court 
issued an order suspending the appeal to allow the district court to issue 
a ruling on the motion. 
The matter was briefed and a hearing was conducted on October 
20, 2008. Additional time was extended in order for the court to secure a 
copy of the relevant trial transcript. On October 28, 2008 Ellington filed 
a Motion to Augment the Record. That motion was noted for hearing on 
December 29, 2008. Additional time was extended to the parties to 
submit further response on the issue. Ultimately on January 20, 2009 
the matter was taken under advisement. 
MOTION TO AUGMENT 
The motion by Ellington refers to newly discovered evidence 
regarding the State's rebuttal witness Fred Rice. Ellington contends that 
Rice provided inconsistent testimony on two critical ~issues. In connection 
with the Motion to Augment the Record Ellington filed an affidavit of 
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William H. Skelton, Jr. along with Idaho State Police Accident 
Reconstruction Training Materials. 
Ellington's efforts to augment the record are misleading. 
Augmentation of the record typically refers to the transcript or record on 
appeal. 1 The appeal in this case has been suspended pending resolution 
of the motion before the trial court. What Ellington is requesting is to do 
is to offer additional evidence in support of his motion. Under I.C.R. 34 a 
motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence must be 
made only before or within two (2) years after final judgment. In this case 
Ellington was sentenced December 4, 2006. The decision denying his 
post trial motions was entered on May 11, 2007. The additional evidence 
was filed in connection with the Motion to Augment on November 4, 
2008. The information is timely under the rule. 
It should also be noted that the basis of Ellington's motion has not 
changed. He has simply supplemented the record with evidence 
supporting his original claim concerning the testimony of Fred Rice. The 
state has had ample time to submit information or evidence in opposition 
but have declined to do so. There has been no showing of prejudice by 
the state. The court will consider all the information submitted by 
Ellington in support of his Motion for New Trial. 
MOTION ·FOR NEW TRIAL 
1 See l.C.R. 54.11; I.A.R. 30. 
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On a motion by a defendant, a court may grant a new trial "if 
required in the interest of justice." Rule 34, Idaho Criminal Rules. 
The grounds for a new trial are set forth in Idaho Code § 19-2406. A 
new trial is authorized "[wJhen new evidence is discovered material to the 
defendant, and which he could not with reasonable diligence have 
discovered and produced at the trial." Idaho Code§ 19-2406(7). 
The general standard for a new trial on the grounds of newly 
discovered evidence is found in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 695, 551 
P.2d 971 ( 1976). Newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial only if 
the defendant demonstrates: ( 1) the evidence is newly discovered and 
was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the evidence is 
material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) the new evidence will 
probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the evidence 
was due to no lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. Id., 97 
Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d 977. 
The question of whether the interests of justice require a new trial 
under the circumstances of a particular case is directed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Thus, the denial of a motion for new trial is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hayes, 144 Idaho 574, 165 
P.3d 288 (Ct.App. 2007). 
A motion for new trial based upon -newly discovered evidence 
involves both questions of law and fact. An abuse of discretion can be 
found if the trial court's findings of fact are not supported by substantial 
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evidence or if the trial court does not correctly apply the law. Motions for 
a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are disfavored and should 
be granted with caution after consideration is given to repose, regularity 
of decision making, and conservation of scarce judicial resources. State 
v. Hayes, supra. 
In the recent case of State v. Stevens, 08.16 ISCR 852 (July 23, 
2008), the defendant moved for a new trial based upon newly discovered 
evidence. The newly discovered evidence included false testimony by an 
expert for the state, Saami Shaibani, regarding his credentials.2 The 
defendant claimed that Shaibani's false testimony as to his credentials 
affected his credibility. In Stevens, the Idaho Supreme Court set forth 
the four-pronged test from State v. Drapeau, supra, as the standard to 
be applied in reaching a determination when a defendant seeks a new 
trial based upon newly discovered evidence. 
Defendant Jonathan A. Ellington argues that the use of the 
Drapeau standards in State v. Stevens, supra, as applied to false 
and/ or perjured testimony was mere dicta. Mr. Ellington urges the 
application of a different standard in cases involving false or perjured 
testimony by a government witness. He cites to Rule 33, Federal Rules 
2 Shaibani testified at trial that he had been a clinical professor of physics affiliated with Temple University 
for about seven years. He also testified that he had published "50 or so" miicles ani:! that those had been 
peer reviewed. On the motion for new trial, the district court found that Shaibani's testimony about being 
affiliated with Temple University for about seven years "was not accurate" and was "untrue," but 
concluded that this was not material and was not newly discovered evidence; the district court concluded 
that the defendant did not show that Shaibani's statements relating to the published articles was false. The 
defendant had been convicted of first degree murder following the death of his girlfriend's eleven month 
old child. 
31 
Decision on Motion for New Trial (Newly Discovered Evidence) 5 03~ 
of Criminal Procedure, 3 certain federal cases, and Idaho cases involving 
witness recantation. 
In State v. Griffith, 144 Idaho 356, 161 P.3d 675 (Ct.App. 2007), 
the defendant moved for new trial on grounds of newly discovered 
evidence that an exp·ert witness for the prosecution had lied concerning 
his qualifications. 4 The district court denied a new trial and that 
decision was affirmed. The State advocated for the application of the 
Drapeau four-pronged test. Griffith urged the application of a test 
adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 
380, 716 P.2d 1152 (1985) for new trial motions based on a recantation 
of testimony given by a witness at the defendant's trial. The two tests 
differed in several ways, but they differed most significantly with regard 
to the likelihood that the new evidence would produce different results at 
trial. The Drapeau test requires that the defendant demonstrate that 
the new evidence "will probably produce an acquittal;" the Scroggins 
test sets a less exacting standard of showing only that, without the 
perjured testimony, the jury "might have reached a different conclusion." 
The reason for the less exacting standard for recantation is because 
perjured testimony affects the integrity of the judicial system In a way 
that overlooked testimony does not. State v. Griffiths, supra. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals stated as follows: 
:; Rule 33, Fedem/ Rules of Criminal Procedure, is similar to Rule 34, Ida/w Criminal Rules. 
4 This case also concerned testimony by Dr. Sa~t~i Shaibani as to his qualifications. 
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Idaho case law calls for application of the 
Scroggins/Larrison test when a trial witness has 
recanted his or her trial testimony and evidence of that 
recantation has been presented to the trial court. Any 
other type of new evidence presented by a 
defendant as an alleged basis for a new trial, 
including other types of proof of perjury and 
evidence of a recantation that has itself been 
subsequently disavowed by the trial witness, are 
subject to the Drapeau test. (Citations omitted.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
State v. Griffith, 144 Idaho at 366, 161 P.3d 685.5 However, the 
Griffiths court went on to hold that, under either the Drapeau or the 
Scroggins standards, the trial court did not err in denying a new trial. 
The standards that generally apply in federal cases involving a 
motion for new trial under Rule 33, Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, based upon the discovery of new evidence are similar to and 
do not· differ significantly from the standards set forth in Drapeau. 
Different standards apply in federal cases when the new trial motion IS 
based on the prosecution's use of perjury. See United States v. 
Sanchez, 266 Fed.Appx. 579, 2008 WL 313187 (C.A.9 (Cal.)). However, 
after reviewing the Idaho cases which serve as precedent, it appears that 
the proper standard to be applied here is the four-pronged test found in 
Drapeau. 
5 The Griff'ult court found that it was questionable as to whether Shaibani's untruthfulness regarding his 
credentials should be characterized as a "recantation" because he never directly admitted that he had 
intentionally lied. His admissions during cross-examination in cases from other states showed that his 
testimony concerning his affiliation with Temple University was highly misleading. 
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DISCUSSION 
The new evidence advanced by Ellington m support of his motion 
for a new trial is a showing that the state's rebuttal witness, Fred Rice, 
provided false or perjured testimony on two material points. First, Rice 
inaccurately testified that there is no average perception-reaction time. 
Second, Rice provided the false opinion that a debris field at an accident 
scene can not provide any indication where an accident occurred upon a 
highway. 
Ellington contrast the testimony that Rice gave on these two points 
with wholly opposite opinions advanced during his testimony in an 
Elmore County case, State v. Ciccone, two and a half years earlier. In 
both cases Rice testified as an expert for the state on accident 
reconstruction. In the Ciccone case Rice testified using an average 
reaction time that he later discounted in the Ellington case. Additionally 
in Ciccone Rice gave an opinion regarding the area of impact based upon 
the location of debris (broken headlight glass) on the ground. 
As noted above, in order for Ellington to prevail he must establish 
four items under Drapeau. Under the first and fourth requirement 
Ellington must establish that the newly discovered was unknown to the 
defense and any failure to learn of the evidence was due to no lack of 
diligence on the part of the defendant. 
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The court is satisfied that Ellington can meet these two 
requirements. The evidence in question is testimony from the same 
witness in a prior proceeding that contradicts the testimony given at 
trial. There is no indication that this testimony was known to the 
defendant at the time Rice testified. In fact, Ellington has advanced that 
the discovery of Rice's prior testimony was based upon information 
uncovered by the State Appellate Defender during the pending appeal. It 
would be logical to recognize that the statewide office handling multiple 
criminal appeals would be in a better position than Ellington's defense 
team to discover this kind of information about a witness common to 
some of their cases. 
It could be argued that Ellington should have investigated Rice as 
a potential witness for the State more thoroughly, thus discovering the 
inconsistencies in advance. The court finds this to be an unrealistic 
burden to be imposed upon the defendant. This is especially truly in 
light of the fact that Rice was a rebuttal witness. His testimony was 
limited to only those issues raised by the defense during trial. Ellington 
can hardly be held to a standard of diligence that would require 
anticipation to the level that would be required to counter such a 
recantation of basic principles by Rice. 
The more important consideration for the court IS whether 
Ellington can satisfy the second and third prong of the test. Is the newly 
discovered evidence material, not merely cumulative or impeaching? Will 
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this new evidence upon a new trial probably produce an acquittal? 
Fundamentally the question becomes; absent the expert testimony of 
Rice on rebuttal will there likely be a different outcome? 
This case was hotly contested over the three weeks that it was tried 
before a jury. A substantial focus of the evidence centered on accident 
reconstruction. This was critical because Ellington's Blazer struck the 
Honda driven by the Larson sisters and also struck and killed Vonette 
Larson. A reconstruction of the scene helped to tell the story as it related 
to any criminal responsibility on the part of Ellington. 
Ellington contends that the testimony of Rice bears on the critical 
issue of the location of the Honda prior to the collision. The argument is 
that Ellington was unable to maneuver his Blazer and safely get away 
because the Honda was partially blocking his lane of travel. Ellington 
claims that the Larson Subaru and the Honda were positioned in such a 
way as to prevent him from being able to react in time to avoid either of 
the fateful collisions. 
The debris on the roadway, the damage to the vehicles, 
calculations of speed or any relevant perception or reaction time only tell 
a part of the story. While accident reconstruction can help shed light on 
a typical accident this case does not involve a typical accident. The 
evidence revealed that the incident began with a heated agitated 
exchange on the roadway between Ellington and the Larson sisters. The 
initial reported "road rage" incident was followed by an ill-advised high 
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speed pursuit on the part of the sisters and later joined by their parents. 
The culmination of the incident led to the disputed collision and the 
tragic demise of Ms. Larson. 
The state produced an extensive case-in-chief including multiple 
eyewitness, photographs, an audio recording and other evidence in 
addition to their expert testimony. Ellington presented extensive 
evidence as well and relied on the testimony of their expert William 
Skelton. Additionally the court granted the defense request for a jury 
view of the scene. 
While Ellington attempts to focus on the split second decision prior 
to the crash and the dynamics of an accident scene created over a span 
of just a few seconds the jury was entrusted with examining the entirety 
of the morning's events. Ellington contends that his actions were based 
only upon an effort to escape and not with any intent to cause harm. 
This may be true to a certain extent; however, other factors were also 
evident. 
The jury had evidence that Ellington was angry with his pursuers. 
He had earlier demonstrated a tactic with his Blazer where he turned 
upon them and drove his vc;hicle in their direction in an apparent effort 
to run them off the road and out of his way. Evidence shows that just 
prior to the collisions he made a critical decision. Rather than continue 
westbound and to the relative safety of the state highway, or utilize his 
phone to call for help he chose a dangerous tact. Ellington turned his 
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Blazer around again and drove in the direction of his pursuers. This time 
any effort on his part to use his vehicle to scare the Larsons off the 
roadway resulted in different consequences. 
Regardless of the location of the Honda or Ellington's ability to 
perceive and react, his deliberate act of turning his vehicle into harms 
way sufficiently demonstrated to the jury the implied malice necessary to 
support the murder verdict. While the disputed evidence relating to the 
motion for a new trial arguably negates any intent initially to commit a 
battery upon the sisters in the Honda, other evidence supports the 
State's position that Ellington persisted with the use of force from his 
vehicle to drive the Honda out of his way. 
This court would be remiss not to express some concern about the 
integrity of the witness that has been called into question in this case. 
This is especially true when it pertains to a trained professional with the 
Idaho State Police. The citizens of this state should be entitled to expect 
the highest of standards from this institution. Any intentional or 
careless manipulation of the truth motivated to accomplish a perceived 
just or moral result is unacceptable. 
The court in this case has a limited snapshot of the inconsistent 
testimony of Fred Rice and therefore it is difficult to conclude that he has 
intentionally or carelessly attempted to mislead the Ellington jury. 
Certainly the defense has pointed out a valid basis upon which they 
might be able to impeach the testimony of Rice on the two issues. Debris 
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on the ground in one case helps locate the collision, yet in the present 
case the debris can not help at all. He testifies in the Ellington trial that 
there is no average perception reaction time in the world. In Ciccone Rice 
used a reaction time of three quarters of a second and the training 
materials upon which he relies and from which he teaches discuss a 
reaction time of 1.6 seconds. (Reaction and Perception paragraph 39) 
The impact of any impeachment on the foregoing issues 1s 
speculative. Rice would be given an opportunity to qualify or distinguish 
the perceived inconsistencies in his testimony as it may relate to the two 
cases. It should be noted that the main focus of the rebuttal by Rice 
related to the conservation of momentum calculations utilized by 
Skelton. This was addressed on subsequent rebuttal by Skelton. 
Ellington chose not to address the reaction time or debris field issue on 
cross examination or upon further rebuttal despite having Skelton's 
knowledge that both of those concepts were well established among 
experts in the field. 
In the final analysis the new evidence secured by Ellington would 
serve only to impeach the credibility of Rice and therefore fail to meet the 
materiality test under Drapeau. The offer by Rice only attempted to 
discredit Skelton. It is not even apparent that Rice was an effective 
witness.6 Skelton provided a ·very plausible explanation of his 
momentum calculations on rebuttal. The jury had already heard 
6 From the perception of the court it is likely that the only one impressed with the testimony of Fred Rice 
was Fred Rice. 
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testimony about reaction time and had an opportunity to consider the 
testimony about debris on the road in light of all the other physical 
evidence. There was sufficient evidence in this case to support the jury 
verdict. The new evidence obtained by the defense would not alter the 
outcome. The motion is denied. 
Dated this 13th day of March, 2009 
40 
John Patrick Luster 
District Judge 
Decision on Motion for New Trial (Newly Discovered Evidence) 14 04. 
I hereby certify that on the 16111 clay of March, 2009, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing DECISION ON MOTIO NFOR NEW TRIAL: NEWLY DISCOVERED 
EVIDENCE was sent via FAX to: 
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Idaho State Police 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report 
r- Report Information -J L__. ___ -=-=-=--=--=-._ ~..::..::....::=~----
Report Subject: COLLISION RECONSTRUCTION 
Date of Report: November I 7, 20 I 0 
Collision Location: NB US 93 @Fish Hatchery Road near MP 118.2 (Custer County) 
Investigating Officer: Master Corporal Wayne D. Scoggins 
'---------~~~~~~~~~~----------~ Pr·imary Investigation lnfonnation __j 
Police Agency: Idaho State Police 
Collision Date: November 11, 2010 
Police Case Number: II 0000816 
Operator (s): 
Vehicle I: 
KLEIN, MARC EDWARD 
DOB: 
Idaho OLN: UL100ll7A 
5575 Fish Hatchery Rd 
Mackay, ID 83251 
CP: (208) 589-0891 
Vehicle 2: 
TWITCHELL, JOR Y WILLIAM (Deceased) 
DOB: 
Idaho OLN: FAI08256K 
232 N Blaine 
PO Box 401 
Arco, 10 83213 
HP: (208) 527-3685 
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BALL, RYAN HILL 
DOB: 
482 N 3435 E 
Lewisville, ID 83431 
HP: (208) 520-0227 
Vehicle (s): 
Vehicle I: 
White 1988 Toyota pickup 
ID License: 7C9585 
VlN: JT4RN63A4J0202180 
Vehicle 2: 
Red 1995 Lincoln Continental 
fD License: 1089598 
VIN: ILNLM97V7SY699795 
Mentioned Police: 
TALBOT, MICHAEL (ChiefDeputy) 
LUMPKIN, LINDA (Dispatcher) 
Custer County Sheriff's Office 
PO Box 344 
Challis, ID 83226 
BP: (208) 879-2232 
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Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report 
Mentioned Others: 
SIMPSON, JEFF S. (Custer County Deputy Coroner) 
PO Box 1127 
Challis, ID 83226 
BP: (208) 940-1035 
L_ ______________ l_n_fo~•-·r_n_a_t•~·o_n __ A_n_a_l~y_s•_·s_l_s_B _ a_se_f_l_O_n ______________ ~ 
• Idaho Vehicle Collision Report 
• Photographs 
• Field Notes 
• Witnesses Statements 
• Measurements 
• Scale Diagram 
• Officer Synopsis 
• Coroner's Report 
• ISP Forensics Laboratory BAC test results (Klein) 
Synopsis of The Collision 
On November 11, 2010, at approximately 1845 hours, a two-vehicle fatality crash occmTed at the 
US 93/Fish Hatchery Road intersection, near milepost 118.2, in Custer County. Mr. Klein was 
traveling north on US 93 and Mr. Twitchell was traveling south. Mr. Klein crossed the 
centerline into the southbound lane, as he was preparing to turn lett onto Fish Hatchery Road, 
and collided head-on with Mr. Twitchell. 
Mr. Twitchell died because of injuries sustained in this crash. Mr. Klein was treated and 
released tor injuries sustained in this collision. After being released from the hospital, he was 
incarcerated in the Custer County jail tor felony vehicular manslaughter and driving under the 
influence of alcohol (excessive). 
45 
Page 3 
Idaho State Police 
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Foundation for Conclusions 
On November 17, 2010, I received and reviewed the packet for this collision (for further 
information, refer to ISP case #Il 0000816 supplement 0001 ). 
Highway Description: 





The shoulders are marked by 
painted solid white lines and 
the travel lanes are divided by 
painted broken yellow lines. 
At the crash scene, the 
highway has a 2.09% 
Fig 1: US 93/Fish Hatchery Rd - Facing South 
(Taken 11/12/10@ 1420) 
downgrade in the southbound direction and the left-hand curve has a 3.49% super 
elevation. It is bordered on both sides by gravel and grass and the terrain slopes slightly 
down from the road edge on both sides ofthe highway. 
• It was overcast and the road was dry when the crash occurred. 
• US 93 is constructed of 
asphalt, which is in good 
condition and the posted 
speed limit is 65 miles per 
hour. 
Roadway Evidence: 
The evidence referred to in this 
section runs from north to south. 
• Pre-collision skid and 
scufl'marks Fig 2: V2 Gouge Marks 
(Taken 11/12/10@ 1422) 
Page 4 
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Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis I~eport 
Neither vehicle left any discernable pre-collision skid or scutfmarks on the highway. 
• Post-collision gouge and scuff 
marks 
The Lincoln left four gouge 
marks in the asphalt, which 
also identified the area of 
impact. The marks were 
located in the southbound 
lane on the south side of the 
intersection, near the fogline, 
and were oriented from north 
to south. There was an oil 
trail starting south of the 
gouge marks that continued to 
the southbound road edge. 
Fig 3: V2 Rotational Scuffmarks 
(Taken 11/12/1 0) 
The Lincoln left three rotational scuftinarks starting near the road edge. The marks were 
approximately 46 feet long and ended approximately 15 feet north of the Lincoln's final 
uncontrolled resting position on the southwest side of the intersection. 
The Toyota pickup did not leave any discernable post-collision skid or scuftinarks. 
Vehicle Description and .Evidence: 
Vehicle 1: 
The white 1988 Toyota pickup was found 
at an uncontrolled rest position in the 
southbound lane, facing south, 
approximately 36 feet southeast of the point 
of impact. 
Master Corporal Scoggins did not note any 
obvious mechanical defects at the scene 
that would have contributed to this crash. 
Contact Damage 
• Bent front bumper 
Idaho State Police 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report 
• Hood bent 
• Left front quarter panel bent 
• Right tJ:ont quarter panel bent 
Induced Damage 
• Windshield broken (Driver's side contained a circular break and the glass was pushed 
outward indicating this was where Mr. Klein struck it with his head) 
• Left front door bent and rippled 
• Right front door bent and rippled 
• Radiator pushed in 
• Left front axle bent and broken 
Seat belts/ Airbags 
• A fully retracted driver's seatbelt and the broken windshield on the driver's side indicates 
Mr. Klein was not wearing his seatbelt when the crash occurred 
• This vehicle is not equipped with airbags 
Vehicle 2: 
The red 1995 Lincoln Continental was 
found at an uncontrolled rest position on 
the west side of the highway, facing 
northeast, approximately 77 feet south of 
the point of impact. 
Master Corporal Scoggins did not note any 
obvious mechanical defects at the scene 
that would have contributed to this crash. 
Contact Damage 
• Front bumper broken and partially 
detached 
• Lefl front quarter panel peeled away 
• Left front door bent 
• Left front tire flattened and axle broken 
Induced Damage 
• Detached radiator 
• Hood bent, rippled, and broken 
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• Oil pan bent and scratched 
NOTE: Fire department personnel removed the roof, partially cut away the driver's door, and 
the left "B" pillar in order to remove Mr. Twitchell from the vehicle. 
Seatbelts/ Airbags 
• There was no evidence EMS personnel cut the driver' s seatbelt in order to remove Mr. 
Twitchell from the vehicle and there were no marks on Mr. Twitchell's body to indicate 
he was wearing his seatbelt when the crash occurred. 
• This vehicle is equipped with airbags and they deployed . 
Occupant Kinematics and Injury: 
Vehicle I: 
Marc Edward Klein 
Mr. Klein was treated and released at the Lost River Medical Center in Arco for injuries 
sustained in the crash. The following external injuries were noted from his Custer County jail 
booking photograph: 
• Two lacerations on left cheek 
• Abrasion above left upper lip 
• Small abrasion right side of forehead 
• Circular abrasion on upper forehead (consistent with striking the windshield) 
• Abrasions on top of his head 
Vehicle 2: 
.lory William Twitchell 
Master Corporal Scoggins noted and photographed the following injuries at the Lost River 
Funeral Home in Arco: 
• Abrasion lower right abdomen 
• Laceration on top of head 
• Laceration on top of left shoulder 
• Multiple lacerations, abrasions, and burns starting on the upper left arm and running 
down to and including the lett hand 
Page 7 
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• Multiple fractures in both legs starting at the femur 
• Abrasions on the left side of face and a laceration under lefljaw 
• Lacerations on lett thigh, left knee, and left shin 
• Small laceration on right shin 





There was insufficient evidence at the scene to calculate either vehicle's collision speed. 
Time/Distance Analysis: 
Due to not having the collision speeds for either vehicle, a time/distance analysis was not 
pertormed. 
Statements: 
Marc Edward Klein 
Chief Deputy Talbot advised Mr. Klein of his Miranda rights after arriving at the Lost River 
Medical Center in Arco. Chief Deputy Talbot did not ask Mr. Klein any questions about the 
crash. However, Mr. Klein made the following spontaneous statements to Chief Deputy Talbot 
as he was being transported to the Custer County jail: 
Mr. Klein stated he was "fuc~ed" and that he really screwed up this time. He also said he didn't 
see the other vehicle and didn't remember the accident. At one point, Mr. Klein said he thought 
the other vehicle was in his lane and had hit him (tor further information, refer to Custer County 
Sheriffs Otlice case #1001117). 




Idaho State Police 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Re110rt 
Mr. Klein recognized Dispatcher Lumpkin and started talking to her about what happened. Mr. 
Klein stated he really screwed up and Dispatcher Lumpkin asked, "You did, why?" Mr. Klein 
stated he had killed someone (for further information, refer to Custer County Sheriff's Office 
case# I 00 1117). 
Ryan Hill Ball 
Mr. Ball stated he was traveling south on US 93, at approximately 1850 hours, when he came up 
on a crash at the US 93/Fish Hatchery Road intersection, involving a white Toyota pickup and a 
red Lincoln. He stopped to check on the drivers and contacted Mr. Klein first, who was still 
sitting in his pickup. Mr. Klein stated he was alright and then Mr. Ball went to check on Mr. 
Twitchell. Mr. Ball turned Mr. Twitchell's car off and made sure there wasn't any gasoline 
leaking from the tank. Mr. Ball asked an unidentified woman, who stopped, to stay with Mr. 
Twitchell and try to keep him talking. During this time, Mr. Klein exited his pickup and was 
sitting on the side of the road when Mr. Ball went back to talk to him. Mr. Ball kneeled down in 
front of Mr. Klein and asked if he needed anything. Mr. Klein stated he was cold and then asked 
Mr. Ball if he was the person he'd hit. Mr. Ball ad vised him he wasn't and that he was there to 
help. During the conversation, Mr. Ball could smell beer on Mr. Klein's breath. Mr. Ball asked 
Mr. Klein if he'd been drinking and Mr. Klein admitted he had. Mr. Klein asked how Mr. Ball 
could tell. Mr. Ball informed him he could smell it on his breath and that there were beer bottles 
on the ground behind him. 
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location: US 93/Fish Hatcl:tery Rd (Custer County) 
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Idaho State Police 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report 
Vehicle Dynamics: 
• Mr. Klein was traveling north on US 93 and Mr. Twitchell was traveling south. 
• The physical evidence indicates Mr. Klein crossed the centerline into the southbound 
lane, as he was preparing to turn left onto Fish Hatchery Road, and collided head-on with 
Mr. Twitchell. 
• Mr. Twitchell's vehicle rotated counter-clockwise after the collision and traveled 
approximately 77 feet south of the point of impact. His vehicle came to rest, facing 
northeast, approximately 21 feet west of US 93. 
• Mr. Klein's vehicle rotated counter-clockwise after the collision and traveled 
approximately 36 feet southeast of the point of impact. His vehicle came to rest, facing 
south, in the southbound lane. 
Causational Factors 
1. At approximately 2000 hours, evidentiary blood samples were taken from Mr. Klein at the 
Lost River Medical Center in Arco. The Idaho State Police Forensics Laboratory tested Mr. 
Klein's blood samples with test results of0.279%. 
2. Mr. Klein failed to maintain his designated lane as he was preparing to turn left onto Fish 
Hatchery Road from US 93. 
Submitted by: Corporal Allen W. Bivins Date: November 18,2010 
Reviewed by: Sergeant Kevin White Date: November 23, 2010 
Reviewed by: Trooper Troy DeBie Date: November 24, 20 I 0 
Approved by: CRPM Fred Rice Date: November 30. 20 l 0 
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DECEMBER 13, 2010 
3 THE COURT: We'll go back on the record on 
4 this, the 13th day of December of 2010, Magistrate's 
5 Division, District Court for Custer County, and take up 
6 the matter set for preliminary hearing, State of Idaho 
7 vs. Marc Edward Klein, Case Number CR-2010-729. 
8 Recognize for the record, he is present together with 
9 his counsel, Mr. Oleson, and recognize for the record 
JO that Ms. Glen is present on behalf of the State. This 
11 matter is set for a preliminary hearing with regards to 
12 a vehicular manslaughter. 
13 Now, I recognize for the record that there 
14 are several folks in the audience; and obviously, if 
15 you're not a witness, this courtroom is open to the 
16 public. I realize that this case is a highly charged 
17 case and that there are emotions that go with cases like 
18 this. I would just ask each one of you to conduct 
19 yourselves as ladies and gentlemen; and when there's 
~0 testimony, I don't want reaction from the crowd. And if 
Z1 there's an overreaction from the crowd, that would then 
22 give me cause to have you removed from the courtroom; 
23 and I don't want to do that. I don't want to go there. 
Z4 I understand folks want to hear this case and that 


























close to the door here so the bailiff can find you 
easily when the State calls you to testify. 
MS. GLEN: Yes, sir. On the record, the 
people who the State would be calling to testify would 
be Trooper Bivins from the Idaho State Patrol; Deputy 
Tilman from the Custer County Sheriffs office; 
Mr. Randy Ivie, who's an EMT; and the State's first 
witness is going to be Mr. Ryan Ball, who's sitting here 
in the red sweatshirt. 
THE COURT: Okay. All others that were 
identified other than Mr. Ball, if you could please just 
wait outside the courtroom; and you'll be called when 
it's your turn to testify. 
Ms. Glen, are you prepared and ready to 
proceed? 
MS. GLEN: Yes, Your Honor, the State's 
ready. 
THE COURT: Do you have any preliminary 
motions in this matter? 
MS. GLEN: I believe that Mr. Oleson has 
already made the motion to exclude witnesses. The State 
has no other motions. 
THE COURT: Okay. You may call your first 
3 
j24 witness. 




















































ivir. Oieson, dfe you prepared and ready to 
proceed at this time? 
MR. OLESON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you have any preliminary 
motions? 
MR. OLESON: Just exclusion of witnesses, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Glen, do you have a 
designated lead investigator in this matter? 
MS. GLEN: I do, Your Honor. That would be 
Trooper Wayne Scoggins, who's sitting to my left. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any objection to him 
remaining in the courtroom? 
MR. OLESON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, your objection's 
overruled. She's entitled to have her lead investigator 
at counsel table. 
Mr. Oleson, do you have any witnesses that 
you intend to call in this matter? 
MR. OLESON: Not at this time, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Glen, if you could 
identify those. Just ask them to leave other than your 
first witness that you intend to call. And I'd ask 
those folks that are waiting to testify just to remain 
2 
4 
calls Mr. Ryan Ball. 
THE COURT: Mr. Ball, please come forward 
right up here, raise your right hand, be sworn by Madam 
Clerk. 
(Witness sworn) 
THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated 
right up here in the witness chair. I'd ask you -- that 
microphone will move around and is adjustable. I would 
ask you to please get up as close to or adjust it so 
it's close to you so that we can get a clear record. 
And I would remind you further that this is an 
electronic record. So if you're asked a question that 
asks for a "yes" or "no" answer, please answer "yes" or 
"no," not "uh-huh" or "huh-uh." And if I remind you 
about that, I'm not scolding you. I'm just making sure 
we get a good record. Okay? All right. Thank you. 
Go ahead, Ms. Glen. 
MS. GLEN: Thank you. 
RYAN BALL, 
having been first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. GLEN: 
Q. Would you please state your name and spell yo1 
last name for the recording? 
A. Ryan Ball. And B-a-1-1. 






Q. What do you do for work, 
A. 1 own a trucking company. 
Q. Out of where? 
4 A. Out of Rigby, Idaho. 
5 Q. Do you have regular customers in the area of 
6 Challis? 
7 A. It's Clayton, Thompson Creek Mining Company. 
8 Q. And what kind of truck do you drive when you're 
9 driving the trucks for Clayton? 
. 0 A. '07 Peterbilt. 
11 Q. Big semi? 
2 A. Yeah. 
,3 THE COURT: "Yes" or "no," please. 
14 THE WITNESS: Oh. Yes. 
.5 THE COURT: Thank you. 
r6 MS. GLEN: Thank you. 
17 Q. (BY MS. GLEN) On the 11th of November of this 
8 year, can you please tell me what you were doing in the 
19 late afternoon, early evening? 
~0 A. I loaded up to Thompson Creek and was headed back 
!1 to Idaho Falls. 
22 Q. And what road were you taking? 
13 A. Highway 93. 
!4 Q. Did you happen to see a red Lincoln between 
25 Clayton and Mackay? 
1 of me on my side with the hazards, so it kind of warned 
2 me to slow down. I didn't know what, you know, had 
3 happened yet. And there was some headlights on the 
4 northbound side, so I figured either somebody had hit a 
5 deer, elk, or we had an accident ahead. 
6 Q. So what did you do? 
7 A. Just slowed down coming up on it. Then I started 
8 seeing silhouettes moving. I could see that there was a 
9 vehicle in the road. 
10 Q. What happened next? 
11 A. I pulled over, put my hazards on, got out, walked 
12 up to a silver Dodge. The guy in that vehicle, I asked 
13 him if he was -- had called the cops. He said yeah. He 
14 was on the phone with them. 
15 So I approached a-- it was either a white 
16 or a tan older pickup. Asked the driver if he was okay. 
17 He said yes, he was. Asked him if he could turn off his 
18 ignition. He said it was. 
19 And then I proceeded over to the car. 
W Somebody handed me a flashlight so we could check to see 
l1 if there was anything leaking out of it. Got to it, 
1.2 checked it out. It wasn't leaking anything. Asked the 
~3 guy if his ignition was off. He said no. And so I-
24 reached in, shut it off, proceeded to have a 
'?5 conversation with him. He admitted he was in a lot of 
5 
7 
1 A. Highway 93. I ·· he was -- he came up 
2 to me just south of the canyon down the road here. 
3 Q. Okay. And did you notice anything unusual or 
4 specific about his driving pattern? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. Did you see that vehicle again? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. When did you see it? 
9 A. At the accident. 
10 Q. Where was this? 
11 A. I think it was Fish Hatchery Road. 
12 Q. Do you know whether or not that's in Custer 
13 County, Idaho? 
14 A. I have no clue. 
15 Q. Okay. That's okay. So tell me, about what time 
16 did you get up to the place where this accident or crash 
17 happened? 
18 A. About 6:45. 
19 Q. And--
20 THE COURT: a.m. or p.m.? 
21 THE WITNESS: p.m. 
22 THE COURT: Thank you. 
6 
23 Q. (BY MS. GLEN) When you approached the scene, wha 
24 were you doing and what were you seeing? 
25 A. I came up on the scene, there was a vehicle ahead 
1 pain and wanted me to get him out. I told him I 
2 couldn't do that. Tried to keep him conscious and 
3 aware. 
4 Went to -- went -- I headed back to my truck 
5 to go get my gloves so I could pull the windshield away 
6 from his face. There was a lady standing there. I was 
7 on the passenger side talking to him. There was a lady 
8 on the driver's side that was rubbing his back and 
9 talking to him and making sure he -- he kept trying to 
10 reach for his seat lever to lay himself back to relieve 
11 the pressure off of his chest, so she was helping with 
12 making sure he didn't do that. 
13 And I was headed back to the truck and ran 
14 into the driver of the pickup. He was kind of walking 
15 around. We got him to the side of the road. He sat 
16 down, looked a little messed up, had about a 
17 golf-ball-size mark on his left cheek. Asked him if he 
18 was all right. He said yeah, he was pretty good. 
19 That's when I was pretty close to him. I got-- kneeled 
20 down in front of him, got real close to his face, could 
21 smell that he had alcohol on his breath. Asked him if 
22 he'd been drinking. He admitted he had. Asked me how I 
23 knew how, how he-- or how he had been drinking. And I 
24 said I could smell it on him. And there were beer 
25 bottles laying behind him. And he asked me why that 
8 
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1 mattered. I said, "Well, you know, in an 
2 accident, so that's going to be a factor there." And 
3 then he asked me if I was a cop. I said no, I wasn't. 
4 He then asked if I was the person that he'd hit, and I 
5 said no. And about that time he said he was cold. 
6 So the EMT showed up. I went -- she was a 
7 brunette. That's all I know. She walked up. I asked 
8 her if she could get a blanket. She ran back to the 
9 ambulance to get him a blanket. And about that time 
.0 they escorted him in, and he was off. 
11 Q. So can you please tell me, at 6:40 p.m. on that 
. 2 night what were the light conditions when you got to the 
.3 crash scene? 
A It was dark. 14 
:5 Q. And did you see anybody else's lights aside from 
·16 the hazard lights on the silver Dodge? 
17 A Yeah. I think it was a -- it was on the 
i8 northbound side. It was a -- like a Volkswagen, I 
19 think, like a Bug. And I think there was a silver car. 
10 Q. Now, you talked about an older pickup that might 
!1 have been white or tan. Can you please tell me where 

















A. It was facing southbound in the southbound lane. 
Q. And how many people were in that? 
A. There was one in it when I got up to it. 
Q. You indicated that after you had stopped to talk 
to the driver of the car, who was stuck in the car, you 
went back to talk to the person who was driving the 
white or the tan pickup; is that right? 
A I was actually headed back to my truck to get a 
pair of gloves so I could go help pull the windshield 
away from his face. It was the guy in the car. It was 
kind of bugging him. It was really close to him. 
That's when I ran into the driver of the pickup. He was 
moving around, and it was -- we tried getting him over 
to the side of the road because there was no lights. We 
didn't want anybody coming through and hitting him. 
Q. So you said you got pretty close and you kneeled 
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identified as the defendant? 
A. Within about two feet. 
Q. You said you smelled an odor of alcohol or 
something like that. Have you been around people who 
have been drinking before? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how familiar are you with the smell of 


























































Q. Wh this one person? 
A. Sitting behind the -- or in the driver's seat. 
Q. You said this person had -- looked kind of messed 
up, had a scratch or something on his left cheek? 
A. Yeah. It looked like he'd hit something with his 
left side of his face. 
Q. Do you see that person in the courtroom today? 
A Yes, sir-- or yes, ma'am. 
Q. That's okay. Can you please tell me where he's 
sitting and what he's wearing? 
A To my right in the orange . 
MS. GLEN: If the record would reflect that 
the witness has indicated the defendant? 
THE COURT: Very well. 
Q. (BY MS. GLEN) So you talked about the driver of 
the other car, who was in pain. Can you tell me where 
that car was stopped when you arrived? 
A. It was in the -- it was off to the right hand --
or on the southbound shoulder, I guess you'd say, down 
in the gutter. 
Q. And had you reached the town of Mackay yet? 
A No. 
Q. So this crash occurred on Highway 93 between 
Challis and Mackay? 
A. Yes. 
12 
Q. When it came to your conversation with the 
defendant about asking him if he'd been drinking and he 
said he had been, did he make any statements to you 
about how much he'd been drinking or where he'd been 
drinking? 
A. He just said he'd been drinking that day. 
Q. You'd indicated, Mr. Ball, that you had seen some 
beer bottles or beer cans or beer containers somewhere 
in the area. Can you please tell me where you saw 
those? 
A They were roughly about-- they were right below 
the passenger side door on the pickup. 
Q. Could you tell whether they were full or empty? 
A. No, I couldn't. 
Q. Do you remember how many there were or what kin• 
they were? 
A. Looked like a Budweiser. From what I could see, 
there was one on the ground right there. 
Q. Anything coming out of it or was it-- did it 
look empty to you? 
A. Looked empty. 
Q. How long did you stay at the scene? 
A. Hour and-15 minutes. 
Q. How did you -- it seems to be a pretty precise 
notation of how long you stayed there. How do you know 




2 A. I have to fiii out a logbook, so I've got that, 
3 you know. 
4 Q. And by the time that you left the scene, who else 
5 either -- who had left the scene as well? 
6 A. The driver of the car. They'd got him out by 
7 then. 
8 Q. And the driver of the pickup was gone as well? 
9 A. Yes. 
() MS. GLEN: I have no further questions of 
11 this witness, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Glen. 
.3 Mr. Oleson. 
14 MR. OLESON: Thank you. 
5 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
t6 BY MR. OLESON: 
17 Q. Mr. Ball, you said the red car passed you on the 
8 south side of the canyon? 
19 A. Yes. 
~0 Q. So that's after going through the canyon or after 
!1 going over the summit? 
22 A. After going through the canyon. 
:3 Q. Between the canyon and the summit? 
!4 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Okay. When did you first see this car coming up 
15 
1 Q. That was before you picked up speed again, I'm 
2 assuming? 
· 3 A Yeah. 
4 Q. Okay. Did he --when's the next-- the last time 
5 you saw that car, then? 
6 A. I think it-- well, it was before the hill. I'm 
7 not real familiar with the area, so --
& Q. Okay. 
9 A. There's a kind of a long grade, and that's where 
10 I start slowing down again. 
11 Q. Before you start going up the summit? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q. Okay. So the car passed you and then just 
'4 basically left you there? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Okay. And then the next time you saw the car was 
17 at Fish Creek Road? 
i8 A Yes. 
19 Q. Did any other cars pass you in between the time 








THE COURT: And just for purposes of the 
record, Mr. Oleson, I believe he testified it was Fish 
Hatchery Road. 



















































A. It was before the canyon. 
Q. Before the canyon? 
A. Yeah. 
14 
Q. How fast were you driving? I'm assuming 65, the 
speed limit? 
A. When he come around -- oh. When he passed me or 
when he came up behind me? 
Q. Either way. 
A. When he came around me, I was doing about 55. 
Q. Okay. Before you reached the canyon, I'm 
assuming you were doing about 65 --
A. Yes. 
Q. -- across the flats? And he was coming up behind 
you? 
A. Well, he was back there. He wasn't gaining on 
me. 
Q. He wasn't gaining on you? 
A. No. 
Q. So you can't say what his speed was roughly whih 
he was driving? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. And then he passed you after you got 
through the canyon while you were doing 55? 
A. Yeah. 
THE COURT: That's okay. Just so the 
record's clear. 
MR. OLESON: Okay. 




Q. Okay. And you don't remember any other cars 
passing you? 
A. No. 
Q. And you believe you came on the scene at about 
6:45? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many other people and vehicles were on the 
scene when you stopped at Fish Hatchery Road? 
A. There were three. 
Q. Three including the two that were involved in the 
accident or three --
A. There would be five total with the two in the 
accident. 
Q. And one you said was a Dodge pickup? 
A. Yes. 
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Southbound shoulder anyway 
On the southbound shoulder. Facing south? 
Yes. 
Q. And that pickup hadn't passed you at any time? 
A. No. 
Q. And then there was two in the northbound -- on 
7 the northbound shoulder, I'm assuming? 
8 A. Yes. 





A. A silver car. I don't know what kind it was. 
Q. And how many individuals were out there? 
A. Seven . 
Q. There were seven people there including the 
14 individuals in the accident? 
5 A. Nine . 
• 6 Q. Does that include yourself or not include 
17 yourself? 
8 A. No. Without me. 
17 
19 Q. Okay. So who are these seven individuals? We've 
~0 got one that's in the Dodge. Where were the other six? 
!1 A. In-- they were walking around. I don't know who 
22 was in what. 
~3 Q. Okay. Were there any-- was there anybody over 
!4 by the Toyota pickup? 
25 A. Yes. 
19 
1 Q. Did you hear anything she said or the driver said 
2 to her? 
3 A. No. 








A. I know the passenger side was. 
Q. What about the driver's side? 
A. Not sure. 
Q. And then you went from the Toyota to the red car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And were there individuals around the red car? 
A. No. 
2 Q. You were the only one that was over there. So 
13 where were these other five individuals, just wandering 
·4 around? 
.5 A. The four of them approached me in between the 
16 pickup and the car. 
7 Q. Okay. And do you remember what they-- who they 
8 were? 
19 A. No. 
0 Q. Male? Female? 
, 1 A. All male. 
22 Q. Okay. Ages? Do you have approximate ages? 
3 A. 30 to 40. 









3 Q. Approximate ages? One female. What did she look 
4 like, do you remember? 
5 A. I think she had short blond hair. She was on the 
6 other side of the pickup. I can't give you a body 
7 description. 
8 Q. Okay. "Other side" meaning passenger side or 
9 driver's side? 
10 A. Driver's side. 
11 Q. So she was on the driver's side. So when you 
12 came up to the Toyota pickup, you were on the passenger 
13 side? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Were any of the doors open? 
16 A. No. 






Q. You noticed that later? 
A. Yes. 
22 Q. Okay. So you were on the passenger side. There 
23 was a female on the driver's side. Was she speaking 
24 with the driver of the Toyota? 
25 A. Yes. 
A. Wearing camo. 
Q. Okay. All four of them were? 








Q. Three were wearing camo? What about the fourth? 
A. Gray something. It was like a gray hoodie. 
Q. Okay. So there should be one other individual, 
7 then. Who was that person? Where were they at? 
8 A. He was kind of standing in between the pickup and 
9 the car. 
10 Q. A male, then? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Anything about him that you can remember? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Don't remember what he was wearing or anything? 
15 A. Coat. 
16 Q. Just a coat? 
17 A. Heavier set guy. 
18 Q. And so then when you walked back over to the car, 
19 there was only one female there? 
20 A. Yeah. 
21 Q. So when you walked back over to the car--
22 THE COURT: "Yes" or "no." 
23 THE WITNESS: Oh. 
24 
25 
THE COURT: "Yes" or "no," please. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
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1 Q. (BY MR. OLESON) So whe ..,4alked back over to 
2 the car, the female followed you over there? 
3 A No. 
4 Q. You were by yourself over at the car? 
5 A. Well, there was -- most of the guys went over 
6 there. 
7 Q. Most of the guys? 
8 A. Yeah. 
9 Q. Guys and the female? 
!0 A. No. 
11 Q So she stayed with the Toyota? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Okay. And then you spoke to the driver of the 
14 car? 
15 A. Yes. 
i6 Q. Okay. Did he say anything to you other than he 
17 hurt? 
18 A. No. 
19 a. Okay. He didn't make any comments that you 
!0 heard? 
!1 A. No. 
22 a. Didn't say anything about driving or anything 
13 about the accident? 
~4 A. No. 























a. Idea? Three, four, maybe more vehicles? 
A. There was quite a few. They weren't really my 
concern. 
a. Well, I understand. And I'm not trying to put 
you on the spot. I'm just trying to figure out who all 
may have been there as a witness. 
A. There were a lot. I -- it's just -- you know, it 
was kind of a collective deal. More and more people 
keep showing up, I mean. 
Q. So this brunette showed up at the car, and she 
wasn't one of the original seven? 
A. No. 
Q. And she was on the driver's side? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was the driver's side window open? 
A Yes. 
Q. What about the passenger side? 
A I don't know. 
Q. You were on the passenger side, though? 
A I was talking to him through the windshield. 
Q. Okay. So the front windshield? 
A Yes. 
Q. And was it pretty much gone, then, or--
A It was laid in towards him. 124 
25 Q. Okay. So broken out of the frame? 
23 
22 
1 A >Nith him for awhile, trying to calm 
2 him dO\AJn. 
3 a. Okay. And at some -- and then you went to get 
4 your gloves? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 a. Were you at the driver's side or the passenger 
7 side? 
8 A. Passenger side. 
9 a. Okay. Was there anybody at the driver's side? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 a. Who was that? 
12 A. The brunette. 
13 Q. Was this the same female that was--
14 A. No. 




A. Other people showed up during. 
Q. Oh. So they're -- in the meantime, other 
19 vehicles started showing up? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Okay. So how many other vehicles showed up and 
22 how many other individuals showed up? Because you're 
23 the only witness that's been listed. That's why I'm 
24 asking, so --
25 A. There was quite a few. 
24 
1 A Yeah. 
2 Q. Okay. And that's when you went to get your 
3 gloves? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q. And then as you went to get your gloves, you 
6 noticed another individual wandering around that you 
7 thought was the driver? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q. Okay. And you sat him down and spoke to him? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 a. And then you said in your prior testimony that 
12 then they took him? 
13 A Yeah, the EMTs did. 
14 Q. Okay. So when did the EMT's show up? 
15 A Probably 15, 20 minutes after I'd been there. 
16 a. And then they immediately came over to where yoL 
17 were speaking with the individual on the side of the 
18 road? 
19 A No. 
20 Q. Okay. So how long-- I'm trying to get some time 
21 frames down. So you show up on the wreck, you go spea~ 
22 to the driver of the Toyota? 
23 A Uh-huh. 
24 Q. Then you go over to the car, speak to that 
25 driver. How much time frame goes on in that? 
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1 A 10, 15 minutes. 
2 Q. 10, 15 minutes. Okay. And then you start 
3 speaking with an individual that you thought was the 
4 driver of the Toyota? 
5 A. Yes. 
25 
6 Q. And how long were you talking with him before the 
7 EMT's showed up? 
8 A Three, four minutes. 
9 Q. Okay. Then the EMT's showed up, and the EMT's 
0 took him to the ambulance? 
11 A Yes. 
2 Q. Okay. Was there any law enforcement there at 
• 3 that time? 
14 A Yes. 
5 Q. Did law enforcement show up before or after the 
t6 EMT's? 
17 A Right before. 
8 Q. Where did law enforcement first go? 
19 A He headed for the pickup. 
~0 Q. Okay. Was there anybody in the pickup at that 
!1 time? 
22 A No. 
:3 Q. And then after he went to the pickup and there 
!4 apparently was nobody there, then where did he go? 
25 A Towards the car. 
27 
1 A. No. 
2 Q. You just kind of stood there? 
3 A. Well, I went back towards my truck. 
4 Q. And you didn't leave? 
5 A No. 
6 Q. Did any of the other individuals leave before you 
7 left? 
8 A. Yeah. 
9 Q. The first seven people who were there, had they 
10 left--
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. -- before you did? Did you ever see law 
13 enforcement speak to any of them? 
!4 A. No. 
15 Q. No? They just spoke to you? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q. And when did they speak to you? 
18 A. When I got there. 
19 Q. When you got where? 
. !0 A. On the accident site. 
21 Q. Law enforcement spoke to you on the accident 
22 site? 
!3 A. Oh. Are you talking individuals or law 
24 enforcement? 
'!5 Q. Law enforcement. 
1 Q. And .::ver come over to where you were 
2 speaking with the individual on the side of the road? 
3 A. He was gone by then. 
4 Q. The officer was gone? 
5 A. No. The individual. 
26 
6 Q. Okay. Did you ever see the individual get out of 
7 the white Toyota? 
8 A No. 
9 Q. Did you ever see which door was opened on the 
10 Toyota? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. So you never saw anybody get out of that other 
13 vehicle? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. What time approximately did this red car pass you 
16 initially, do you remember? 
17 A. Probably about 6:20, maybe 6:25. 
18 Q. Okay. So about 20 minutes earlier? 
19 A. Yeah. 
20 Q. And then you -- what did you do after they took 
21 the individual you were talking to to the ambulance? 
22 Where did you go? 
23 A. I just kind of stepped back and got out of the 
24 way. 
25 Q. Did you go back over towards the red car? 
1 A. Okay. Yeah, that's where I talked to them at. 
2 Q. At your truck? 
3 A. Accident site. 
4 Q. Okay. How long after everybody else left? 
5 A. 20 minutes. 
28 
6 Q. So you went back to your truck and sat there for 
7 about 20 minutes before anybody talked to you? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Okay. After you left, when the individual you 
10 were talking to was taken to the -- with the EMT's, you 
11 then walked back to your truck? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. How long after the point where you walked back to 
14 your truck did law enforcement come talk to you? 
15 A About 10 minutes. 
16 Q. About 10 minutes. And when law enforcement 
17 talked to you, the other seven people that were at the 
18 scene had already left? 
19 A. Yes. 




A. No. They left before law enforcement got there. 
Q. So there was a lady -- the blond lady that was 
24 speaking to the driver of the Toyota was gone before law 
25 enforcement got there? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. And the thiee guys v-vearing camo vvere all gone 
3 before law enforcement got there? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And the guy wearing the gray hoodie was gone 
6 before law enforcement got there? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. What about the brunette that was at the red car? 
9 A. I'm not sure. 
. 0 Q. You don't know if she was there or not? 
11 A. Huh-uh. 
2 Q. And the guy that was in the Dodge, he was gone 
• 3 before law enforcement got there? 
14 A. No. He was still there. 
·5 Q. So he was the only one still there of the 
16 original seven? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q. Do you know when those individuals left? 
19 A. I'm not sure. 
"!0 Q. Okay. Can you testify that one of those seven 
.!1 individuals was not the driver that was removed from the 
22 vehicle prior to your appearance? 
"!3 A Yes. 
!4 Q. You can. How do you know that? 


























of the southbound lane? 
A More towards the fog line. 
Q. To the fog line? 
A Yeah. 
31 
Q. Okay. When you first went there, neither door 
was open? 
A No. 
Q. You then went-- and you're parked north of this, 
right? 
A Yeah. 
Q. North of the intersection? 
A (No audible response). 
Q. Okay. So you walked clear to the south to speak 
to the driver in the Toyota? 
A Yes. 
Q. You then walked back to the north or did you go 
further south to go to the car? 
A South. 
Q. So then you went south to the car, then you went 
back to your truck, you went to the north, and this 
individual -- there was an individual out of the truck? 
A Yeah. 
Q. Which side of the truck did he get out of? 
A Driver's side. 
30 
1 Q. H you know that there wasn't a different 
2 driver? 
3 A. There was only one guy with a big ol' knot on the 
4 side of his face. 
5 Q. Okay. Of the eight people that you seen when yo 
6 got there? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Okay. 
9 A Nine actually . 
10 Q. Nine? 
11 A Seven people, two drivers. 
12 Q. Okay. And you're saying that individual is right 
13 here next to me? 
14 A Sitting to your left. 
15 Q. Okay. You're certain of that? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q. So this Budweiser beer bottle, when did you see 
18 it, later, then? 
19 A When I kneeled down to talk to him. 
20 Q. Oh. So it was on the side of the road? 
21 A Yeah. 
22 Q. It wasn't by the pickup? 
23 A It was right below the pickup. 
24 Q. Okay. I guess I've got to go through this. The 


























A. Not that I could see. 
Q. Okay. And you're saying there was a beer bottle 
on the ground under the driver's side? 
A. Passenger side. 
Q. Did the individual you thought was driving ever 
go over to the passenger side? 
A I don't know. I wasn't watching him. 
Q. You never seen him over there? 
A. No. 
Q. Are you somehow trying to testify this beer 
bottle came out of that pickup or did it come out 
just -- it was just there from somewhere? 
A It was there. 
Q. So you don't know if it has anything to do with 
coming out of the pickup? 
A No. I've never -- I didn't see it come out. 
Q. Okay. Were there any beer bottles in the pickup 
that you noticed? 
A I didn't look in it. 
Q. And the vehicle was facing southbound? 
A Yes. 
Q. And so this individual you spoke to had got out 
of the driver's side? 
A Yes. 124 
'25 Q. Driver's side. Was the passenger side open? 25 Q. Walked around over to the shoulder, was on the 
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1 passenger side of the vehicle wh spoke to him? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Okay. By the passenger door? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Okay. And you wrote a statement? 
6 A. Yes. 
.7 Q. In your statement you said he had beer bottles on 






Q. But you hadn't seen them either? 
A No. 
4 MR. OLESON: I have no further questions. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you. 
6 Anything further, Ms. Glen? 
7 MS. GLEN: Yes, sir. 
8 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
9 BY MS. GLEN: 
34 
A. Yes. 10 Q. Mr. Ball, discussing the time frame when you $aw 
11 Q. -- that you're testifying to that was under the 
2 passenger door? 
11 the red car pass you between Grand View Canyon and the 
12 summit, how would you characterize how this person 
.3 A. Yes. 13 passed you? 
14 Q. Okay. Were there other beer bottles in the 14 A. He did it legally. He waited till it was a 
5 bottle pit? 15 passing zone, came around me, and -- I mean --
·16 A I didn't look. 16 Q. Did you have any concerns about his speed? 
17 Q. You didn't look. Okay. So that part of your 17 A No. 
8 statement's not accurate? 18 Q. I think Mr. Oleson is trying to determine whether 
19 A I guess if I wrote "bottles." 
~0 Q. Okay. And would they have been behind him or 
~1 just under the door? 
19 or not the person that you saw behind the driver's side 
20 of the pickup and the person that you saw on the side of 
21 the road is the same person. Can you tell me if that 
22 A They were behind him but right next to the 22 was the same person or not? 
13 pickup. 23 A Yes. 
!4 Q. Okay. And you didn't see those when you 24 Q. And was it the same person? 



























Q. You seemed to have some ambivalence when it came 1 
to the question that Mr. Oleson asked you about what 2 
time did the person in the red car pass you. You said 3 
6:20, 6:25. Can you really be sure of the time? 4 
A. No. It's a rough estimate. 5 
Q. So you also indicated on your cross-examination, 6 
Mr. Ball, that a lot of the other people who were there 7 
initially when you arrived had already left by the time 8 
law enforcement officers arrived. Why did you stay? 9 
A Doing the right thing. 10 
Q. What do you mean by that? 11 
A Kind of karma. What goes around comes around. 12 
You can do the right thing. Maybe when I need help, 13 
somebody will be there to help me. 14 
MS. GLEN: I have no further questions. 15 
THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further, 16 
Mr. Oleson? 17 
MR. OLESON: No, Your Honor. 18 
THE COURT: Thank you. You may step down. 19 
I'm going to place the record on hold for 20 
just a moment. 21 
(Pause) 22 
THE COURT: Resume the preliminary hearing 23 
in the matter of State vs. Klein. Was there any 24 
resolution of the other matter? 25 
MS. GLEN: At this point, no, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. GLEN: But thank you. 
THE COURT: Again recognize the defendant, 
defendant's counsel, and counsel for the State are 
present. You may call your next witness. 
MS. GLEN: Thank you, Your Honor. The State 
calls Mr. Randy Ivie. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Ivie, if you'd please 
come forward, raise your right hand, and be sworn by 
Madam Clerk. 
(Witness sworn) 
THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated 
here. Please adjust the microphone so it's comfortable 
but close enough that all can hear and we can get a good 
record. When asked for a "yes" or "no" answer, please 
answer "yes" or "no," not "uh-huh" or "huh-uh." Should 
I remind you you need to answer "yes" or "no," I'm not 
scolding you. I'm merely reminding you. 
Go ahead, Ms. Glen. 
MS. GLEN: Thank you. 
36 





2 having been first duiy sworn, testified as follows: 
3 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
4 BY MS. GLEN: 
5 Q. Please state your name and spell your last name 
6 for the record. 
7 A. It's Randy Ivie, I-v-i-e. 
8 Q. Mr. Ivie, where do you live? 
9 A. Mackay. 
.0 Q. And do you have any volunteer jobs that you 
11 perform for the community in Mackay? 
2 A. I am with the City of Mackay, South Custer Fire. 
,3 I'm their fire chief. And I am also an Advanced EMT 
14 with South Custer County Ambulance. 
·5 Q. Were you on call on the 11th of November of this 
16 year? 
17 A. Yes. 
.8 Q. Can you tell me whether or not you responded to 
19 any motor vehicle crashes? 
10 A. Yes. I responded to a multiple accident with 
!1 multiple injuries north of Mackay. 
22 Q. Exactly where was that? Can you please tell me? 
13 A. It was at the Fish Hatchery turnoff on 
!4 Highway 93. 

























A Troy and Bart grabbed some medical gear. I went 
straight to the car, done a real quick hands-on 
assessment on a gentleman sitting in the front seat of 
the car. I immediately called for South Custer Fire's 
crew, which had been dispatched also, to be prepared to 
do multiple extrication on an individual in the dark 
car. 
Q. Okay. And then what happened after that? 
A I also called for a helicopter, which I had put 
on standby prior to us arriving. I believe probably at 
that time I cut off an individual's shirt, done a quick 
assessment, found a heart rate in the upper 130, 140's. 
Gentleman was complaining to me that he couldn't 
breathe, "I can't breathe. I can't breathe. You need 
to get me out of here," and then was complaining of 
severe pain. 
My -- Troy and Bart at that time crawled in 
through the window on the passenger side. And the 
window, I guess they broke the window out and then 
crawled in through the passenger side; and they 
proceeded to do some hands-on work, stabilizing the 
neck, putting the neck collar on, kind of trying to do a 
23 little more thorough hands-on survey to really see what 
124 kind of injuries we had. 
25 Probably by that time our fire department 
39 
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1 A Cu ludhO. 
2 Q. Thank you. When you got there, can you please 
3 tell me what you saw? 
4 A. As we pulled up, there was a white pickup sitting 
5 in the middle of the highway facing south. There was a 
6 dark-colored car sitting kind of off the left-hand side 
7 of the highway, maybe 50, 75 feet off of the highway, 
8 facing probably northeast. There was a lady standing on 
9 the driver's side of that car, which would have been on 
10 the north side, waving her arms very frantically, 
11 wanting us to come to that particular car. 
12 Q. And how is it that you got to the scene? 
13 A By ambulance. 
14 Q. Who else was with you? 
15 A Troy Harris and Bart Wojciechowski. 
16 Q. And was that the only ambulance that was 
17 dispatched to the scene? 
18 A No. There was a second ambulance coming. 
19 Q. Do you know who was in that ambulance? 
20 A T.J. Park and Julie Buckwalter. 
21 Q. So who was driving your ambulances? 
22 A Troy Harris. 
23 Q. So when you arrived at the scene and you and yot 
24 ambulance crew saw this lady waving her hands at the 
25 side of the car, what happened next? 
1 had showed up; and I instructed them to cut the roof off 
2 of the car, you know, cut the driver's door off, proceed 
3 on to pulling the steering wheel and the dashboard so we 
4 could get this gentleman out. 
5 Probably in that time frame I left that 
6 particular car and went to see if there was another --
7 to see where the other individual was and what kind of 
8 shape he was in. So I went to our second ambulance, 
9 which had arrived, and I jumped in. There was one 
10 individual laying on the gurney in the ambulance. 
11 I asked, I think, T.J., you know, what he 
12 had found. 
13 Very quickly he said, "He's got a little 
14 facial injury." 
15 I said, "What is his vitals?" 
16 He had an elevated blood pressure. His 02 
17 sats were down just a little bit and his heart rate was 
18 up around 100, 110, I believe. So I told him then to 
19 get a nasal cannula on him and I'd be right back. 
20 So I went back to the dark car. By that 
21 time I believe our fire department had the roof cut off, 
22 was starting to work on taking the driver's door out. 
23 Then I believe I went back to our second 
24 ambulance probably at that time and checked to see how 
25 that patient was doing. His vital signs hadn't changed 
40 
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any. And so I instructed them to ,, co Lost 
Rivers Hospital and get him evaluated at that t1me and 
then went back to the car and started working on the 











Q. So when you got back to the other car after 
sending the second ambulance off, you said you started 














A Well, at that point in time I was trying to 
figure out how to get him out of the car with all the 
injuries that he had. Did a more thorough hands-on 
assessment, found that he was -- his upper left-hand 
side of his body was totally just smashed. His left arm 
from his wrist to his shoulder was bent in multiple 
directions. His left chest had some big abrasions on 
it, was starting to turn black. His left femur was 
turned in two different directions in two different 
places. And then that's as far as I could get because 
when I got to his knee, I couldn't find his lower legs. 
They were--
Q. Why not? 
A Well, they were turned vertical and shoved up 
underneath the dashboard. And the impact of the crash 
13 had shoved the engine and the dashboard, the steering 
Z4 wheel back quite a ways back into the -- inside the car. 
25 And so there was just no place to work in there to find 
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1 of the car and the steering wheel and the dash pulled 
2 out far away enough so that you could extricate the 


























Q. How did you get the person in the driver's 
side out? 
A Well, he -- as we progressed on, trying to 
untangle his legs out from underneath the dash, we 
started to realize that he -- his breathing really 
slowed down to virtually nothing. So we had put a --
what we call a KD device on him that would support his 
spinal column and his neck. And once we realized that 
he was probably going to die on us pretty -- in fact, he 
might have already had got to that point -- we rapidly 
just bodily pulled him out of the· car and slid him onto 
a backboard and moved him onto our gurney and took him 
into our ambulance. 
Q. Where were you taking him? 
A Well, we were headed to Lost Rivers Hospital with 
him. We were denied helicopters because helicopters 
were down for maintenance, they were down for weather. 
I think we tried three or four different helicopters and 
was unable to get any because of the weather or down for 
maintenance. So we were stuck at that point, you know, 
doing our own transport. Right shortly after we got him 
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1 what we tu nnd. 








of bending at the knees and having the knees bend dow 














A. Yeah. Instead of his legs being out like that, 
his legs were turned and stuffed up underneath the 
dashboard up inside. 
Q. So once you couldn't find his knees, what 
happened next? 
A. Well, I had -- I -- we were having problems 
trying to get the steering wheel and the dashboard 
pulled off of him. Normally we run a set of chains out 
over the front of the car and do some cribbing to kind 
of shore that up and hook hydraulic tools to it, and we 
can usually pull the steering wheel and the dash up out 
of the car pretty readily. But as we started to pull, 
the integrity of the front of the car was so damaged 
that all it did is pulled the front of the car up 
instead of the steering wheel out. So that caused us a 
delay because then we had to find a four-wheel-drive 
pickup that we could back down in there, and we tied to 
the back of the pickup and blocked all the wheels up on 
23 it and then was able to pull the steering wheel and the 
24 dash. 
25 Q. So were you eventually able to get the front part 
1 in the ambulance, you know, we were bagging him, 
2 · breathing for him, had a defibrillator on him. We 
3 were -- he was flatlined. We had an unshockable rhythm. 
4 And I got into contact with the doctor at Lost Rivers 
5 Hospital, Dr. Haskell, and explained to him how long we 
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6 had been -- what we had experienced on scene and what we 
7 were experiencing at the time; and he advised me that 
8 the patient had died and that we needed to get ahold of 
9 the coroner and take that patient to the mortuary rather 
10 than to Lost Rivers Hospital. 
11 Q. Was there ever any change in the patient betwee 
12 the time that you left the scene and the time that you 
13 arrived at the coroner's mortuary? 
14 A. Nothing other than that he just, you know, turned 
15 blue and just had a lot of vomit and stuff coming up out 
16 of his belly that we couldn't control. 
17 Q. Have you attended crash scenes where there hav 
18 been deaths before? 
19 A. Yes, I have. 
20 Q. Was the vomit and other bodily function 
21 consistent with deaths that you've seen occur? 




Q. Were you able to identify the person who was in 
the vehicle who passed away? 
A. No, I was not. I was not familiar with him at 
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1 the time. Later on, after we got h tne mortuary 
2 and the coroner got his wallet out, I realized then that 
3 it was a lady who had worked for me years ago, it was 
4 her husband. But I was not familiar with him. 
5 a. Can you please tell me how long it took the 
6 combined efforts of the ambulance and the fire 
7 department to extricate this driver of this --
8 A. I believe we were probably 55 minutes from the 
9 time we -- I think from the time we got the call until 
JO we got him out was about 55 minutes. I could be a 
11 little wrong there because I'm not sure if that included 
12 the time to get from Mackay to the Fish Hatchery 
13 turnoff. 
14 a. Okay. Thank you. 
15 MS. GLEN: I have nothing further for this 
i6 witness, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Oleson. 
l8 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
19 BY MR. OLESON: 
"lO Q. I'm sorry, sir. I didn't catch those times. 
Z1 What time were you dispatched? 
22 A I'd have to go back and look at the -- I think it 
13 was 6:55 or-- I'd have to go back and look at my log. 
!4 THE COURT: a.m.? p.m.? 
25 THE WITNESS: p.m. 





























had a chance to review your note; is that correct? 
A Sort of. 
Q. Okay. Do you remember what time you were 
dispatched? 
A 16:46. Or was it 18:46? I can't remember. 
Q. Okay. About 6:46? 
A Six, yeah. 
Q. 18:46, 6:46? 
A Yeah. 
a. That seems accurate to you? 
THE COURT: "Yes" or "no." 
A Yes. 
Q. (BY MR. OLESON) And what time did you finally 
leave the scene? 
A Well, I didn't look on that piece of paper there; 
but I think it was -- do you want me to come and get it 
and read it to you? 
THE COURT: No, no, no. We have a bailiff 
here. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
Q~ (BY MR. OLESON) Would your report help you on 
124 that? 
25 A Yes. 
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1 Q. ( OLESON) Did you do a report on this? 
2 A. Yes, I did. 
3 Q. And you have a log? 
4 A. Well, I have a state. I do a report on the state 
5 system, and she has a copy of that. 
6 Q. You didn't bring that with you today, your 
7 report? 
8 A. Yeah. She has a copy of it. 
9 MR. OLESON: Do you mind if I look at that? 
10 MS. GLEN: Brandon's got it. I didn't-- I 
11 just got it today. 
12 If we can put the record on hold, I'll go 
13 get that, Your Honor. I just received that today from 
14 Brandon Tilman and from Randy Ivie. 
15 THE COURT: Where is it? 
16 MS. GLEN: It's in the hallway with Brandon. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Let's take about a 
18 five-minute recess. Stand in recess. 
19 (Recess) 
20 THE COURT: ... December, 2010. Resuming thE 
21 matter of the preliminary hearing in State vs. Klein. 
22 Note for the record, the defendant, defendant's counsel, 
23 and counsel for the State have returned. Mr. Ivie has 
24 resumed the stand. 
25 I'll remind you, you're still under oath. 
Q. Refresh your memory? 
A Oh, you bet. 
MR. OLESON: Your Honor, if he may? 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to review 
that first, Ms. Glen? 





























hand that to him, please. 
THE WITNESS: If I had a micro lens. 
THE COURT: Here you go. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you very much. 
THE COURT: Two O's. 
MR. OLESON: I haven't reviewed it, Your 
Honor. I'm just assuming it's in his report, so --
THE WITNESS: It's-- we left at 19:58. 
Q. (BY MR. OLESON) Which is what time for most c 
us, 7:58? 
A 7:58, yep . 
Q. So approximately an hour later? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q. Okay. 
THE COURT: "Yes" or "no." 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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1 THE WITNESS: I'm 
2 Q. (BY t•1R. OlESOt~) Now, you testified that-- I 
3 guess I probably ought to get that report back. Now, 
4 you testified that the plan was to have air flight, Life 
5 Flight I guess you'd call it? 
6 A. Yeah. What we were hoping is, they would come in 
7 and land right alongside us and assist us. 
8 Q. When did you first start contacting for Life 
9 Flight? 
iO A. Probably -- we started discussing it probably 
11 three or four or five minutes into when we got the call 
12 going up the highway. 
J3 Q. Okay. And so you attempted to make contact with 
14 Life Flight? 
15 A. Well, the dispatcher did. We sent everything 
i6 through the dispatcher. 
17 Q. Okay. And when were you told that you would not 
!8 get Life Flight? 
19 A. We had probably been on the scene for, I don't 
10 know, 10 or 15 minutes. It's hard saying for me because 
~1 things were very chaotic at the time. I just know I was 
22 told that, "We're having problems finding you a 
,13 helicopter. We'll keep trying.• 
M Q. Okay. Did you ever get informed that you could 




















a difference in Mr. Twitchell's being with us today? 
A. No, I don't believe that it would have. I 
believe that he bled to death internally from the trauma 
that he sustained in that vehicle accident. 
Q. And did you do an autopsy? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. So you don't know the basis of his death? 
A. No, I don't. 
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Q. You don't know whether he bled to death or not? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Okay. You do not know the cause of 
Mr. Twitchell's death? 
A Traumatic trauma, that's -- that's it. 
Q. Did you do an autopsy? 
A No, I did not. 
Q. Okay. Are you qualified to make a determination 
as to cause of death? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. So you cannot testify as to 
1 A. No. c told that we couldn't get a 
2 helicopter. And vvc -vA,lere en route 'Nith the patient; and 
3 they said, "Possibly we might be able to get you a fixed 
4 wing." But it still hadn't left the ground. That still 
5 could have been another hour away, so--
50 
6 Q. Okay. I've been provided some dispatch logs, anc 
7 they indicate a state seal "MM" that talks about a 
8 helicopter. What is that? 
9 A. That is a central dispatch system out of Boise 
10 that the state communication center runs. 
11 Q. Okay. Did you ever talk to anybody at the 
12 state --
13 A. No, I did not. Everything was done out of Butte 
14 County. 
15 Q. So if the log indicates that there was a call 
16 from the state com and they were-- and Dispatch gave 
17 them Randy Ivie's name, Unit 2, as a ground contact, arE 
18 you telling me that they never contacted you? 
19 A. No, they did not. 
20 Q. So would it surprise you if there were log notes 
21 indicating there could have been a helicopter available? 
22 A. It would surprise me, yes, because we were told 
23 there was not one available. 
24 Q. If there would have been a helicopter available 




















been there, they could have tried, yes. 
Q. Okay. Now, are you the head of the EMT's or 
what's your qualifications? 
A I am an Advanced EMT. I have the most seniority, 
yes. I've been there the longest. 
52 
Q. Okay. Advanced EMT, and you have seniority? 
A Well, I've been there the longest, yes. 
Q. Okay. Is there like qualifications of-- or 
layering in the EMT's; or if you're an EMT, are you all 
equal footing? 
A We're all equal footing. 
Q. Okay. You just have been there the longest? 
A. Just been there the longest, yes. 
Q. Who's in charge when you show up to an accident 
you? 
A. The individual who has the most time. The 
Advanced EMT, yes. 
Q. So in this accident you were in charge? 
A. Correct. 
20 Mr. Twitchell's cause of death, can you? 20 Q. You were the one that made the decisions? 





A No. All I can testify is that he died. 21 
Q. Okay. And you can't testify as to whether or not 22 
other procedures could have been used which would have 23 
Q. Okay. Were there other things that, looking 
back, that you would have done if you could have? 
saved his life? 24 A. I don't know what else I could have done, no. I 
A Well, possibly, yeah. I guess if they'd have 25 did everything that I thought I could do, yes. 
~~~------------------~~------~--------------J-______ _ 
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1 Q. Okay. Now, in your • .te received in 
2 the break, there is a narrative at the back of that; and 
3 that lists a plan but appears that it's cut off. Do you 
4 know if there was writing that's part of any plan in 
5 your notes? 
6 A. The plan would be where we were taking him to. 
7 Q. Okay. And it starts out-- and I'll just tell 
8 you, it starts out, it says, "Treatment were 
9 administered as follows," and then it has-- appears to 
JO be a time, which has half a sentence. It's gone. It 
11 says "10:01," and then it has something. Was there 
12 anything after that? 
13 A. I'm not sure which form you're looking at. Are 
14 you looking at Jory's? 
15 MR. OLESON: Your Honor, if the witness 
16 could be shown that? 
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17 a. (BY MR. OLESON) What I'm asking, is there more 
18 report to this that we haven't been provided? 
19 A. This is Jory's report, and there would have been 
10 a little bit of a treatment at the bottom of that is 
!1 all. 
22 a. That's not on there, right? 
"!3 A. Right. Correct. 
~4 Q. Okay. 


























7:58, and it was 13 minutes later when you called it? 
A. Yeah. 
a. Okay. So he was alive in the ambulance? 
A. No, I don't believe he was. I believe he died in 
the car. And we -- he quit breathing in the car. We 
just had the KD and stuff on him. We yanked him out of 
the car at that time, got him on a backboard, and 
started doing CPR on him. 
a. So there were no vitals at all in --
A. No. 
Q. -- the ambulance? 
A. No. 
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a. Tell me what this means. It says, "At 19:01 the 
patient was found." 
A. I don't know. I'd have to look at what the 
context is of it. Let me see the report, and I'll tell 
you. 
Q. I'm assuming that's when you got on the scene? 
A. So is that in my narrative? 
a. Yes. I believe it's under "Objective." 
A. Well, at 19:01 is when I recorded the fact that 
he had a pulse of 140 and respirations at 40. So that 
was something that I had wrote on the back of my hand to 
1 how to get pn .. red off . 
2 Q. I'm assuming you can probably get that --
A. Yes. 
Q. -- and to the prosecutor? 





6 a. Okay. Is there any other reports other than that 
7 one and one on a Mr. Marc Klein? 
8 A No. 
9 Q. That's all the documentation you would have? 
10 
11 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Do you have any notes or anything else? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. What time was Mr. Twitchell extracted from the 
14 vehicle? 
15 A. I'd have to look at the report to see what time 
16 we left the scene. It was approximately maybe two 
17 minutes prior to leaving the scene. 
18 Q. You've already testified, that was at 7:58, so--
19 A Okay. 
20 Q. A couple of minutes, correct? 
21 A. So probably 7:56. 
22 Q. Okay. And what was the official time of death, 
23 do you know? 
24 A. I think we called it at 8:11. 
25 a. So he was extracted 7:56, you left the scene at 
56 
1 time you arrived on scene? 
2 A. Arrived on scene 19:01, yes. 
3 Q. Okay. Did you know any of the witnesses who wer 
4 on scene when you arrived other than the EMT's? 
5 A. The only one was Brandon Tilman, Custer County 
6 police officer, that I'm aware of. 
7 Q. So Brandon Tilman was there before you arrived? 
8 A. Just barely, yes. 
9 Q. Were there other individuals on the scene when 
10 you arrived other than EMT's or Mr. Tilman? 
11 A There was a lady standing alongside the car that 
12 was waving at me to come and do something. I did not 
13 recognize who that person was. 
14 a. Okay. Other than her? 
15 A Not that I recollect. 
16 Q. You don't recollect individuals or there could 
17 have been, you're not sure? 
18 A. There could have been. I have no idea. As I 
19 came up, I focused on the white pickup at first, turned 
20 and realized that there was a lady over next to the car 
21 waving her arms, and that's where my focus went. 
22 Q. Okay. One of the reports tends to indicate 
23 there's a Justin Ivie. 
124 try and give myself information. 24 A. He's on the fire department. He came in after I 
25 a. So I'm assuming that was approximately at the 25 did. 
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1 Q. Okay. And who app o. ~he fire department 1 ~.-...JURT: Thank you. Please be seated 
2 other than Justin Ivie? 
3 A. Ken Day, Daryn Moorman, Sam Moorman. I know it 
4 was chaotic up there. I'm not -- I don't remember for 
5 sure. Bill Hardy. 
6 Q. I'm assuming Justin !vie is a relative of yours? 
7 A He's my son. 
8 Q. Okay. 
9 MR. OLESON: I have no further questions. 
0 THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further of 
11 this witness, Ms. Glen? 
· 2 MS. GLEN: No, sir. Thank you. 
• 3 THE COURT: Thank you. You may step down. 
14 May this witness be released if here 
5 pursuant to subpoena? 
16 MS. GLEN: From the State, yes, Your Honor. 
17 MR. OLESON: No objection. 
8 THE COURT: You're free to go or free to 
19 stay at your choosing, Mr. Ivie. Thank you. 
. '·W Next witness. 
!1 MS. GLEN: Your Honor, the State calls 
22 Trooper Bivins. 
""!3 THE COURT: Please come forward, raise your 
!4 right hand, be sworn by Madam Clerk. 


























you perform with the Idaho State Police? 
A. Yes. I'm -- my specialty is traffic accident 
reconstruction. 
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Q. And can you tell me, please, how long you've been 
doing that? 
A. Since September of 2003. 
Q. Thank you. What kind of particularized training 
or education have you had in order to be a crash 
reconstruction expert? 
A. It works in a progression. I started out with 
basic accident investigation, then advanced crash 
investigation. And then after I had some experience, 
then I was selected --
MR. OLESON: Your Honor, to save time, I'm 
familiar with Trooper Bivins for purposes of this 
preliminary hearing. 
THE COURT: So you'll stipulate to his 
expertise with regards to traffic accident 
reconstruction? 
MR. OLESON: For purposes of the preliminary 
hearing. 
THE COURT: Very well. For those purposes 
the foundation is laid. 
MS. GLEN: Thank you. Appreciate that, 
Mr. Oleson. 
2 here in the witness chair. VVhen seated, make yourself 
3 comfortable with the microphone. It is adjustable. 
4 Make sure it's close enough and you speak clearly into 
5 it so all can hear. If asked for a "yes" or "no" 
6 answer, please answer "yes" or "no," not "uh-huh" or 
7 "huh-uh." 
8 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
9 THE COURT: Should I remind you of that, I'm 
10 not scolding you. I'm just reminding you so we can get 
11 a good record. 
12 Go ahead . 
13 MS. GLEN: Thank you. 
14 ALLEN W. BIVINS, 
15 having been first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
16 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
17 BY MS. GLEN: 
18 Q. Please state your name and spell your last name 
19 for the recording • 
20 A. My name is Allen W. Bivins. My last name is 
21 spelled B-i-v-i-n-s. 
22 Q. Trooper Bivins, can you tell me, please, what you 
23 do? 
24 A. I'm a trooper with the Idaho State Police. 
25 Q. And is there any specialized area of work that 
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1 Q. (BY MS. GLEN) Trooper Bivins, did you investigat• 
2 the crash that occurred on November 11th in Custer 
3 County? 
4 A. No, I did not. 
5 Q. Did you reconstruct the crash after it occurred? 
6 A. Yes, I did. 
7 Q. And can you tell me, please, what you did to 
8 reconstruct the crash? 
9 A. On November 12th Trooper Scoggins contacted me 
10 and asked if I could assist him with this particular 
11 crash. And we first met in -- just outside of Arco at 
12 Lost River Towing, where we reviewed -- or where I had a 
13 chance to take a look at a red Lincoln Continental that 
14 Corporal Scoggins stated had been involved in the crash. 
15 And from there, we -- he took me out to the crash scene, 
16 located on U.S. Highway 93 and Fish Hatchery Road. 
17 Q. What did you do when you got to that scene? 
18 A. The first thing Corporal Scoggins and I did was 
19 walk through the scene. He pointed out to me where the 
20 vehicles' final resting -- uncontrolled resting 
21 positions were. He also pointed out physical evidence 
22 that he had noted the night before or the night of the 
23 crash. 
24 Q. And how did -- what points of reference did he 
25 use to point these things out to you? 
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1 A Well, he indicated -- or he ,_, out where the 1 A At then Corporal Scoggins and I used 
2 vehicles' finaf uncontrolled resting positions were that 2 a iaser measuring device to document the evidence. 
3 he had he told me that he had marked those with 3 Q. And did you prepare a diagram as a result of 
4 orange paint, and the orange paint was still visible on 
5 the ground and on the highway. He also pointed out some 
6 gouge marks and some -- in the asphalt on Highway 93 and 
7 some scuff marks in the dirt on the southwest corner of 
8 the U.S. 93/Fish Hatchery Road intersection. 
9 Q. So what significance did these orange marks of 
0 paint and the gouge marks in the asphalt have to you? 
11 A Well, the orange paint, Corporal Scoggins 
4 that? 
5 A Yes. I created a scale diagram from the 
6 measurements that Corporal Scoggins and I took at the 
7 scene. 
8 MS. GLEN: I'd like for the bailiff to hand 
9 to the witness what's been admitted -- or what's been 
10 marked as State's Exhibit C, a copy of which defense 
11 counsel has in a smaller format. 
2 explained to me, this was where the vehicles came to 
;3 rest after the collision. The gouges indicated to me, 
14 · after looking at the red Lincoln, that they were --
12 THE COURT: Have you seen that, Mr. Oleson? 
13 MR. OLESON: Yes, Your Honor. I believe 
14 it's a larger version of the one that was provided to 
15 me. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
5 indicated that those gouges had been left by the oil pan 
16 on the Lincoln Continental involved in the crash. There 
17 was also an oil trail starting at the road edge just to 17 Q. (BY MS. GLEN) Trooper Bivins, do you recognize 
8 the south of those gouge marks that continued towards 
19 the southwest and led toward the Lincoln Continental's 
~0 final rest position. And there was also fluid spills 
!1 near the orange marks that Corporal Scoggins indicated 
22 to me was where the Toyota pickup had come to rest after 
"!3 the collision. 
!4 Q. So after you took a look at the orange paint and 
18 the document that I've just handed you? 
19 A Yes. I printed this diagram out this morning. 
20 Q. And is-- what does that diagram reflect? 
21 A The diagram reflects the crash scene and the 
22 physical evidence that I noted -- or that Corporal 
23 Scoggins and I measured on the afternoon of November 
24 12th. 

















Corporal Scoggins as to the orange paint placements, 1 
where does the rest of the information that you used to 2 
build that diagram come from? 3 
A It comes from the actual physical evidence that I 4 
observed while I was there. 5 
MS. GLEN: Your Honor, I'd move for the 6 
admission into evidence of State's Exhibit 3 (sic). 7 
THE COURT: Any objection? 8 
MR. OLESON: Not for purposes of this 9 
hearing, Your Honor. 10 
THE COURT: It shall be admitted for 11 
purposes of the preliminary hearing. I would note that 12 
probably not included on yours-- and I'm assuming you 13 
saw it, Mr. Oleson -- that there is, in addition to the 14 
printed materials on State's Exhibit C, a yellow sticky 15 
easier, Madam Clerk. 
THE CLERK: Thank you. 
MS. GLEN: If I could have the Court hand 
that back to the witness, please? 
64 
THE COURT: Hand back to the witness what's 
been marked and admitted into evidence as State's 
Exhibit C. 
MS. GLEN: If you'd like to take that from 
me for just a moment. 
And I'd like to ask the witness to come 
down. If he can bring the microphone down so that he 
can explain to the Court and counsel what's depicted on 
this exhibit?. 
116 that has what appears to be "1 inch equals 15.0 feet." 16 
THE COURT: Very well. You can take your 
microphone with you. You can be -- you can return to 














Did you see that? 17 
MR. OLESON: I do not have that. The 18 
trooper informed me, that was his scale drawing earlier. 19 
So I don't know if it needs to be on there, but I don't 20 
have any objection to it -- 21 
THE COURT: All right. 22 
MR. OLESON: -- for the purpose of this 23 
MS. GLEN: Yes, sir. 
Q. (BY MS. GLEN} So, Corporal, there is an 
indication of a V2 gouge there on State's Exhibit C. 
Can you please tell the Court what that is? 
A Based on the scratches that I saw on the oil pan 
earlier that day on the red Lincoln -- or on the Lincoln 
Continental, that's consistent with the four gouges that 
hearing. 
THE COURT: Going to make your life a little 
24 I found in the asphalt on November 12th at approximately 
25 1:00 p.m. 
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1 Q. And Vl represents 
2 A This represents the white Toyota pickup that was 
3 involved in the crash. 
4 Q. And V2? 
5 A. That represents the red Lincoln that was 
6 involved. 
7 Q. And then there are some V2 scuff marks noted on 
8 State's Exhibit C. Can you expound on those, please? 
9 A. These are the rotational scuff marks that the 
10 Lincoln left after it rotated away from the collision or 
11 from the area of impact. 
12 Q. And the area of impact is -- did you determine 
13 where that was? 
14 A. The gouges indicate the area of impact. 
15 Q. So based on --thank you. You can take your seat 
16 again. 
17 A. (Returning to the witness stand). 
18 Q. So as a result of your reconstruction of this 
19 crash, can you tell the Court what you were able to 
20 conclude using the evidence that was at hand? 
21 A. Using the evidence at hand, I concluded that the 
22 white Toyota pickup, as it was traveling north, crossed 
23 into the southbound lane and struck -- or collided with 
24 the lincoln nearly head-on. 




























the vehicles rotated counterclockwise. Their final 
resting positions indicate to me that the Toyota was 
traveling slower than the Lincoln was. 
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Q. Were you able to get an estimate of the speed of 
the vehicles based on the evidence at the site? 
A. No, I was not. 
Q. And why not? 
A. Because Vehicle 1, there were no scuff marks, 
post-collision scuff marks, left by the white Toyota, 
which is Vehicle 1, indicated in the photographs taken 
by Corporal Scoggins the night of the crash. And when I 
returned -- or when we returned to the crash scene the 
following day, I could not find any rotational or 
post-collision skid or scuff marks left by the Toyota. 
Without that, it would just be a guess to try to 
calculate the collision speed. 
Q. So if Vehicle 2, the red car, was fully in the 
southbound lane at the time of the crash, what does that 
then indicate to you of the position of Vehicle 1 at the 
time of the crash? 
A. 
lane. 
That it was traveling north in the southbound 
Q. And off of the diagram that's Exhibit C, right by 
where it says "U.S. 93," can you please tell me, does 
the road continue on in a straight manner? Is it a 
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1 whether t tne red car was fully in the southbound 
2 iane or not? 
3 A. The gouge marks in the asphalt, as you could see, 
4 are very close to the southbound fog line. That 
5 indicates to me that the Lincoln was fully in its lane 
6 at the time of the collision. 
7 Q. It doesn't indicate that the gouge marks are 
8 right in the smack middle of the southbound lane, 
9 though. Does that have any significance to you? 
10 A. It indicates to me that the Lincoln was closer to 
11 the southbound fog line than it was to the center line. 
12 Q. And can you explain, based on the evidence that 
13 you had from the scene and your experience and traini11 
14 how it is that the vehicles landed both fairly facing 
15 the direction that they were facing with Vehicle 2 
16 facing sort of northeast and Vehicle l's driver's 
17 side-- well, which way was Vehicle l's driver's side 
18 facing? 
19 A. The driver's side, if you're-- as you're looking 
20 at the diagram, driver's side is to the right side, so 
21 the vehicle is facing south. 
22 Q. So, again, based on that evidence that you had, 
23 your experience and training, how is it that the 
24 vehicles landed in this position? 


























curve? What's the topography of the road? 
A. Due to the fact that the scale -- or the -- I'm 
trying to think of the best way to explain this. The 
scale is smaller than what is depicted in the 
photographs. You can see a significant curve in the 
photographs of this crash. However, due to the scale, 
that curve is not as apparent in this diagram as it is 
in the photographs. 
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Q. So from which way -- which way does the road 
curve, then, as U.S. 93 is going northwest? 
A. If you're -- the easiest way to explain it is, if 
you're standing looking southeast, the road curves to 
the left. 
Q. What about if you're standing looking northwest? 
A. Well, it would -- yeah, it would curve toward the 
right. 
Q. You indicated that based on the evidence it would 
appear that Vehicle 2 is traveling northbound in the 
southbound lane. Can you tell me whether or not that is 
an offense for which someone can be cited? 
A. No, ma'am. If-- I would like to correct you. 
Vehicle 1 was traveling north, which is the white 
Toyota, was traveling north in the southbound lane at 
the time. 
Q. I apologize. I got my l's and 2's mixed up. So 




















































the white Toyota was traveling ? 
A. In the southbound iane. 
Q. And is that an offense for which someone can be 
cited? 
A Yes. Failure to maintain designated lane. 
further. 
MS. GLEN: Thank you. I have nothing 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Oleson. 
MR. OLESON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. OlESON: 
Q. let's see, it's not Trooper anymore? It's 
Corporal? Captain? What is it? 
A Corporal. 
Q. Corporal. Corporal Bivins, looking at your 
Exhibit C that's on the board there, you were talking 
about the V2 gouge. How far is that from the fog line? 
A Fog line, if I had a ruler, I could give you an 
estimate. But probably the closest gouge mark is within 
two to three -- or within a couple of feet of the fog 
line. 
Q. Within a couple of feet of the fog line? 
A Correct. 
Q. And you're saying that's from the oil pan? 
A Correct. 
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THE COURT: Because I'm not sure it's a 1950 
Lincoln, which was a monster, or if it's the brand new 
Lincoln, which is kind of small. 
MR. OLESON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: They went European on us. So I 
don't know where-- what we're talking about here. 
Q. (BY MR. OLESON) Officer, without knowing the 
width of the Lincoln, you can't testify as to whether 
the Lincoln was fully within its lane or whether or not 
it was over the fog line, then, can you? 
A Actually, yes, I can. Because the vehicle is 
scaled out, with a ruler I can demonstrate the position 
of that Lincoln at the time of the crash. 
Q. So it's scaled out. So you did measure it? 
A ·Yes. The vehicle is scaled out. 
Q. Okay. Do you have any notes on your scaling --
or any notes to the measurement of the car? 
A No, I do not. I don't include those in my 
report. 
Q. Did you take notes? 
A On the width of the car? 
Q. Width of the car. 
A No, l did not. 
24 Q. So, then, how did you determine the width of the 
25 car for your scaled drawing? 
1 Q. H is this car? 
2 A. i couidn't teii you. i couid iook up the 
3 specifications on that car, but I can't tell you right 
4 off the top of my head. 
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5 Q. How far is the oil pan from the left-hand side of 
6 the car? 




Q. Are you sure? 
A From the best of my recollection, it sits 
11 fairly -- pretty much in the center. 
12 Q. Okay. And how wide in your experience is a--
13 was it a lincoln? lincoln. 
14 A How wide is a Lincoln? 
15 Q. Yeah. 
16 A Mr. Oleson, I don't know. I couldn't-- I would 
17 just be guessing. 
18 Q. Are they five feet wide? 
19 A It would be wider. 
20 MS. GLEN: Objection, Your Honor. He's 
21 already asked and answered this question. He doesn't 
22 know. 
23 THE COURT: Sustained. He's already 
24 testified, he doesn't know. 
25 Q. (BY MR. OlESON) So if this vehicle was --
1 A Through a computer-aided-diagram program that 
2 gives different makes and models of the vehicle and 
3 using that to place the vehicle at its final rest 
4 position. 
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· 5 Q. But you don't measure it to determine whether or 
6 not it's accurate based upon the computer programming; 
7 A. No, I do not. 
8 Q. Okay. So you can determine the width of the 
9 vehicle if you had a ruler? 
10 A Yes, I could. 
11 Q. And you could determine where V2 gouge is if you 
12 had a ruler? 
13 A. Yes, I can. 
14 Q. Okay. And your testimony --
15 THE COURT: We can probably find you a ruler 
16 if you'd like one, Mr. Oleson. 
17 MR. OLESON: That would be good, Your Honor. 
18 THE CLERK: There's one on the desk in 
19 there. 




THE CLERK: Do you want me to grab it real 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. I'm not sure it's --
24 how accurate a ruler is, but it's a ruler. We can get 
25 close. 
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1 THE WITNESS: Well, -.:ering scale is 
2 preferable, but--
3 THE COURT: I doubt we've got one of those 
4 here. I have one at home. 
5 MR. OLESON: That's the triangle rulers, 
6 right? 
7 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: Either that or a steel ruler, 
9 not so mechanical. 
lO THE WITNESS: This is not going to be quite 
11 as close --
12 THE COURT: Come on up, Mr. Oleson, 
13 Ms. Glen. Madam Clerk has retrieved a ruler from her 
14 desk. Now, I'm pretty sure if this witness was asked, 
15 he'd say that this is going to be a rough estimation of 
16 widths. But if you want to-- can I do a little bit of 
17 work here for both of you? 
18 MR. OLESON: Sure. 
19 MS. GLEN: Please. 
'lO THE COURT: Officer, I'm handing you this 
21 ruler that Madam Clerk was gracious enough to go to her 
22 desk and get. I note that it's a wooden ruler. Looks 
'23 like it's been around for a considerable period of time. 
24 From that ruler can you make a rough estimation from 












THE WITNESS: Again, approximately two, two 



















MR. OLESON: Thank you. That's all the 
measurements I have. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Madam Clerk. 
THE CLERK: You're welcome. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Oleson. 
Q. (BY MR. OLESON) So if the width of the -- or the 
most westerly part of the V2 gouge is two feet, it's two 
and a half feet wide, then that would mean -- and the 
car's seven foot wide, the car is approximately three 
and a half foot to center, right? 
A Correct. 
Q. And if you go three and a half foot from the 
center of the V2 gouge, you'd be over the fog line? 
A No, you would not. Or I'm sorry. Repeat your 
question again. 
Q. If the car is seven feet wide, half that distance 
is three and a half feet, right? So the center of the 
car is three and a half feet? 
A Correct. 







gouge as indicated on State's 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I can, sir. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. Would you like him to do 
5 that, Mr. Oleson? 
6 MR. OLESON: Yes, Your Honor. And one other 
7 thing while he's there. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. 
9 MR. OLESON: If he could wait and measure 
10 the width of the southbound lane. 
11 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 
12 THE WITNESS: Again, this is just a rough 
13 estimate. The southbound lane is approximately 12 feet 
14 wide. The Lincoln is approximately seven feet wide. 
15 And I'm sorry, Mr. Oleson. Did you want the farthest 
16 gouge closest to the center line or the one closest to 
17 the--
18 MR. OLESON: To the--
19 THE WITNESS: --fog line? 
20 MR. OLESON: --fog line. So the most 
21 westerly point of the V2. 
22 THE WITNESS: This ruler's not scaled down 
23 that far, but I believe it's approximately two feet. 
24 MR. OLESON: Can you-- while you're there, 
25 can you measure the width of the V2 gouge? 
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1 Q. --center of the oil pan and/or center of the 
2 car, as you testified, would be one foot into the V2 
3 gouge? 
4 A That would be correct. 
5 Q. Okay. And then from the most westerly part of 
6 the V2 gouge to the fog line is two feet, you're three 
7 feet? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. And if the car is three and a half feet, that 
10 would mean, based upon these rough estimates, the car 
11 was at least a half a foot over the fog line? 
12 A That would be correct. 
13 Q. So I guess without more accurate numbers, you 
14 cannot testify today that the lincoln was wholly within 
15 its lane of travel based upon your investigation? 
16 A If I understand the question correctly, what 
17 you're asking me or trying to indicate is, was there a 
18 possibility that it was left of the center line. No, 
19 there is no possibility of that. You were asking about 




Q. Yes, fog line. 
A Fog line is to the right. That would indicate 
that actually the Uncolnwas riding on the shoulder. 
24 Q. You confuse me. Are we saying the car is toward: 
25 the fog line or towards the center line, the lincoln? 
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1 THE WITNESS: Your , .nay I borrow your 
2 ruler again, please? May I step dovvn? 
3 THE touR.t: You may. 
4 A. I just want to make sure that you and I have our 
5 terminology correct. 
6 Q. (BY MR. OLESON) So do I. 
7 A. This is the fog line. 
8 Q. Yes. 
9 A. This is what you're referring to when you asked 
10 me if the Lincoln was -- this is what you're referring 
11 to when you're asking whether or not the Lincoln was 
12 wholly within its lane, correct? 
13 Q. And not over the fog line. 
14 A. Okay. This is the line that in an investigation, 
15 when I try to determine whether or not a vehicle is over 
16 the line, this is-- the center line is the line that 
17 I'm concemed with. 
18 Q. Okay, I understand that. But my questions and 
19 the measurements that you've listed are based upon the . 
W fog line, correct? 
!1 A Yes, they are. 
22 Q. Okay. So based upon your rough measurements, 
Z3 that would indicate that the Lincoln potentially was 
14 over the fog line? 
25 A Potentially, yes. 
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1 Q. Center to the left would be passenger side, which 
2 would be towards the fog line, correct? 
3 A No. It would be towards the driver's side. 
4 Q. So when you look at a vehicle left side--
5 A Left side to me is driver's side. 
6 a. Okay. So the driver's side takes the most damage 
7 on the Lincoln? 
8 A That is correct. 
9 a. The Toyota takes damage square on? 
1 0 A. Correct. 
11 a. And the Lincoln appears to be to the right 
12 towards the fog line? 
13 A. Correct. 
14 a. So can you testify or not testify as to whether 
15 or not perhaps the Toyota was over the fog line and out 
16 of its lane of travel on the turn when the Lincoln 
17 struck the Toyota? 
18 A I'm sorry, Mr. Oleson. I'm -- I don't understand 
19 what your question is. 
20 a. Okay. 
21 
22 
A Could you rephrase it? 
a. Damage to Toyota is square on? 
23 A Correct. 
24 a. Damage to Lincoln is on left side or driver's 
25 side? 
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1 Q. 0 so if it was over the fog line, it was 
2 not wholly vvithin its lane of travel, vvhich v.;ould be 
3 center line to fog line, correct? 
4 A. That would be correct. 
5 Q. Okay. And this accident occurred at the 
6 intersection of Fish Hatchery Road, right? 
7 A. Correct. 
8 a. Okay. Now I'm going to ask you some other 
9 questions. In reviewing your report, it appears that 
10 the damage to the Toyota was basically centered, right? 
11 A. Correct. 
12 a. In the damage to the right side, the left side, 
13 damage to the center? 
14 A That is correct. 
15 a. Could you tell whether or not the Toyota was 
16 struck at an angle or whether the damage was consisten 
17 straight through the bumper? was there any bends in th 
18 center of the bumper? 
19 A Based on the photographs that I saw, it appears 
20 that the damage to the Toyota was nearly straight on. 
21 a. Okay. Now, the damage to the Lincoln is on the 
22 left side or the right side? 
23 A. The primary -- or the most damage to the front of 
24 the Lincoln appears to be center -- from the center to 
25 the left side of the vehicle. 
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1 A It's nearly head-on. 
2 a. Nearly head-on but more towards the center to thE 
3 left you testified? 
4 A On the Lincoln, yes. 
5 a. On the Lincoln, which is the driver's side? 
6 A. Correct. 
7 Q. Okay. The impact of V2, or the V2 gouge, is 
8 towards the fog line, or to the right side? 
9 A That is correct. 
10 a. Okay. So if the Lincoln's coming southbound,--
11 A. Correct. 
12 a. -- hugging or over the fog line towards the right 
13 side and it was to hit the Toyota, which was turning and 
14 perhaps straddling the fog line or off the fog line, 
15 that would be consistent with the damage to the driver's 
16 side of the Lincoln close to the west or the fog line? 
17 A. Based on what I saw of the damage to the Toyota, 
18 this was not an angled crash. The Toyota was still 
19 traveling straight. 
20 a. Are you sure the Toyota was even? 
21 A. Yes, sir, I am. I'm absolutely certain that the 
22 Toyota was in the -- traveling north in the southbound 
23 lane at the time of the collision. 
24 Q. And you're not-- can you testify, then, the 
25 Toyota was not over the fog line on the southbound lane? 
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1 A If I understand your questio y, you're 
2 also indicating that the Toyota was ling north in 
3 the southbound lane and was to the left of the fog line? 
4 Is that what you're asking? 
5 Q. Or a portion of the vehicle. 
6 A No. 
7 Q. No? 
8 A No. 
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9 Q. Where was the Toyota in the southbound lane when 
JO the Impact occurred? 
11 A I cannot place it because there was no physical 
12 evidence at the scene that I observed where I could 
J3 actually say the Toyota was right in this position when 
14 the collision occurred. 
15 Q. So you can't testify as to where the Toyota was? 
16 A I can testify to the fact with absolute certainty 
17 that it was traveling north in the southbound lane at 
18 the time of the collision. 
19 Q. Well, can you only testify that it was traveling 
~0 to the west of the center line? 
!1 A Regardless, traveling west of the center line, 
22 traveling north in the southbound lane, it was still 
13 left to center, failed to maintain its designated lane, 
~4 which is still a violation of Idaho Code. 
25 Q. Well, and I'm not asking about violation of Idaho 
1 stopped? Can you testify that it wasn't stopped or 
2 stalled? 
3 A I can't say that. 
4 Q. Okay. So if the Toyota was stalled in the 
5 southbound lane, then the Lincoln ran into it. 
6 A. It's also against Idaho Code to obstruct lanes of 
7 travel. 
8 Q. Okay. So what happens if your vehicle dies as 
9 you're driving down the road? You have to make 
10 reasonable efforts to move it off the road, right? 
11 A That is correct. 
12 Q. Okay. So if you're stalled as you're turning and 
13 another car is coming at you at 65 miles an hour, you 
14 have a reasonable amount of time to move it, right? 
15 MS. GLEN: Your Honor, I'm going to object. 
16 This calls for a legal conclusion and speculation on the 
17 part of the officer. 
18 THE COURT: Well, I'll sustain as an 
19 improper hypothetical. If you want to phrase it as a 
20 hypothetical, we'll let you do that; but you'll have to 
21 phrase it as a proper hypothetical. 




Toyota was stopped in the middle of the road on the 
southbound lane --




















Code. m ~ying is, you can't testify as to the 
of the vehicles? 
A No, I cannot. 
Q. All you can testify to is, the lincoln was going 
faster than the Toyota based upon the final resting 
place of the two vehicles? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Okay. You did not see any skid marks, brake 
marks, any other marks on the road from tires or 
anything else? 
A. Neither vehicle left any precollision skid or 
scuff marks on the highway. 
Q. Okay. So what I'm saying, is it not possible 
that the Toyota was sitting on the fog line on the west 
side of the road and the lincoln ran into it because the 
lincoln was also over the fog line? It is possible, 
isn't it? 
A. Mr. Oleson, I'm -- I've explained that the Toyota 
19 was left of the center line. 
20 Q. I understand that. 
21 A. Right. And regardless of whether the Lincoln was 
22 on the fog line or just slightly over the southbound fog 
23 line, the Lincoln was still traveling in the correct 
24 lane. 
25 Q. What if the Toyota wasn't moving at all and was 
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1 Q. (BY MR. OlESON} Facing northbound and the Lincol 
2 was coming southbound at 65 miles per hour or roughly 
3 thereabouts, --
4 A. Okay. 
5 Q. -- maybe higher, maybe lower, you -- when you 
6 look at the accident scene the next day, that 
7 hypothetical is possible, isn't it? 
8 A That the vehicle was stalled? 
9 Q. Or stopped, not moving. 
10 A It's possible. 
11 Q. Okay. There's no indication in any of the record 
12 that the Toyota vehicle was moving at the time of 
13 impact, is there? 
14 
15 
A. No, there is not. 
Q. And you can't from your accident reconstruction 
16 testify that the vehicle was moving at the time of 
17 impact, can you? 
18 A. No, I cannot. 
19 Q. But you can testify that the lincoln was towards 
20 the fog line at the point of impact? 
21 
22 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And the Toyota was somewhere to the west of the 
23 center line, correct? 
24 A. That is correct. 
25 Q. Okay. But you can't, again, testify as to where 
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1 it was? 
2 A Not c;recifically, no. 
3 Q. Okay. Did you look at the Toyota and the lincoln 
4 as part of your accident reconstruction? 
5 A. I looked at the Lincoln. I did not physically 
6 inspect the Toyota. I noted the damage from photographs 
7 that were taken at the scene on the night of the crash. 
8 Q. Okay. Did you take any photographs as part of 
9 your accident reconstruction? 
10 A. I took photographs of the crash scene. I did not 
11 take any photographs of any vehicles. And the 
12 photographs that I took were taken the following day, on 
13 November 12th. 
14 Q. What time did you finish your accident 
i5 reconstruction? 
16 A. Are you referring to the report itself or the 
'".7 time that I spent out at the scene? 
!8 Q. Okay, let me rephrase the question. When did you 
19 make the determination in your reconstruction-- the 
!0 decision, so to speak-- that the accident was caused by 
~1 Mr. Klein's vehicle traveling left of center or right of 
22 center? 
!3 A When I wrote my report on November 17th. 
24 Q. On November 17th. 
25 THE COURT: Now, wait a minute. Was your 
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1 A I didn't like that press release, so I don't 
2 know. 
3 Q. And you didn't make the determination until the 
4 18th? 
5 A Until the 17th; that is correct. 
6 Q. The 17th of November, right? 
7 A. That's correct. 
8 MR. OLESON: No further questions. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Glen. 
10 MS. GLEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
11 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
12 BY MS. GLEN: 
13 Q. Trooper Bivins, assuming the hypothetical that 
14 Mr. Oleson gave you in which Vehicle 1 is stalled in the 
15 northbound lane-- or, I'm sorry, in the southbound lane 
16 facing northbound and assuming that Vehicle 2 is coming 
17 southbound and strikes the stalled vehicle, in your 
18 experience, if that were the case, would there be skid 
19 marks that would indicate that one moving vehicle had 
W struck one stationary vehicle? 
21 A. Yes, there would have been. 
'l2 Q. Did you find any such skid marks? 
23 
24 
A No, I did not. 
Q. Are you -- do you know whether or not Vehicle 1, 




















































question ri center or left of center' 
THE WITNESS: Let's see, if you're 
traveling, you'd be right. 
THE COURT: Because you used both right and 
left in that question. 
MR. OLESON: Left of center. Excuse me. 
Left of center. 
THE COURT: So reask it with --
Q. (BY MR. OLESON) When did you make the 
determination that the accident was caused by 
Mr. Klein's traveling left of center? 
A. On November 17th. 
Q. Okay. At no time prior to that did you make the 
determination? 
A No, I did not. 
Q. And it was your job in the -- as the Idaho State 
Police investigator to reconstruct this accident and 
make a determination as to the accident? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Can you tell me why the Idaho State Police 
released on December -- or on November 12th the 
statement that the accident was caused when Mr. Klein' 
vehicle crossed the middle line and collided with a 
lincoln Continental traveling southbound, driven by Jor 
Twitchell, 36, of Arco? 
88 
transmission? 
A. Ma'am, I could not tell you that. 
Q. Would that make a difference as to whether or nc 
there would be skid marks if a vehicle -- if Vehicle 1 
had been stalled there? 
A. If the vehicle was still in gear, stalled, or 
even a manual transmission in neutral with the parking 
brake set, there is a -- roughly a two percent grade in 
the southbound direction, so they would have had to have 
done something to prevent the vehicle from rolling, 
either emergency brake or left the vehicle in gear or 
park if it were an automatic, and there would have been 
post-collision scuff marks left by Vehicle -- or by the 
white Toyota. 
Q. And you found none? 
A. I found absolutely none. 
further. 
MS. GLEN: Thank you. I have nothing 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Oleson. 
MR. OLESON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. OLESON: 
Q. So you're saying if the -- in the hypothetical 
the Toyota was not moving, there had to have been scuf1 
marks? 
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1 A If the vehicle would have a complete stop 
2 m gear or in park or With the emergency brake set, 
3 there would have been at least short scuffs, indicating 
4 that the vehicle was stopped and pushed. 
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5 Q. So you're telling me that you have -- if you are 
6 stopped on the road, you have to have your emergency 
7 brake on? 
8 A. No, I'm not saying that. 
9 Q. Is it not possible that the emergency brake would 
·rO not be on? 
11 A. It is possible. 
12 Q. Okay. 
13 A. But it's also --and what I've tried to explain 
14 before is that there's a two percent grade in the 
15 southbound direction; and it's enough of a grade, had 
16 the vehicle just been in neutral, that it would have 
17 rolled. 
18 Q. How far would it have rolled on a two percent 
19 grade? 
!0 A. I have no idea. 
Z1 Q. Okay. So if the vehicle is stalled and 
22 somebody's trying to start it and it's rolling slowly 
Z3 backwards when it gets hit, that would be consistent 
14 with no skid marks? 




























Q. And that the point of impact of the Toyota 
appeared to be almost straight on, right? 
A. That's correct. 
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Q. Whereas the point of impact to the Lincoln 
appeared to be on the left-hand side or, in other words, 
the driver's side? 
A That's correct. 
MR. OLESON: No further questions. 
MS. GLEN: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Glen? Thank you. You may 
step down. If the bailiff could retrieve that exhibit 
unless you want it left up for further use. 
MS. GLEN: I would like it left up for the 
next witness, please, Your Honor. 
subpoena? 
released? 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. GLEN: Brandon Tilman. 
THE COURT: Is this witness here pursuant to 
MS. GLEN: He is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any objection to him being 
MS. GLEN: None at all, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Oleson? 
MR. OLESON: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You're free to go or free to 
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1 Q. urd also be consistent with the Toyota 
2 being spun out of the road and the Lincoln Continental 
3 going clear past it, spinning out of control, wouldn't 
4 it? 
5 A I'm not sure what you're trying to ask. If you 
6 could rephrase --
7 Q. What I'm saying is, you don't have enough 
8 information to testify as to whether or not there woulc 
9 have been skid marks if the Toyota was stopped on thE 
10 road either on the fog line or in the driving lane-- or 
11 in the leftbound lane -- excuse me, southbound lane? 
12 You don't have the information? 
13 A That's correct. 
14 Q. There are too many variables that would factor i 
15 to be able to make any determination? 
16 A. That's correct. 
17 Q. All you can testify to today is that the Toyota 
18 was to the west of the center line, correct? 
19 A. That's correct. 
20 Q. The Lincoln was apparently going faster, at a 
21 greater speed, than the Toyota? 
22 A That's correct. 
23 Q. And the Lincoln was closer to the fog line than 
24 the center line? 
25 A That's correct. 
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1 stay at your choosing. 
2 THE WITNESS: All right, Your Honor. Thank 
3 you. 
4 THE COURT: Please come forward, raise your 
5 right hand, be sworn by Madam Clerk. 
6 (Witness sworn) 
7 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
8 MS. GLEN: Thank you. 
9 BRANDON TILMAN, 
10 having been first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
11 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
12 BY MS. GLEN: 
13 Q. Please state your name and spell your last name 
14 for the record. 
15 A My name is Brandon Tilman, T-i-1-m-a-n. 
16 Q. Your occupation, please? 
17 A I'm a deputy sheriff for Custer County. 
18 Q. Did you respond to a crash scene at Fish Hatcher 
19 Road and Highway 93 on November 11th of this year? 
20 A Yes, I did. 
21 Q. What were the two vehicles that were involved ir 
22 that crash? 
23 A It was a white Toyota pickup and there was a 
24 red -- I believe it was a Lincoln. 
25 Q. Who ran the information to determine the 
01/18/2011 01:08:57 
1 registration and ownership of th 
2 
3 
A. I did. 
Q. And what did your results -- the results of your 
4 request about registration and ownership indicate as to 
5 the white Toyota pickup? 
6 A. It came back registered to a Marc Klein of 
7 Mackay. 
8 Q. Do you know Mr. Klein? 
9 
. o 
A. I do not . 
Q. You've never had any interactions with him? 










Q. 1 .nat's what, 7:04? 
A Yes, it would be. 
Q. Were you the first officer on the scene? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. Where did you come from? 
A. I came from my house in Mackay. 
Q. So it took you -- when were you dispatched? 
A. I was advised at 18:53, and I believe I was 
9 en route at 18:54 hours. 
10 Q. So it took you about-- what was that, then -- 11 
11 minutes to get on scene from Mackay? 
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11 
2 Q. When you responded to the scene on November 11th, 12 A. About 10 minutes, I believe. 
13 can you tell me whether or not there were any people 
14 other than the driver of the white Toyota pickup and the 
5 driver of Vehicle Number 2, a red Lincoln, who were 
16 injured? 
"'7 A. No, not that I could see. I did not see anyone 
8 else that was injured besides those two. 
19 MS. GLEN: Thank you. I have nothing 
'!0 further. 
!1 THE COURT: Mr. Oleson. 
22 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
!3 BY MR. OLESON: 
!4 
25 
Q. What time did you arrive on scene, Officer? 
A. I believe it was 19:04 hours. 
13 Q. Is that about how long it takes to get there from 
14 Mackay? 
15 A. No, it's not. 
16 Q. Now, are you downtown Mackay or--
17 A. My-- I live just on the out-- about city limit 
18 sign. I'd say--
19 Q. To the north or the south or --
20 
21 
A. To the north of Mackay. 
Q. Okay. So what is the average driving distance 
22 from say downtown Mackay to the site of the accident? 
23 A. I'd say it's about, oh, 12, 13 minutes I'd say. 
24 Q. Okay. When you arrived on scene, how many 




A. There were several people on scene. 
Q. can you give me an estimation? Two? Three? 
3 More than five? 10? More than 10? 
4 A. I can say more than three, but I can't give you 
5 an exact number. 
6 
7 
Q. Other than the-- Mr. Klein and Mr. Twitchell? 
A. Yeah. There were several people there; but, like 
8 I said, I don't have a number of how many. 
9 Q. Did you question any of those individuals to see 
10 if they were witnesses to the accident? 
11 A. When I arrived at the scene, I did not at the 
12 time. I was more concerned about the two individuals 
13 involved and their injuries. 
14 Q. Did you at any time question any potential 










A. Yes, I did. There was --
Q. Who did you question? 
A. What's that? 
Q. Who did you question? 
A. The truck driver actually. I talked to him. 
Q. Do you remember his name? 
A. His last-- I believe it's Ball. 
Q. Okay. Other than Ball, did you question anyone 
124 else? 
25 A. No. Several people had left when I showed up on 
1 scene. 
2 Q. Did you determine who was the first individual on 
3 the scene? 
4 A. I didn't. I don't-- I don't know who was the 
5 first one on scene, who called 911. 
6 Q. Did you recognize any of the vehicles or the 









A. Just one. 
Q. And who was that? 
A. Her name is Kimm Peterson. 
Q. Kimm Peterson? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you ever talked to Ms. Peterson? 
A. I have not. 
Q. You've never asked her if she was the first on 
16 the scene, if she saw the accident, anything? 
17 A. I asked her if she did see the accident, and she 
18 said no. 
19 Q. Did you ask her when she came on the scene? 









And you didn't know any of the other individuals? 
I didn't, no. I didn't recognize anyone. 
Mr. Ball testified there were approximately seven 
individuals there, I believe seven individuals, at the 
time law enforcement first arrived. Does that seem 














A It could be. I'm not going to y i1 numbPr 
because -I don't know a number. 
Q. Okay. But there were several there? The only 
person you knew was Ms. Peterson? 
A Yes. 
Q. And you talked to her at the scene? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q. Have you ever looked at the dispatch logs to see 
who called 911? 
A No, I didn't because the 911 came through Butte 
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1 A Yes, . "c was T.J. Park and Julie 
2 Buckwalter don't know who the driver of the 
3 ambulance was, though. 
4 Q. At the scene did you also talk to Marc Klein? 
5 A Briefly when I first showed up. 
6 Q. Where did this happen? 
7 A Well, when I showed up, Mr. Klein was sitting on 
8 the side of the road by his --
9 MR. OLESON: Your Honor, I'm going to 
10 object. I believe that's beyond the scope of the cross . 
11 THE COURT: Overruled. 






Q. Okay. And you never followed up with any other 13 
witnesses? 14 
A Just the truck driver. 15 
MR. OLESON: I have no further questions. 16 
A Mr. Klein was sitting on the shoulder by his 
pickup, and I seen that he had a blanket on him and was 
smoking a cigarette. I walked up and asked him if he 
was okay; and he mumbled, "Yeah." And so I turned my 
attention and went over to Mr. Twitchell to see if he 







Q. (BY MS. GLEN) Did you ever talk to Mr. Klein 
after that? 
:0 BY MS. GLEN: 20 A I did not. He went to the ambulance. 
~1 Q. So it was before or after that you were on scene 21 Q. Did you ever go into the ambulance with him? 
22 that the ambulances arrived? 
~3 A They arrived after. 
!4 Q. And do you know who it was who was in the 
25 ambulance that took Marc Klein from the scene? 
1 and I wanted to verify. So when I walked in the 
2 ambulance and all the doors were closed, I could smell 
3 an odor of an alcoholic beverage emitting from 
· 4 Mr. Klein's breath. 
5 MR. OLESON: Your Honor, I'm going to 
6 object. This is beyond the scope of the cross. 
7 THE COURT: I understand. Overruled. 
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8 Q. (BY MS. GLEN) I'm sorry. The doors were closed 
22 A Yes, I did. 
23 Q. And why did you do that? 
24 A I went in because the truck driver had stated 
25 that Mr. Klein stated to him that he had been drinking, 
1 MR. OLESON: No objection. 
2 THE COURT: All right. Free to go, free to 
3 stay at your choosing. Next. 
4 MS. GLEN: Your Honor, I'd ask that the 
5 bailiff hand what's been marked as State's Exhibit B --
6 there's a copy and the original, both of which -- well, 











and what? 9 
A The doors were closed, so it was a contained 10 
MR. OLESON: Let me see that just a minute. 
MS. GLEN: Oh, go ahead. 
area, and I could smell an odor of an alcoholic beverage 11 
emitting from Mr. Klein's breath. 12 
Q. Did you ask him any questions when you were in 13 
that ambulance with him? 14 
A I did not. 15 
MS. GLEN: Thank you. I have nothing 16 
MR. OLESON: Real quick. 
MS. GLEN: State'sExhibit B would be a 
certified copy of a death certificate of Jory Twitchell, 
and the copy that the State would ask be admitted into 
evidence is a copy of the original. 
THE COURT: Any objection? Any objection? 








MR. OLESON: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Oleson? 
MR. OLESON: No. No questions. 
THE COURT: Thank you. You may step down. 
May this witness be released if pursuant to 
124 MS. GLEN: He may, Your Honor. 
~5 THE COURT: Any objection? 
18 it's not signed. It does say "Electronically Signed," 
19 but --
20 THE COURT: The registrar's signature is 
21 there. Now, is there -- where is the certified copy, or 




MS. GLEN: That's the original, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. GLEN: From the State Bureau of 






MR. OLESON: Origi 
MS. GLEN: Yes. 
certified copy, right? 
4 THE COURT: I will admit State's Exhibit B. 
5 MS. GLEN: Thank you, Your Honor. And if 
6 the bailiff would please hand the Court a copy of 
7 State's Exhibit A, a copy of which has been given to 
8 Mr. Oleson, it is a frontal -- the front sheet with a 
9 short letter from Delisa Downey, who is a forensic 
_o scientist from the Idaho State Forensic Bureau, 
11 indicating that it's not their policy to send copies of 
2 an affidavit. The original notarized affidavit would be 
,3 sent with a copy of the report to my office. 
14 The second page would indicate a blood 
5 toxicology collection with ethyl alcohol detected. 
16 And the third page would be an affidavit of 
17 the forensic scientist, which is admissible in court 
8 pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1. 
19 The third copy -- or the third page is a 
~0 chain of custody. 
!1 And the fourth copy -- or the fourth page 
22 would be a request for blood alcohol restitution. 
""'!3 THE COURT: Any objection? 
!4 MR. OLESON: Your Honor, my objection is, 
25 it's a faxed copy, it's not a -- it's not the original, 
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1 problem with this; and the problem I'm having is, you've 
2 got one, two, three, four, five pages, one of which is a 
3 bill, it looks like, for a hundred bucks for a test and 
4 one appears to be a chain of evidence. And the 
5 affidavit refers to -- so I will admit, even though it 
6 is a faxed copy, for purposes of the preliminary 
7 hearing, the affidavit of Downey, the chain of evidence 
8 sheet, and the analysis of the blood. 
9 With regards to the information letter dated 
10 December 13th of 2010, I don't think that's part of 
11 anything she included within her affidavit. 
12 MS. GLEN: That's correct, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: And with regards to the Idaho 
14 blood --Idaho State Police blood alcohol restitution of 
15 $100, I don't believe that's anything that was concluded 
16 within the affidavit. 
17 MS. GLEN: Yes, sir. 
18 THE COURT: So the only thing admissible is 
19 those things that are attached and affixed to the 
20 affidavit. So I will admit those three sheets that 
-21 include the affidavit, the forensic analysis, and the 
22 chain of custody. 
23 MS. GLEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: They're all attached, but those 
25 are the only portions that are admitted. And so you'll 
102 
it's not ce . fhe Exhibit A includes a 1 
2 
3 
mount of hearsay, which I don't believe is 




THE COURT: Ms. Glen? 
MS. GLEN: Well, Your Honor, as the Court's 
7 well-aware, Rule 5.1 specifically allows affidavits to 
8 be entered into evidence to show probable cause at 
9 preliminary hearings. 
10 THE COURT: I understand that. The 
11 objection isn't to the affidavit. The objection is that 
12 it's a faxed copy. 
13 MS. GLEN: Yes, I understand that, Your 
14 Honor. And, as the Court can see from the fax cover 
15 sheet there, Idaho State Forensic policies evidently 
16 have changed in that they don't send the originals or 
17 even a copy to the State in the mail but are sending it 
18 to the submitting agency. And while it may not be the 
19 best evidence at this point in time, Your Honor, all 
20 that's necessary for the State to do is prove probable 
21 cause; and I believe that the affidavit and the blood 
22 toxicology result is sufficient to show probable cause 
23 combined with Deputy Tilman and Mr. Ball's testimony o 
24 detecting the odor of alcoholic beverage. 
25 THE COURT: Well, I'm having a little bit of 
104 
1 need to note that in your record of exhibits, Madam 
2 Clerk. 
3 THE CLERK: I will. So you want these to 
4 remain attached? 
5 THE COURT: No, they have to stay attached 
6 because they came with the exhibit. 
7 MR. OLESON: Your Honor, I have one other 
8 objection to the chain of custody. Part of that appears 
9 to not -- well, the fax took off part of that, so I 
10 can't even see what's on the top of it. And it appears 
11 the chain of custody is not complete because at the 
12 bottom of it there's an arrow which I'm assuming goes to 
13 the back side, which we do not have. 
14 THE COURT: Well, I will note that that is, 
15 in fact, the case of the document, that there's an arrow 
16 under "Chain of Custody" after 11-12 of '10 that points 
17 to the right-hand side of the page. And your 
18 objection's noted, but I'll allow the results in. 
19 Next witness. 
20 MS. GLEN: Your Honor, the State has no 
21 further witnesses and rests at this time. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Oleson? 
23 MR. OLESON: No witnesses, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. Argument if desired. 
25 Bailiff, would you collect the State's 
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3 THE COURT: Thank you. For purposes of the 
4 preliminary hearing, any objection -- that's kind of 
5 big, and we're going to have to fold it up. I'm a 
6 little bit at a risk of losing the Post-it note or 
7 sticky note. 
8 Any objection, Mr. Oleson, to that large 
9 exhibit being withdrawn and the smaller one that you had 
0 or Ms. Glen had being substituted in its place as 
11 admitted? I mean, we can fold it up and put it in a 
2 folder, but --
.3 MR. OLESON: You should have that one. 
14 MS. GLEN: I have no objection, Your Honor; 
5 and I have a copy of one here. 
16 THE COURT: The problem is -- is that an 
17 extra copy for us? 
8 MS. GLEN: I can get another. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
~0 MR. OLESON: It appears to be the same other 
~1 than a smaller scaled-down drawing, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Let's do that. And so we'll 
""!3 have the smaller 8-1/2 by 11 without the Post-it note on 
!4 it substituted as State's Exhibit C admitted. Thank 
25 you, counsels. 
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1 two together. Was he driving at one time? Obviously, 
2 he got there, we're assuming. There's been no testimony 
3 that -- how he even got there, if he'd driven there, if 
4 anybody had seen him driving at any time. All we know 
5 is that his vehicle was on a road, Highway 93 at the 
6 intersection of Fish Creek, which may or may not have 
7 been moving. We don't know. We don't know if he was 
8 driving. We don't know if he'd driven it there. We 
9 don't know if it was parked or, I guess, not moving. 
10 We -- I guess that's my only trouble is that there 
11 hasn't been anything to tie that together. 
106 
1 <c:>LEN: Thank you. 
2 E COURT: ,t>..rguments if desired. 
3 CLOSING ARGUMENT BY THE STATE 
4 MS. GLEN: Your Honor, the State would just 
5 point out for the record that the ethyl alcohol that the 
6 state laboratory detected in Mr. Klein's blood was .279 
7 grams per 100 cc's of blood plus or minus 5.94 percent. 
8 The State believes it's met its burden of showing 
9 probable cause to believe that the defendant who's 
10 before the Court today committed the offense of 
11 vehicular manslaughter, showing the date, the place, the 
12 defendant driving a motor vehicle on a street or 
13 highway, committing an unlawful act either of failure to 
14 maintain his traffic or driving under the influence of 
15 alcohol pursuant to his blood alcohol content, thereby 
16 causing the death of an individual named Jory Twitchell. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Oleson. 
18 CLOSING ARGUMENT BY THE DEFENDANT 
19 MR. OLESON: Your Honor, I guess the only 
20 part I'm troubled is that yes, is he -- was 
21 Mr. Twitchell killed -- was Mr. Twitchell obviously 
22 driving? Yes. Based upon the accident reconstruction, 
23 his speed was greater than Mr. Klein's speed. We don't 
24 even know if he was operating the motor vehicle at the 
25 time of the accident. There's been nothing tying the 
108 
1 no testimony the engine not -- or the -- engine not 
2 running or the vehicle not moving is no violation of 
3 Idaho Code 18-8004 if it was just stopped in the middle 
4 of the road, and nobody has testified that it was 
5 moving. 
6 So we would ask that the Court dismiss this 
7 as there's a significant element of the offense which is 
8 missing. Thank you. 
9 oou~s~u~ 
10 THE COURT: All right. I was satisfied with 
11 the trooper's testimony that the defendant was traveling 
12 And so based upon that, I believe that Idaho 12 north in the southbound lane of Highway 93 at the time 














died, that it was unlawful, and that the defendant was 
operating in which the operation of a motor vehicle is a 
significant cause contributing to the death because of 
either an unlawful act or, as it's charged, the 
commission of Idaho Code 18-8004. But there's been no 
testimony, no evidence at all, that he was operating the 
vehicle. He was found in the vehicle. There's been no 
testimony the vehicle was running or at any time moving 
while he was operating it, which I believe then there's 
been insufficient evidence because there hasn't been an 
element of the offense. It's just as likely that his 
vehicle was stopped there, not moving. If the engine--
14 cause, that's sufficient evidence to bind the defendant 
15 over to stand to answer the charges in the district 
16 court. We will set this before Judge Tingey on December 
17 15th at 1:30 p.m. 
18 MR. OLESON: Wednesday? 
19 THE COURT: Yeah. It's just his normal day 
20 to be here, so --
21 Anything further, Mr. Oleson? 
22 MR. OLESON: Yes, Your Honor. We'd like to 
23 address a bond or, at the very least, request my client 
24 be able to work during the day. I know that the Court 
25 took this up the last time. I know the Court's 
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Court doesn't 1 
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._ouRT: Okay. Well, I'm going to deny 
2 want him, I think the saying was, 2 the motion this time. You'll be before Judge Tingey 
3 a bottle; but he does have employment. If the Court's 
4 concerned about him, obviously he can check in, he can 
5 be tested. If the Court feels there's still that 
3 on Wednesday of this week. I've already bound him ove 
4 to the district court, so you can address that with the 
5 district court. 
6 concern about him not having the close supervision, if 
7 he's sleeping every night here, at least he can work 
6 MR. OLESON: Well, my only problem with 







during the day; and his drinking, I guess, would be 8 
easily monitored. And obviously, if he drinks, then he 9 
won't be getting back out and he'll be sitting for a 10 
long time. But we'd ask the Court to at least give him 11 
the opportunity to work if the Court's not inclined to 12 
reduce the bond. The $250,000 between the two is pretty 13 
14 substantial. So thank you. 14 





MS. GLEN: Your Honor, it's the State's 16 
understanding that Mr. Klein is self-employed. The 17 
State's not aware of where he would be working or how he 18 
would be getting from here to there. Should the Court 19 
~0 see fit to release Mr. Klein for work release, of 20 
!1 course, it would have to be up to the sheriff to 21 
22 determine whether or not that's going to be something 22 
"!3 the sheriff's office can work with with the holidays and 23 
!4 their schedule. That's the State's concerns with regard 24 
25 to this. 25 
86 
think I have a trial, so --
THE COURT: I can't -- you know how it 
works. The district judges set their dates, and I'm 
obligated to follow that. 
MR. OLESON: I understand. 
THE COURT: So all right. That'll be all. 
(Proceedings concluded) 
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Idaho State Police 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report 
Report Information 
Report Subject: Case Analysis 
Oat~ of Report: February 2, 2011 
Collision Location: US Highway 93 @ Fish Hatchery Road (Custer County) 
Investigating Officer: Master Corporal Wayne D. Scoggins 
Information Analysis Is Based On 
• IVCR, Idaho Vehicle Collision Report 
• Idaho State Police Incident Reports 
• Idaho State Police Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report 
• Butte County Sheriffs Office Incident Reports 
• Custer County Sheriffs Office Incident Reports 
• Photographs 
• Photograph Log 
• Measurements 
• Tail Lights, Brake Lights and Turn Signal Lights 
• Field Sketch 
• Field Notes 
• Statements 
• Scale Diagram 
• Medical Records and Reports 
• Idaho State Police Forensic Services Lab Reports 
• Affidavit of Probable Cause 
• Criminal Complaint 
EH 07 03.01 
Page 1 89 
EXHIBITJL 
rev 02/08 
Idaho State Police 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report 
Technical Analysis 
On January 28, 2011, at approximately 0800 hours, I Fred Rice, met with Corporal Allen 
Bivins and Master Corporal Wayne Scoggins at the Idaho State Police, Idaho Falls 
Region office. A complete copy of the case file was supplied to me and we discussed 
and reviewed the case information. 
At approximately 1 000 hours, on January 28, 2011 , Corporal Scoggins and I left Idaho 
Falls and drove to the crash site on US highway 93 in Custer County. At the crash site 
we met with Custer County Sheriff's Deputy Tilman and Custer County Prosecuting 
Attorney Shawn M. Glen. 
On January 31, 2001, I started reviewing all of the material from this case at my office in 
Meridian, Idaho. The scale drawing that was created by Corporal Bivins clearly shows 
the movements of the vehicles from the area of impact to the final resting positions. A 
Momentum Analysis and a Vector Sum Analysis of this collision clearly illustrates that 
both vehicles were moving at the time of the impact The speeds of the vehicles at the 
moment of impact are not absolute but would not vary by more than 5%. The speed of 
the 1995 Lincoln driven by Jory Twitchell was 53 miles per hour at impact, plus or minus 
2.65 miles per hour. The speed of the 1988 Toyota driven by Marc Klein was 31 miles 
per hour at impact, plus or minus 1.55 miles per hour. 
The information used for the Momentum Analysis and the Vector Sum Analysis is the 
follewing. Based on the damage to the vehicles analyzed from the photographs and the 
scale drawing, the approach angle ofthe 1988 Toyota was 217.5 degrees. The 
approach angle of the 1995 Lincoln was 0 degrees. The departure angle of the 1988 
Toyota was 355 degrees and the departure angle of the 1995 Lincoln was 334 degrees. 
The 1995 Lincoln rotated clockwise while scuffing 30.8 feet on a surface with a drag 
factor of. 7 and 61 feet on a surface with a drag factor of .4. The 1988 Toyota rotated 
counterclockwise, while scuffing 38.8 feet on a surface with a drag factor of .7. The 
weights ofthe two vehicles were taken from the Vehicle Specifications data base. 4273 
lbs was used for the 1995 Lincoln and 2846 lbs was used for the Toyota. 
The following calculations were used to determine the vehicles at impact speed. 
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idaho State Poiice 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report 
S= ../30xDxf 
S = ../ 30 X 3Q.800Q X 0.3500 
s = -J 323.4000 
S= 17.9833 
S= ../30x Ox f 






D = lre D&am in Fe6t. 
f = 1re pqwoo Proai/D-~ Fro a. 
1re \A31ooty in R=s is: 
S= lre~inMA-t 
30 = AOn:tat. 
D = lre DS:am in Fea.. 
f = 1re A::juioo A:x:x:ID-eg Fro a. 
26.3755 
61.0000 28.0589 
S= ../52(1) + SZ(2) + ... ~(n) 
S= ../(17.9800)2+ (19.1300)2+ (0.0000)2+ (0.0000)2+ (0.0000)~ (0.0000)2+ (0.0000)2+ (O.OOOC))2 
S= ../323.2804+ 365.9569+ 0.0000+ 0.0000+ 0.0000+ 0.0000+ 0.0000+ 0.0000 
s = -J 689.2373 S= lre~inM1-t 
f1 = lre lrd\1d.a Mn ~ 
S= 26.2533 (1), (2), (n) = lre# dtreird\1d.B ~. 
~#1 inMA-Hs: 17.9800 
~#2 inMA-fis: 19.1300 lfe~tyinfffiis: 
--------------------~------~ 
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Idaho State Police 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report 
S= -/30 x Ox f-
s = -/30 )( 38.8000 )( 0.3500 
S= lha~inMffi 
30 = A On:ita1:. 
D = lhe Dstcn::e in Feet. 
f = lhe pqu&oo ~>a:a/D-ag Fro a. 
s == -/407.4000 
S= 20.1841 
38.8000 
WI X V3 X Sn e V4 X Sn <I> 
V2= +---
W2. x . Sn 'I' Sn 'I' 
1re ~cx:ity in FPS is: 
V1 = 1re ~ ci \Ml1 in MR-i. 
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The above :photographs illustrate how the two vehicles impacted each other. The 
folloWing draWing :shows the placement of the two vehicles in relationship to each other 
af:maiim4.m engagement. 
The photographs following the diagram show marks on the Lincoln that indicate that it 
rolled onto its side and top before coming to rest on its wheels. 
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The driver of the 1988 Toyota was not wearing his seat belt and his face and head 
struck the front windshield. This is clearly visible in the following photographs. Injuries 
to Marc Klein's head and face match the damage to the driver's side windshield of the 
1988 Toyota. 
The 1988 Toyota traveled approximately 12.6 feet from the time it started its turn to the 
point of impact. At 31 miles per hour, it took the 1988 Toyota approximately .27 
seconds to make this maneuver. The 1995 Lincoln would have been approximately 
20.9 feet north of the point of impact at 53 miles per hour, when the 1988 Toyota started 
its left tum. 
EH 07 03-01 
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Conclusions 
The 1988 Toyota was being driven by Marc Klein at the time of this collision. Klein is 
re§ponsible for this collision, as he failed to yield to Twitchell, while attempting to turn 
felt ont0·Fish Hatchery ~oad. Twitchell did not have enough time to even perceive that 
the 1988 Toyota was turning prior to the collision. 
Submitted by: CRPM Fred Rice -1vl ..... ~~'{ ~ 
1i'f~ 11(1> ~-
Reviewed by: Brandon Eller 
Reviewed by: Quinn B. Carmack 
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Date: February 4, 2011 
Date: February 7, 2011 
Date: February 7, 2011 
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- Stephen J. Blaser 
Murray Jim Sorensen 
Justin B. Oleson 
Marc Edward Klein 
c/o Custer County Jail 
P.O. Box 344 
Challis, 10 83226 
~nRI=I\I~E---N' ''; Q! FSON, @hartel!ed 





Februnry 22, 2011 
RE: Vehicular Manslaughter 
Dear Marc: 
285 N.W. Mai1 
MAILING ADDRESS 
P.O. Box 104~ 
Blackfoot, Idaho 8322-
I enclose a copy of the Minute Entry And Order setting your sentencing on Apri120, 
2011 at 1 :30 p.m. 
This confirms that based upon the new report from Fred Rice, my discussions with 
-Mr. Rice and our inability to find anyone that would be creditable in disputing Mr. Rice's 
- analysis and you inability to have any memory of the accident and the State's plea 
agreement, you wished to pled guilty to vehicular manslaughter and the excessive DUI will 
be dismissed. 
The State is bound to recommend no more than 3 years fixed and 3 years 
indeterminate. The court also indicated in chambers that he did not feel with your record that 
he would probably send you to prison for more time than that. However I get did the 
impression that we might be able to get less, perhaps a Rider or some lesser amount of 
time. 
Further, we will be getting the presentence investigation and see what the 
recommendation will be. 
We also attempted to get you released on your recognizance, based up the charges 
and your plea to those the court did not reduce your bond or allow you to be released. 
In the meantime if you have any questions let me know. 
Otherwise, I will see you on the 201h of April. 
JBO/sa 




Nevin Benjamin McKay & Bartlett LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 W. Bannock St. 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attn: Jeff Brownson 
RE: Klein accident reconstruction 
FDJ CN: 11-144 
April9, 2012 
Pursuant to your request, we have prepared a preliminary report regarding the accident at the 
intersection ofUS93 and fish hatchery road about 10 miles north ofMackay, Idaho. Conclusions 
for this report are based upon discussions with Marc Klein, a site visit January 11, 2012, review of 
Idaho State Police documentation and reports, accident reconstruction training and standards, and 
engineering principles and experience. 
This report has been divided into five sections for your review and use. 
I. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
III. GENERAL ACCIDENT DISCUSSION 
IV. FACTS AND PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
V. PHOTOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 
We appreciate the opportunity to work on this case. If you have any questions or comments 
regarding this report please call us, thank you. 
Very Truly Yours, 
ave Jak~c, P.E. 
Presiden{ 
ENCL: 2 CD 11-144 Report 
Files 10-1, wkl2-104 Cltr EXHIBIT£ 
FDJ Engineering ph: 208.368.0045 fax: 208.368.0056 908 Linden, Boise, Idaho 83706 
FDJ Engineen"ng, PC 
_,.,~rom 
I. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Klein Accident 
Fish hatchery road and US 93 near Mackay, ID 
FDJ CN 11-144 
March 30,2012 
On October 11, 2010 a collision between a 1988 Toyota Pickup (VI) driven by Marc Klein and a 
1995 Lincoln Continental (V2) driven by Jory Twitchell occurred near mile post 118 on US 93 
about 9 miles north of Mackay Idaho. The collision occurred at the "T intersection" at the junction 
with Fish Hatchery Road. V 1 was traveling northbound (NB) on US 93 and V2 was traveling 
southbound (SB) when VI driver (left) front comer collided with the, left front corner of V2. Our 
objective was to determine the probable cause of the accident, and determine if possible, the Idaho 
State Police (ISP) investigation and accident reconstruction analysis accuracy, validate the 
summary ofiSP findings, and the identification of the responsible party(s). 
II. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
With a reasonable degree of engineering certainty we have concluded that the more likely cause of 
the accident was due to excessive speed ofV2, whereas both V2 and Vl collided near the centerline 
of the US93 roadway. V2 pre-impact velocity was approximately 75 to 78 miles per hour (MPH). 
V2 speed may have been faster if the driver if V2 had applied brakes, but did not leave tire skid 
marks. At V2 speed of 75 to 78MPH, it would have been probable that V2 was steered left to cut 
the comer. This was visually observed numerous times traveling SB during the site inspection on 
the 11JAN2012. The vehicle damage profiles do not support the ISP impact diagram in exhibit 7a 
due to the windshield impact of Mr. Klein, and the post impact travel path and rotation of the 
vehicles. Evidence was not documented by ISP that V2 may have been decelerating or braking, 
which would have had V2 traveling faster than 75-78 MPH. 
Based on the accepted laws of conservation derived by Isaac Newton, the energy that goes into a 
collision is equal to the energy out. The ISP calculations were found to have errors of gross 
magnitude and employed the use of vector analysis equations that did not apply to the accident 
conditions, and physical constraints. Moreover, the ISP investigation report calculation missed 
basic energy balance by omitting vehicle crush deformation, post travel rotation/distance, and V2 
rollover event, including Fred Rice's report which at times contradicted the ISP investigation 
results. When substantial energy loss has been permitted in your analysis, the results may become 
invalid. The ISP Fred Rice range of speed accuracy of 5% statement was grossly overstated and 
actual calculated speed results were a 54% decrease for VI and a 41% increase for V2. ISP 
knowingly documented and did not evaluate field evidence and information relevant to the accident 
reconstruction analysis results. 
The evidence that was not incorporated into the ISP reports included, but was not limited to: 
l. V2 rolled over after skidding approximately 58 feet post impact, but the rollover was not 
implemented in their analysis or for energy balance. 
2. The road gouges in the SB lane were identified as the point of impact (POI) in the vector 
analysis. 
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3. ISP used linear momentum with vector analysis, without incorporating the road geometry 
which included a vertical and horizontal curve with super elevation. 
4. Light bulbs were secured but not evaluated in any of the reports. 
5. Took pictures, but did not evaluate vehicle fluid loss spray patterns. 
6. Photographed, but did not document or evaluate impact deformation. 
7. Window spider cracks in front of Klein in V 1. 
The exact location of the vehicles just prior to impact was defined by ISP, and the interface angle at 
impact was defined to be at 2I7.5°, which was errant as shown in exhibit 4. The ISP accident site 
survey located VI and V2 final resting position (FRP), identification of gouges in the SB lane made 
from V2 undercarriage; and tire scuffing in the gravel and location of V2 vehicle rollover. Neither 
pre-impact nor post impact tire skid marks were documented by ISP for VI or V2, although V2 
rotated= 400 degrees and V2 rotated over 65 degrees on dry ACP. This would be considered an 
anomaly. ISP reported that the POI was at the gouges in the SB lane, which was errant. At an 
average speed of 55 mph (80 fps) from impact deceleration ofV2 with a standard collision 
engagement period of O.I to 0.2 seconds, V2 would have traveled approximately between 8 feet and 
I6 feet. This distance would occur along the post impact departure path ofV2. ISP did not 
document the actual POI, but used the gouges in the road as the basis for impact in the vector 
analysis. This is another inconsistency in the report statements and calculations. 
By the time that V2 made the skid gouge marks, V2 had rotated counterclockwise as a result of the 
impact to V2 front left comer, and later along its left side. This is assuming that V2 was traveling 
parallel to the center line. The ISP POI was I8 feet south of the center of the intersection and would 
place V2 straddling the west fog line and VI headed off the paved road surface onto the SW 
embankment ofFish Hatchery Road at the intersection ofUS93. 
ISP secured "Tail Light, Brake Lights and tum Signal Lights" because they thought it could be 
critical to the final accident reconstruction analysis. V2 was totaled out in Idaho and rebuilt in 2005 
as shown in exhibit 4, which may have significant impact to driving and automobile stability, 
brakes and electrical system malfunction. The evidence may still be retained but needs to have 
independent evaluation, since there was not any bulbs "on-off analysis" or mention of any 
evaluation in the summary of findings in any ISP report. Light on/off analysis has the potential to 
better determine the ability to see, whether braking was initiated, and whether tum signal was in 
operation. Unfortunately, V2 was not inspected, retained for later inspection and evaluation for 
Klein's legal and accident reconstruction representation. However, based on ISP errant accident 
reconstruction combined with minimal and selective evaluation of all evidence, criminal charges 
were filed against Mr. Klein because of blood tests. 
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Accident reconstruction analysis review and exceptions to the ISP reports: 
ISP reports were generated by using linear momentum and vector analysis, which in my opinion, 
would not be a viable application in a case where vehicles have collided with angular acceleration 
causing rotation as well as the V2 rollover event The ISP angle of approach for the two vehicles 
and the impact engagement diagram was not utilized in the calculations consistently. There was not 
a common ordinate with Odegrees used with the stated azimuth of engagement between the two 
vehicles. 
The standard co-efficient of friction values used for tires on asphalt concrete pavement (ACP) and 
gravel were reduced by 50% without explanation or evidence to support this large of correction to a 
standard factor. There was disagreement between the ISP officer reports as to which way the 
vehicles rotated in post accident travel, exhibit 6. The ISP results were not supported by physical 
evidence that ISP documented at the site. The investigation omitted evaluation of mechanical 
failure, electrical failures, and did not address any need for corrective eyewear or night vision 
issues. The POI that ISP sited was not accurate and may be as much as 8 to 16 feet off, from where 
the initial impact occurred. In my opinion, the apparent ISP focus was to convict the driver that 
was impaired from excessive alcohol consumption, and not an objective and thorough accident 
reconstruction. 
III. General Accident Discussion: 
a. The roadscape included a 2 travel lane rural secondary highway with shoulders on both 
sides. There were not any guardrails or striping that denoted a no passing zone. This section 
of road for V2 pre-impact SB travel was a long section ofhighway with a downward grade 
of 2.4 to 3.5%, around a left hand curve with Fish Hatchery Road intersection on the west 
(right) side of US 93 near the apex of the curves. Historically, this has been a hazardous 
highway section and has resulted in numerous serious collisions as documented by the Idaho 
Transportation Department (lTD.) 
b. The noted road surface condition noted by ISP was dry. Neither driver had any physical 
visual obstructions that would have contributed to line of sight or reflection issues 
contributing to the collision. The accident occurred at 7:25PM MST on November 11, 
2010, which was more than 2 114 hours after sunset, approximately 5:10pm (reference 
exhibit 8.) Vehicle driving lights would have been on for a driver to see this late into the 
evening. Although secured by ISP, neither vehicle headlights, including marker lights, 
brake lights or tum signal light bulbs were evaluated in their report. The ISP Rice report in 
exhibit 7a identifies securing left tum signal, brake and taillights, but none were addressed 
in the his or any ISP report. Checking the bulbs and filaments may have provided evidence 
of pre-impact vehicle lighting and verification if driver visibility and subsequent impaired 
visibility and delayed reaction may have caused the collision. In particular the potential for 
V2 speed increase from pre-impact breaking and VI signaling would provide more insight. 
Moreover, there may have been a braking malfunction if V2 brake lights were on at impact 
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and there were not any pre-impact tire skid marks observed by ISP. The significance to 
malfunction multiplies when V2 was totaled out in Idaho and rebuilt in 2005 as shown in 
exhibit 4. 
c. There were not any witnesses to the collision. The only surviving witness was Mr. Klein 
who said that he had driven from Mackay Idaho and past at least 2 vehicles going in the 
opposite direction SB on US 93, but could not recall the events just before impact. Head 
impact with the windshield behind the steering wheel was severe and documented by ISP to 
be consistent with Klein's injuries. 
d. Four reports were prepared by reviewing vehicle damage and a site survey by three ISP 
officers as follows: 
~ #2575 Wayne Scoggins, Idaho Vehicle Collision Report dated 11116/2010 
~ #2575 Wayne Scoggins, Incident Report dated 12/7/2010 
~ # 3151 Allen Bivins, assisted with investigation and Incident Report supplement 0001 
dated 11111120 l 0 and approved by officer #2608 on 11/16/2010. 
~ Fred Rice Report Dated 2/2/11, rev 02/08 EH07 03-01 
e. Accident A voidance indicators and possibilities have been outlined below: 
l) Driver ofV1- Actions taken to avoid the accident was not known, but his speed was 
minimal prior to impact relative to the posted maximum speed for this section ofUS93. 
Klein told ISP officers that he thought the collision was in his NB lane, but this was not 
seriously or equitably considered by ISP or the Custer County prosecutor. 
2) Driver ofV2- Evasive actions were not identified by ISP at the accident scene, but the 
bumpers did not to match height at impact, which could be because of braking. However 
there were not any documented tire brake or skid marks by ISP on the pavement. The 
driver may have been cutting the corner because of the excessive speed over the 65 
MPH speed limit while traveling on a long section of 3.5% highway descending slope, 
then entering the left curve and reaching the vertical and horizontal apex near the Fish 
Hatchery Road intersection on the west side ofUS93. 
f. Other contributors -
11-144 report 
1) VI driver had traveled from the town of Mackay to the intersection which is less 
than ten miles. He had high alcohol blood content and did not recall the collision 
details except that he was traveling slowly and he thought the collision was in his 
NB lane. 
2) V2 driver had been traveling for a longer period of time and for at least 268 miles; 
leaving in the afternoon from Idaho Falls, going to Salmon and on toward Mackay 
through Challis, and may have been tired and fatigued. V2 driver was traveling to 
Arco, Idaho, which was approximately 45 miles away. He did not survive the 
incident. 
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g. Vehicles were not available to inspect for malfunction or crush deformation, and survey 
records, plots and field notes, and light bulbs secured by ISP were not available for review. 
Documentation of driver need for corrective lenses was not available. Discussions with 
police officers were not attempted, but we were able to discuss some items specific to the 
pickup with Klein. I was not aware that there was an autopsy performed to determine the 
cause of death for Mr. Twitchell. 
h. There was a discrepancy in the length that the Lincoln skidded post impact between ISP 
officers Bivins and Rice. Unfortunately a common bench mark was not set up and so it is 
unclear which of these measurements are correct, if either. Surveying an accident sight 
typically requires two or more reference points to validate results with a closed survey. 
Reference exhibit 6. 
1. There is a discrepancy between statements of Bivins and Rice about the direction of spin for 
the Lincoln. Bivins states in his Traffic Reconstruction and Analysis Report that the 
Lincoln rotated counter-clockwise after impact. Rice states in his Traffic Collision 
Reconstruction and Analysis Report that the Lincoln rotated clockwise after the impact. 
(exhibit 6.) 
J. There was no post or pre-: impact skid marks noted by ISP for either vehicle. The only 
visible marks left on the ACP were documented by ISP and in their photographs, exhibit 9, 
They included AC pavement gouge marks, destroyed delineator, tire scuff in the gravel and 
the fluid from VI mostly in the NB lane. 
k. Photos of the accident and scene taken by police yielded the following information: 
11-144 report 
1) Damage to both vehicles was consistent with a minimal offset head on collision with 
the worst damage focused around the driver side of V2 and the front of V 1. The 
difference in damages was related to the amount of rotation each vehicle makes 
during engagement. VI in this case had less impulse force and rotates more and in 
the direction ofV2. The front left comer ofVl shows initial impact and the right 
front area of the vehicle shows rotation impact deformation from impact with V2 
toward V2 pillars A and B. 
2) Red fiberglass debris located in the front "brush guard" of the Toyota pickup 
indicates that the pickup went over some of V2front bumper during the initial 
collision. The brush guard bumper was made of welded flat spring steel and cold 
rolled steel tubes. The photographs show transfer of red on the pickup skid plate. 
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3) Gouge marks are located in the SB lane were documented. The closest gouge mark 
located approximately 2 inches Northwest of the fog line and the farthest gouge 
mark located approximately 3 feet Northwest of the west fog line measuring 
perpendicular from the fog line. V2 had rotated before leaving the gouges and west 
side of the highway edge of pavement. A reflector post was also flattened to the 
ground as the car slid over it sideways. Tire scuff marks left in the gravel by the 
Lincoln indicate it went down off the west road embankment skewed to US 93 
highway alignment. After traveling 60 feet sideways, then it rolled over to the FRP 
at approximately 82 feet from the ACP gouges in the SB lane of US 93. 
4) A liquid deposit was located in the North bound lane that appears to be spray 
resulting from VI radiator as it was rotating counter-clockwise approximately 400° 
after impact. The ISP distance traveled between the gouges and the FRP was 36 feet 
for the vector analysis calculations, but the actual distance traveled was estimated at 
53 feet with the post impact path including rotation. This was a 48% increase in 
distance. 
This preliminary report may be subject to change based on new information. This report should not 
be used solely for making insurance coverage decisions or for use by subsequent entities for future 
evaluation, without FDJ Engineering's written authorization. 
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IV. FACTS AND PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
The following physical properties and understood facts have been outlined herein to assist with a 
better understanding of the problem that was outlined in section I, reference documents in section 
IV and the correlations with the conclusions reached in section II. 
1. The Idaho Vehicle Collision Report dated 11NOV10 with case number: I10000816 yielded 
the following information: 
a. The accident between Klein and Twitchell occurred at the intersection of US 
highway 93 and Fish Hatchery Road. 
b. Klein was driving a 1988 Toyota pickup and Twitchell was driving a 1995 Lincoln 
Continental. 
c. Klein's blood alcohol was measured at 0.279 via a blood test. 
d. Klein was headed Northbound on US 93 and Twitchell was headed Southbound on 
us 93. 
e. After impact Twitchell's vehicle went off the right side of the road (SW direction), 
hit a delineator post and came to a rest facing Northeast in the borrow pit after 
rolling over sideways one time. 
f. After impact Klein stayed on the road facing Southwest in the SB lane. 
2. The Idaho State Police Incident Report dated llNOVIO by Wayne Scoggins yielded the 
following information: 
a. The road was bear and dry at the time Scoggins arrived on scene. 
b. Gouge marks were observed in the SB lane. 
c. Tire marks were observed going toward the final resting place of the Lincoln. 
d. The windshield of the Toyota pickup was damaged from Klein impact with his head 
during the collision. 
e. The airbags had deployed in the Lincoln. 
f. The post impact fluid spray from VI counter-clockwise rotation showed mostly in 
the NB lane and supported rotation of approximately 400°. 
3. A site inspection was conducted by FDJ on 11JAN12 with the following information: 
11-144 report 
a. R Clayton and D Jakovac left Boise at 7 am and arrived at the accident site at 11:15 
am. The weather was clear and sunny and there was not any snow on the roads. 
There was some snow on shaded areas in surrounding landscape. The stationing was 
initiated at the SB lane fog line perpendicular to the speed sign about 900 feet north 
of the intersection with Fish Hatchery Road. The stationing continued US93 SB past 
the intersection and approximately 1200 feet. FDJ station 8+74 correlated to ISP RP 
at centerline marking. 
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b. Visual notes of the vehicles traveling SB on US 93 through by the intersection and 
resulted in nearly one-third of the trucks, pickups and cars "cut the inside comer" 
(e.g. crossing into the NB lane) negotiating the left hand curve. Later in the 
afternoon, the Custer County sheriff was setting along the road in at a historical 
monument sign sta. 4+ 30 to sta. 5+90, and the driving habits changed. The officer 
said that he helped with the accident. 
c. A site drawing with roadscape physical information, ISP markings, V2 gouges (sta. 
9+32) and vehicle FPR. 
d. The Toyota's FRP via ISP was approximately 36 feet south ofthe SB lane gouges 
near Fish Hatchery Road. 
e. The Lincoln's FRP via ISP was approximately 77 feet south ofthe SB lane gouges 
near Fish Hatchery Road. We measured the distance to be approximately 79 feet to 
the north side of the vehicle and 21 feet west of US 93 SB lane fog line. 
f. The ISP reference point (RP) nail was found at the EOP east of the curve sign at FDJ 
station 8+74. 
g. There were items at the accident site that were secured, as it was believed to be 
components ofV2 from the subject collision. In particular, there was a headlight 
assembly south ofV2 FPR and 34 feet west of the US 93 SB lane fog line. The 
evidence log has been included in exhibit 3. 
h. The highway sloped down at 3.4% at sta. 6+50. The road crown was 2.2%. The 
highway super was between 2.5% to 4.1 %. 
i. The center of fish hatchery road T intersection was measured at sta. 9+ 10 on US 93 
at the centerline. 
J. Traffic control for the intersection was a stop sign for EB Fish Hatchery Road to 
make a tum onto either NB or SB US 93. There was not a left turn lane for NB 
traffic on US 93 wanting to make a left hand turn, similar to what M Klein was 
intending. 
k. A left hand turn was negotiated from NB US 93 onto Fish Hatchery Road several 
times and the comfort level was at 15-20 mph and 25 mph was about the fastest 
speed to avoid skidding or rollover using empirical test results from driving a 2011 
expedition. Attempting this tum at 31mph would be dangerous from a vehicle 
stability and vehicle stability and passenger comfort. 
l. The gouges in the SB lane of US 93 were approximately 18 feet south of the center 
of the T -intersection confluence and close to the US 93 west embankment. 
4. The Idaho State Police Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report dated 2FEB12 
written by Fred Rice has been summarized below: 
11-144 report 
a. Vector sum and momentum analysis was used to determine the initial (impact) 
speeds of the vehicles. 
b. The speed of the Lincoln was 53 mph and the speed of the Toyota was 31 pmh, with 
only 5% variance in speed level of confidence. 
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c. The Lincoln rotated clockwise while skidding 30.8 feet on the roadway and skidding 
another 61 feet in the gravel borrow pit including a rollover. 
d. A drag factor of 0. 7 was used for the asphalt and 0.4 was used for the gravel borrow 
pit. The drag factors of0.7 and 0.4. [FDJ found that the ISP drag factors (COF) had 
been divided in half for the calculations without explanation.] 
e. The weight ofthe Lincoln was 4273 pounds. 
f. The weight of the Toyota was 2846 pounds. 
g. The impact engagement angle was at approximately a 37 degree angle relative to the 
Lincoln. [FDJ determined that the angles did not correspond to the same ordinate 
system used between VI and V2 at impact. The vector analysis would be in error.] 
h. Rice stated that "Klein is responsible for this collision, as he failed to yield to 
Twitchell, while attempting to tum left onto Fish Hatchery Road. Twitchell did not 
have enough time to even perceive that the 1988 Toyota was tuning prior to the 
collision. (FDJ did not find these conclusions to be supported with physical evidence 
or accurate reconstruction analysis.) 
5. Klein thought that fluids present in the NB lane were where the actual collision took place. 
Upon examination ofthe photographs we confirmed that the fluid in the NB was from VI, 
as a result of the Toyota rotating counterclockwise on the highway post collision. The 
directional spray in the NB lane can be seen in ISP photos along the edges of the liquid 
spray indicate counter clockwise rotation. The police report does not discuss this spray in 
the road, and energy lost due to the rotation of the pickup, and increased distance VI 
traveled in the calculations, thereby only having the speed ofV2 at impact of 53 MPH. 
6. The method of vector analysis and momentum analysis (used by ISP) was an inappropriate 
and resulted in inaccurate results. The ISP linear momentum vector analysis, when there 
was vehicle rotation and rollovers was errant. The ISP vector analysis calculation would rely 
on vehicle velocity, mass and post impact travel in a linear route directly to the vehicle 
FPRs. It took considerable more energy to make VI do the required rotation of 
approximately 400 degrees, the energy lost in the vehicles crush deformation and V2 
rollover and rotation. FDJ analysis using EDC accident reconstruction software resulted in 
V2 exceeding the 65 MPH posted maximum speed limit, traveling in excess of 75MPH, and 
the PU speed at impact of approximately 17 MPH. The point of impact was not correctly 
identified by ISP as the gouges in the SB pavement. A 0.1 to 0.2 second impact engagement 
can be used between colliding vehicles. V2 traveling 75MPH (110 FPS) could result in 
between 8 and 16 feet prior to making gouges from the left front frame protrusions falling to 
the AC pavement. The collision may have initiated near if not within the NB lane. 
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7. HVE EDSMAC4 analysis indicates that speeds needed to produce spinning ofthe pickup 
and final resting position ofthe Lincoln were different than what was stated in the ISP 
report. See exhibit 5 for the details of our accident reconstruction. Case scenarios were run 
for a number of simulations before getting results with energy balance similar to the actual 
accident as documented, but are still pending. The following vehicle physical 
characteristics, assumptions and derived results were as follows: 
a. Lincoln weight:4271 lbs (from Edmunds) 
b. Toyota weight: 3234lbs (from HVE database) 
c. Lincoln initial speed: 75-80 mph 
d. Toyota speed: 15-20 mph 
e. POI approximately 7 feet NNW of SB fog line. 
f. Toyota preparing to make a left tum off US 93 onto Fish Hatchery road WB. 
ISP was a registered EDC accident reconstruction software package user. It was not 
apparently used by ISP to evaluate this accident. EDCRASH4, EDSMAC and HVE provide 
a substantial increase in the degree of accuracy than the use of vector and linear momentum 
analysis, which was not appropriate reconstruction science methodology for this type of 
collision. As noted in exhibits 6 and 7, the accuracy of the vehicle speeds by Fred Rice was 
grossly overstated and post impact VI rotation was errant. 
8. ROADSCAPE PHYSICALS-
a. Neither vehicle would have been obscure from the drivers, but it was dark and light 
"on-off' analyses were not performed or just not reported by ISP. 
b. The roadscape was a two lane AC paved secondary highway signed as US 93. It 
travels over Gilmore Summit (7200 feet elevation) south on long straight stretches, 
where as the road is windy along the Mackay reservoir traveling north from Mackay 
to Fish Hatchery Road, being at the upper end of the reservoir fetch. There were not 
any visual barriers. The striping was not restrictive for passing either NB or SB on 
US 93, although the highway had a curve at the intersection of Fish Hatchery road. 
c. The road cross sections and slopes were documented on a site drawing in exhibit 1. 
9. IDAHO ACCIDENT RECORDS for the area including the subject intersection on US 93 
has been included in exhibit 7b. 
10. DAMAGE PROFILES for the vehicles were not taken or recorded by ISP, to our 
knowledge. The crush energy was also missing from the ISP accident reconstruction 
analysis. 
11. EDCRASH, EDSMAC AND HVE RESULTS have been provided in exhibits 2 and 5. 
12. AAA CALCULATIONS AND RESULTS were not included since there was not any 
vehicles to inspect, witness, tire marks, and minimal roadscape evidence. 
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13. WEATHER CONDITIONS AND NOAAC REPORTS for this accident date have been 
provided in exhibit 8. 
14. PHOTOS BY OTHERS have been included in exhibit 9. 
15. FDJ PHOTOGRAPHY has been included in exhibit 10. 
16. In 2005 the DMV desk multi-state vehicle history report has the 1995 Lincoln damaged to 
status of "totaled," as referenced in exhibit 4. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 







Case No. CV-2012-56 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. _____________________________ ) 
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF; 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
COMES NOW, Val Siegel, Custer County, Idaho Prosecuting Attorney, and submits 
these answers to the allegations made in the Petition for Post Conviction Relief as follows 
(a Brief in Opposition to the Petition will be filed separately): 
1. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
2. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
3. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
4. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
5. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
6. The Respondent admits that the Petitioner was represented by Justin B. Oleson 
in the trial court, but denies that there was a trial in the criminal matter; 
7. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
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8. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
9. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
10. The Respondent denies that the Honorable John P. Luster found that Fred Rice 
provided testimony in State v. Ellington, Kootenai Case No. F06-1497, that 
was "inconsistent and wholly contradictory'' from testimony provided by Mr. 
Rice in State v. Ciccone, and admits only that Judge Luster found "perceived 
inconsistencies" in Mr. Rice's two testimonies (see Affidavit of Jeffrey 
Brownson in support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief, Exhibit "A", page 
13). Judge Luster further found that "it is difficult to conclude that he (Mr. 
Rice) has intentionally or carelessly attempted to mislead the Ellington jury" 
(Brownson Affidvit, page 12); 
11. The Respondent denies the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
12. The Respondent admits that the aforementioned decision by Judge Luster was 
served on the Kootenai Prosecuting Attorney on March 16, 2009, but denies 
that the Custer County Prosecuting Attorney had knowledge of that decision at 
that time; 
13. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
14. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
15. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph, 
and the Respondent notes that this statement by the Petitioner contradicts the 
statement he made as set forth in the preceeding paragraph, as well as his 
admission made to Sheriffs Deputies that "I really screwed up this time"; 
16. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
17. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
18. The Respondent admits that there were no eye witnesses to the collision, but 
notes that another motorist observed the Twitchell vehicle shortly before the 
crash; 
19. The Respondent denies that the State's criminal case was entirely premised 
upon the accident reconstructions conducted by the Idaho State Police; 
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20. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
21. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
22. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
23 (i) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
(ii) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
(iii) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
(iv) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
(v) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
(vi) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
(vii) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
(viii) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
(ix) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
(x) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
24. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
25. (i) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
(ii) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
ST. v.KLEIN 
Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief; Motion for Summary Disposition 
PAGE3 
119 
(iii) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
(iv) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
26. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
27. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
28. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
29. (i) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
(ii) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
(iii) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
(iv) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
(v) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
(vi) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
(vii) The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
30. The Respondent admits that the Petitioner entered an Alford plea of guilty in 
the criminal case, but denies that he did so because of Mr. Oleson's 
representations and the Rice Accident Reconstruction Report; 
31. The Respondent admits that Mr. Oleson wrote a letter to the Petitioner making 
the statements alleged in this paragraph; 
32. The Respondent denies the allegations made by the Petitioner in this paragraph; 
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33. The Respondent denies the allegations made by this Petitioner in this paragraph, 
and notes that Mr. Oleson contacted independent accident reconstructionists to 
review the Rice Accident Report as documented in paragraphs 31 and 39 ofthe 
Petition; 
34. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
35. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
36. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
37. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
38. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
39. The Respondent admits that Mr. Oleson made the statement attributed to him in 
this paragraph; 
40. The Respondent admits that Mr. Oleson made the statement attributed to him in 
this paragraph, but denies "there was no other independent evidence supporting 
the allegations"; 
41. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
42. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
43. The Respondent admits the Petitioner's allegations set forth in this paragraph; 
44. (i) The Respondent admits that the FDJ Accident Reconstruction Report 
makes the statements alleged in this paragraph; 
(ii) The Respondent admits that the FDJ Accident Reconstruction Report 
makes the statements alleged in this paragraph; 
(iii) The Respondent admits that the FDJ Accident Reconstruction Report 
makes the statements alleged in this paragraph; 
(iv) The Respondent admits that the FDJ Accident Reconstruction Report 
makes the statements alleged in this paragraph; 
(v) The Respondent admits that the FDJ Accident Reconstruction Report 
makes the statements alleged in this paragraph; 
(vi) The Respondent admits that the FDJ Accident Reconstruction Report 
makes the statements alleged in this paragraph; 
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(vii) The Respondent admits that the FDJ Accident Reconstruction Report 
makes the statements alleged in this paragraph; 
(viii) The Respondent admits that the FDJ Accident Reconstruction Report 
makes the statements alleged in this paragraph; 
(ix) The Respondent admits that the FDJ Accident Reconstruction Report 
makes the statements alleged in this paragraph; 
(x) The Respondent admits that the FDJ Accident Reconstruction Report 
makes the statements alleged in this paragraph; 
(xi) The Respondent admits that the FDJ Accident Reconstruction Report 
makes the statements alleged in this paragraph; 
(xii) The Respondent admits that the FDJ Accident Reconstruction Report 
makes the statements alleged in this paragraph; 
(xiii) The Respondent admits that the FDJ Accident Reconstruction Report 
makes the statements alleged in this paragraph; 
45. The Respondent denies that Mr. Oleson made no efforts to consult with 
independent accident reconstructionists, further denies that independent 
accident reconstructionists would have told him that the Rice Accident 
Reconstruction Report was erroneous, and notes in Paragraph 39 of the Petition 
that Mr. Oleson "contacted other accident reconstructionists to attempt to rebut 
CPL. Rice's testimony and was told .... it would be a waste of time and 
resources to attempt to rebut his testimony in any aspect"; 
46. The Respondent denies that there were "errors of gross magnitude in the Rice 
Accident Reconstruction Report," and further denies that the Petitioner would 
not have entered a plea of guilty had it not been for the Rice Accident 
Reconstruction Report; 
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47. The Respondent denies that Fred Rice "was found to have previously given 
false, inconsistent, and contradictory testimony in other cases" (see 
Respondent's answer in paragraph 10 hereof), and further denies that the 
Petitioner would not have entered a plea of guilty had he known of Mr. Rice's 
previous testimony in the Ellington and Ciccone cases; 
48. The Respondent admits that neither the Custer County Prosecuting Attorney nor 
Mr. Rice reported Mr. Rice's testimony in the Ellington or Ciccone cases, but 
denies that they had any legal obligation to do so under the circumstances, and 
further denies that Mr. Rice "was previously found to have provided false, 
inconsistent, and contradictory testimony'' in those cases; 
III. (A) The Respondent denies that the Petitioner's constitutional right to Due 
Process was violated, denies that the Custer County Prosecuting Attorney 
knowingly, negligently, or otherwise culpably failed to report the 
Ellington or the Ciccone matters involving Mr. Rice to the Petitioner, and 
further denies that there was any legitimate "impeachment evidence" to 
report; 
(B) The Respondent denies that Mr. Oleson was ineffective per Strickland, 
and further denies that Mr. Oleson failed to conduct an independent 
investigation or consult with independent accident reconstructionists; 
(C) The Respondent denies that Mr. Oleson was ineffective per Strickland 
because he allegedly failed to timely file a motion to withdraw the 
Petitioner's plea of guilty. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
COMES NOW, the Respondent, and, pursuant to I.C. 19-4906(c), moves for 
summary disposition upon the grounds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
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WHEREFORE, the Respondent respectfully requests that the Court deny the Petition 
for Post Conviction Relief, including the relief sought therein. 
Dated: May ~~, 2012 
Val Siegel 
Custer County Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that, on May tf 2012, I served a copy of the ANSWER TO PETITION 
FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF; MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
on the following in the manner indicated: 
Jeffrey Brownson, Esq. 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
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C~tr Mail 
---"~ D Facsimile 
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
2012 JUN 18 PH 12: 34 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83 701 
Phone: (208) 343-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 











CASE NO. CV-2012-056 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
(and Request for Oral Argument) 
Respondent. 
Petitioner, Marc Klein, by and through his attorneys, moves this Court pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 19-4906( c) for its order summarily granting the relief sought in his Verified 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. This Motion is based upon the record herein and upon the 
Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition, contemporaneously 
filed. 
Respectfully submitted this /,r- day of June, 2012. 
ownson 
Attorney for Marc Klein 
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Petitioner, CASE NO. CV-2012-056 
VS. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Respondent. 
Idaho Code Section 19-4906( c) provides: 
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the 
application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admission and agreements of fact, together with any 
affidavit submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Idaho Code § 19-4906( c). 
Here, Mr. Klein filed a Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief explaining how in 
at least three respects his conviction for vehicular manslaughter under Idaho Code § 18-
4006(3 )(b) was in violation of the constitution of the United States. First, Mr. Klein's right to 




due process was violated when the State of Idaho, the prosecuting attorney, and Fred Rice 
failed to disclose that Fred Rice, the State's key witness and accident reconstructionist, had 
previously provided false, inconsistent, and contradictory testimony under oath. Second, Mr. 
Klein received ineffective assistance of counsel from Attorney Justin Oleson because counsel 
failed to independently investigate the accident or consult with an independent accident 
reconstructionist. And third, Attorney Oleson failed to timely file a motion to withdraw Mr. 
Klein's guilty plea. 
In response, the State filed its Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Based 
upon the State's admissions there are no genuine issues of material fact with regard to Mr. 
Klein's first and third basis for relief. 1 Put differently, summary disposition in Mr. Klein's 
favor is appropriate in this case because every fact necessary for granting relief with at least 
two of his claims has been pleaded by Mr. Klein and admitted by the State. 
A. Mr. Klein's Constitutional Right to Due Process was Violated When the 
Prosecuting Attorney Failed to Disclose Impeachment Evidence Regarding 
the Credibility and Reliability of Fred Rice 
A prosecutor in a criminal case must disclose to the defendant all exculpatory material, 
that is, all evidence that is favorable to the accused. This duty on the part of the prosecutor was 
established in the seminal case of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and is grounded in 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as Article 1, § 
1 Mr. Klein acknowledges that based upon the State's Answer to Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief and the denials contained therein, a genuine issue material fact may exist with 
regard to Mr. Klein receiving ineffective assistance of counsel because Attorney Justin Oleson 
failed to conduct an independent investigation or consult with an independent accident 
reconstructionist and that an evidentiary hearing upon this issue is most likely necessary. 
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13 of the Idaho Constitution. "[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to 
an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective ofthe good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." !d. at 87. In 
addition to exculpatory evidence, Brady requires the disclosure of evidence impeaching the 
testimony of a state witness when the reliability of that witness may be determinative of a 
criminal defendant's guilt or innocence. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
The duty of disclosure under Brady extends to all persons working as part of the 
prosecution team or intimately connected with the government's case. See Kyles v. Whitley, 
514 U.S. 419,454 (1995) (declining state's request to hold that prosecutor not responsible to 
disclose information not known by prosecutor although known by police). In order to comply 
with Brady, therefore, 'the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence 
known to the others acting on the government's behalf in this case, including the police." 
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,280 (1999), quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437 
( 1995) (internal citation omitted). "Because prosecutors rely so heavily on the police and other 
law enforcement authorities, the obligations imposed under Brady would be largely ineffective 
if those other members of the prosecution team had no responsibility to inform the prosecutor 
about evidence that undermined the state's preferred theory of the crime." Moldowan v. City of 
Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 377 (61h Cir. 2009). Finally, the State's obligation under Brady 
continued past the entry of a plea and sentencing. Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 
749-750 (91h Cir. 1992) (Brady duty continues into post-conviction proceedings). 
In order to establish a Brady violation, only three things need be shown: "The evidence 
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at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is 
impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or 
inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 
( 1999). Thus, constitutional error results when favorable evidence is withheld from the 
defendant "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceedings would have been different." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 
419, 437 (1995). "On a Brady challenge to a guilty plea, the test of materiality (i.e., prejudice) 
is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the state's failure to produce the 
information, the defendant would not have entered the plea but instead would have insisted on 
going to trial." Roeder v. State, 144 Idaho 415,418, 162 P.3d 794, 797 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(citation omitted). 
In this case, unbeknownst to Mr. Klein, Fred Rice previously provided testimony that 
was found to be inconsistent and contradictory to his testimony in prior cases. It had been 
previously established that on at least two separate issues Fred Rice advanced under oath 
"wholly opposite opinions." State of Idaho v. Jonathan Wade Ellington, Kootenai County 
Case No. F-06-1497, Decision on Motion for New Trial: Newly Discovered Evidence, p.8. 
District Judge John P. Luster noted in his written decision that "[t]he evidence in question is 
testimony from the same witness in a prior proceeding that contradicts the testimony given at 
trial [in this matter]." Id. at 9. Judge Luster, referring to Fred Rice, went further to say, "[t]his 
court would be remiss not to express some concern about the integrity of this witness that has 
been called into question in this case. This is especially true when it pertains to a trained 
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professional with the Idaho State Police." ld. at 12. This evidence that a district court in the 
State ofldaho had found Fred Rice unreliable and not credible is undeniably impeachment 
evidence. Judge Luster himself found that Fred Rice's inconsistent testimony would serve to 
impeach Rice's credibility. 
Interestingly, the State attempts to deny that Fred Rice's previous inconsistent 
testimony is impeaching. Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief ("Answer"), ~ 11. 
Regardless ofthe State's position, the determination of whether something is impeachment 
evidence and subject to disclosure is not a question of fact but instead a question of law. The 
evidence simply is what it is. Its legal effect is a question of law. Though the State can attempt 
to deny this information is impeachment material subject to disclosure under Brady and its 
progeny, the facts are not in dispute and this Court should conclude that Fred Rice's previous 
false testimony is at the very least impeachment material. 
Second, there is no dispute that this evidence of Fred Rice previously providing 
inconsistent and contradictory testimony under oath was never disclosed by the State in this 
matter. Whether inadvertently or willfully, this evidence was never provided to the defense. 
The State admits as much. Answer, ~ 48. Neither the prosecuting attorney nor Fred Rice 
himself informed Mr. Klein that approximately twenty months prior to the accident in this case, 
Judge Luster in Kootenai County unequivocally called into question the credibility and 
reliability ofFred Rice.2 
2 The veracity of Fred Rice was affirmed when the Supreme Court of Idaho issued its 
decision in State of Idaho v. Jonathan W Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P .3d 727 (20 11) finding 
that Fred Rice had provided false testimony. 
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Finally, Mr. Klein was prejudiced by the suppression of this favorable evidence because 
there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result 
of the proceedings would have been different. Had Mr. Klein been made aware of the fact that 
Fred Rice had previously provided false testimony and had significant credibility issues, he 
would not have entered a plea of guilty to vehicular manslaughter. 3 This is further evidenced 
by Attorney Oleson's attempt, though untimely, to withdraw Mr. Klein's guilty plea after the 
Supreme Court of Idaho issued its Ellington decision. 
Here, all three Brady requirements have been met. The withheld evidence regarding 
Fred Rice is impeachment evidence as a matter of law. The evidence was never disclosed to 
the defense. And Mr. Klein would not have pled guilty had he been made aware ofthe 
evidence. As a result, Mr. Klein's conviction must be vacated because it was obtained in 
violation of his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution as well as Article 1, § 13 ofthe Idaho Constitution. 
B. Mr. Klein Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Because Defense 
Counsel Failed to Timely File a Motion to Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A defendant in a criminal case is also guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel 
under both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 
1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based 
upon the state or federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 
3 While the State denies that Mr. Klein would not have entered a plea of guilty had he 
known Fred Rice was found to have provided false, inconsisent, and contradictory testimony in 
other cases (Answer,~ 47), this fact is solely within the province of Mr. Klein and the State's 
attempt to create an issue offact where one fails to exist should be rejected. 
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466 U.S. 668 (1984) standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) 
that counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable 
professional performance, and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong of the test is shown if there is 
a reasonable probability that a different result would have been obtained in the case if the 
attorney had acted properly. !d. "[I]n order to satisfY the "prejudice" requirement, the 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 
Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to timely file a motion 
to withdraw Mr. Klein's guilty plea. Reasonable professional performance requires counsel to 
be aware of the governing rules of procedure and to file motions in a timely fashion. Here, 
even though there existed sufficient time for Attorney Oleson to file a motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea prior to the district court losing jurisdiction, he failed to do so. Answer,~~ 36-38. 
Attorney Oleson's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. On 
April22, 2011, the Judgment ofConviction in the underlying criminal case was file stamped 
by the clerk of the court. Answer,~ 35. Under Idaho Appellate Rule 14, the Judgment of 
Conviction became final forty-two days later- or on June 3, 2011. Answer,~ 37. Because the 
district court loses jurisdiction once the judgment becomes final, any motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) needed to be filed on or before June 3, 2011. 
See State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352,79 P.3d 711 (2003). 
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Attorney Oleson filed a motion seeking to withdraw Mr. Klein's guilty plea on June 
27,2011, more than three weeks after the district court no longer had jurisdiction ofthe matter. 
Answer, ~ 38. The basis for the motion as set forth by Attorney Oleson was: 
[T]that the Defendant entered an Alford Plea admitting that based upon the 
evidence the State had there would be sufficient evidence that the jury could 
convict him in this case. The initial officer at the preliminary hearing could not 
confirm that the Defendant had drove across the center line and caused the 
accident. However, based upon the report of Fred Rice and the conclusions 
made by him, the Defendant agreed to plead guilty to the offense. 
However, based upon the newly discovery evidence and the recent opinion in 
State ofldaho v. Jonathan W. Ellington, recently decided by the Idaho Supreme 
Court and filed on May 27, 2011, Fred Rice provided false testimony in that 
trial which went to the Defendant's sole defense. If the Defendant would have 
know [sic] that at the time of his plea the Cpl. Rice's testimony was suspect, he 
would not have entered the plea. 
Motion for Rule 35, pp. 1-2. Attorney Oleson in the motion itself acknowledges that the 
Ellington decision was issued on May 27, 2011. Inexplicably however Attorney Oleson does 
not file the motion until June 27, 2011. Seven days existed between the issuance ofthe 
Ellington decision and the judgment becoming final in the underlying case, yet no motion was 
timely filed. The motion to withdraw guilty plea should have been timely filed and in failing to 
do so, Attorney Oleson was deficient. There simply is no strategic reason or valid excuse not 
to timely file the motion when sufficient time to do so existed. 
Mr. Klein was also prejudiced as a result of his counsel's deficiency. In order to 
establish prejudice, all Mr. Klein must show is a reasonable probability that, but for Attorney 
Oleson's inadequate performance, the outcome ofthe proceeding before the district court 
would have been different. "Furthermore, in a post-conviction proceeding challenging an 
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attorney's failure to pursue a motion in the underlying criminal action, the court properly may 
consider the probability of success of the motion in question in detennining whether the 
attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance." Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 158, 
857 P .2d 634, 63 7 (Ct. App. 1993 ). Had the motion to withdraw guilty plea been timely filed, 
it was likely Mr. Klein would have prevailed on that motion. Because Mr. Klein would have 
been withdrawing his guilty plea after he was sentenced, he would have needed to establish that 
doing so would have corrected a "manifest injustice." State v. Freeman, II 0 Idaho 117, 714 
P.2d 86 (Ct. App. 1986). Even with that stricter standard applied, Mr. Klein would have likely 
prevailed. 
Again, there were no witnesses to the accident. Based solely upon the Rice Accident 
Reconstruction Report and his attorney's representations, Mr. Klein entered an Alford plea to 
the charge of vehicular manslaughter. Now however, there is "very strong evidence that Cpl. 
Rice perjured himself during the Ellington trial." State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53,253 P.3d 
727, 749 (2011). According to the Supreme Court ofldaho, the State's proverbial star-witness 
IS: 
[A] police officer with twenty five years of experience, who teaches accident 
reconstruction to other Idaho police officers and who has testified for the State 
on many other occasions regarding accident reconstruction, to the stand and ... 
testified falsely according to the well-established principles of accident 
reconstruction ... as well as his own testimony in the Ciccone case and his own 
training materials. 
!d. There is no longer any way Fred Rice could be considered credible or reliable. In light of 
the circumstances, including the fact that Mr. Klein entered a guilty plea pursuant to Alford v. 
North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), upholding a conviction relying solely upon a perjurer's 
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report constitutes a manifest injustice and the motion to withdraw his guilty plea would have 
been granted had it been timely filed. 
Because there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding Attorney Oleson's failure 
to timely file a motion to withdraw, Mr. Klein's guilty plea this issue is ripe for summary 
disposition. Whether Attorney Oleson's deficient conduct and the prejudice suffered by Mr. 
Klein is a question of fact for this Court's determination. 
For all the reasons stated above, as well as those contained in the Verified Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief, the Court should grant summary disposition in favor of Mr. Klein. 
Respectfully submitted this f) day of June, 2012. 
Je&~ 
Attorney for Marc Klein 
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Case No. CV-2012-56 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
AND IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
COMES NOW, Val Siegel, Custer County, Prosecuting Attorney, and submits this 
memorandum in support of the Respondent's motion for summary disposition and in 
opposition to the Petitioner's motion for the same. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On November 11, 2010, the Petitioner was involved in a two vehicle crash on U.S. 
Highway 93 near the Fish Hatchery Road intersection. Highway 93 is a two-lane roadway. 
The driver of the other vehicle, Jory Twitchell, was killed. Blood was drawn from the 
Petitioner and a forensics analysis by an Idaho State Police (ISP) laboratory determined 
that his blood alcohol concentration was .279. (Val Siegel's Affidavit with attached Exhibit 
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1: copy of the criminalist's report and affidavit.) The Petitioner was subsequently charged 
in Custer County case CRF1 0-729 with vehicular manslaughter pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 18-4006(3 )(b), and with driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant to LC. 18-
8004. He entered on Alford plea of guilty as charged to vehicular manslaughter on 
February 16, 2011 pursuant to a written plea agreement. A judgment of conviction and 
sentence entered on April 22, 2011. (Siegel's Affidavit with attached Exhibits 2-5: copies 
of the minute entries of the Petitioner's arraignment and plea change, the judgment of 
conviction, and the plea agreement.) 
Two ISP accident reconstructionists completed investigations and filed reports in the 
criminal case, Allen Bivins and Fred Rice. Bivins also testified at the preliminary hearing. 
Both reconstructionists concluded that the Petitioner, traveling in the northbound lane, 
caused the accident when he crossed the center line to tum left on to Fish Hatchery Road 
and ran into Mr. Twitchell's southbound vehicle. (See Jeffrey Brownson's affidavit filed 
herein, exhibits B,C, and D.) 
On May 27, 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed First Judicial District Judge 
John P. Luster's decision in State v. Ellington, docket no. 33843, a case in which Mr. Rice 
had testified at trial. Rice had previously testified in State v. Ciccone, an Elmore County 
case, that the average perception - reaction time is 1.5 seconds, and that the crash debris 
field is relevant in ascertaining where the crash impact occurred. In Ellington, Rice 
testified that there is no average perception-reaction time and that debris field is "not going 
to tell me where the point of impact happened." Ellington, supra. The Idaho Supreme 
Court held that Judge Luster had erred in denying Ellington's motion for a new trial based 
upon this "newly discovered" evidence from Ciccone and some other sources. 
On June 3, 2011, seven days after the Ellington decision, the Petitioner's judgment 
of conviction herein became final. On June 27, 2011, the Petitioner's counsel Mr. Oleson 
moved to withdraw the former's guilty plea under Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) 
based upon Ellington. That motion was denied on jurisdictional grounds and the pending 
petition for post-conviction relief, dated April 17, 2012 and raising the following issues, 
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was subsequently filed. 
ISSUES 
I. Is the Petitioner entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because of alleged Brady 
violations wherein the Respondent is alleged to have withheld Judge Luster's and the 
Supreme Court's Ellington decisions from the Petitioner? 
II. Is the Petitioner entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because Mr. Oleson was 
allegedly ineffective by allegedly failing to conduct a reasonable investigation and 
failing to retain a crash reconstructionist? 
III. Is the Petitioner entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because Mr. Oleson was 
allegedly ineffective by failing to file a motion to withdraw the Petitioner's guilty 
plea until after the latter's judgment became final? 
The Respondent would argue that the answers to these questions is undoubtedly "no." 
ARGUMENT 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) provides that a guilty plea may be withdrawn after 
sentencing only to correct a "manifest injustice." A stricter standard is applied to a motion 
for plea withdrawal following sentencing to ensure that the accused does not plead guilty 
merely to test the weight of potential punishment and then withdraw the plea if the 
sentence is unexpectedly severe. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295; 787 P.2d 281 (1990). 
I. 
A prosecutor has a Brady objection to disclose evidence to a defendant only if it is 
exculpatory, material, and in her possession or in the possession of government agents 
having a significant role in investigating and prosecuting the offense. State v. Gardner, 
126 Idaho 428; 885 P.2d 1144 (1994) citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83; 83 S.Ct. 
1194; 10 L.Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Evidence is exculpatory if it tends to clear an accused of 
guilt. Gardner, supra. In the context of a prior guilty plea, evidence is material only if 
"there is a reasonable probability that, had it been disclosed to the defense, the defendant 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Gardner, supra, 
citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52; 106 S. Ct. 366; 88 L.Ed. 2d 203 (1985). The test for 
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"reasonable probability" is an objective, not a subjective one. "This is not a subjective 
investigation into what the particular defendant and his counsel actually would have 
decided, but an objective assessment, based in part upon the persuasiveness of the withheld 
information." The weight of the "other evidence" is an important factor for the Court's 
consideration, as are other motivations for pleading guilty, such as "any benefit derived by 
the defendant from the guilty plea," i.e. a favorable plea agreement. Gardner citing Hill v. 
Lockhart, supra. 
In determining whether a defendant ought to be permitted to withdraw a guilty plea 
because of an alleged Brady violation, the Court should also consider the following three 
factors: (1) whether the plea was entered with the advice of counsel, (2) whether the plea-
taking procedure complied with Boykin v. Alabama, and (3) whether a factual basis was 
established for the plea. "The satisfaction of these criteria must go a long way toward 
protecting the plea-taking event from later collateral attack" from an alleged Brady 
violation. Gardner citing Campbell v Marshall, 769 F. 2d 314 (6th Cir. 1985) and White 
v. U.S., 858 F. 2d 416 (8th Cir. 1988). Boykin, supra, requires that the plea-taking record 
show that the plea was voluntary, that the defendant was informed of the consequences of 
the plea, that the defendant was advised that the plea would waive certain fundamental 
constitutional rights, that the defendant was advised ofthe nature ofthe charge, and that 
the defendant was asked whether any promises had been made to get him to plead guilty. 
To a great extent, I.C.R. 11(c) codifies Boykin. 
In the case at bar, the Petitioner has failed to show that Judge Luster's decision in 
Ellington was in the possession of the then Custer County Prosecutor. He has even failed, 
by affidavit or otherwise, to show that Mr. Rice was aware of it, alleging only that it was 
served upon the Kootenai County Prosecutor. (Petition, paragraph 12.) The Kootenai 
County Prosecutor is not an "agent" of the Custer County Prosecutor. The Petitioner has 
failed to show that Judge Luster's decision is exculpatory. Judge Luster wrote at page 12 
and 13 of his decision that "it is difficult to conclude that (Rice) intentionally or carelessly 
attempted to mislead the Ellington jury" and that any "perceived inconsistencies" might be 
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"qualified or distinguished." His decision is not evidence that tends to clear Ellington of 
guilt, much less the Petitioner. 
The Petitioner has failed to show that Judge Luster's decision is material as he has 
failed to establish a "reasonable probability" that one armed with that decision would, in 
similar circumstances, have insisted upon going to trial. As discussed, Judge Luster's 
decision is not persuasive impeachment evidence and the weight of the inculpatory 
evidence in the Petitioner's case is heavy. Mr. Rice was not alone in his conclusion that the 
Petitioner was responsible for the crash when he crossed over the center line of Highway 
93 and ran into Mr. Twitchell's vehicle. Allen Bivins came to the same conclusion. Mr. 
Bivins' report contains photographs that show all the physical evidence on the roadway, 
gouges and debris, located in Twitchell's southbound lane, establishing that as the lane 
where the crash impact occurred. (Siegel's Affidavit with attached Exhibit 6: Bivins 
reconstruction report.) Even David Jakovac, a reconstructionist recently hired by the 
Petitioner, finds at page 1 of his report that the crash occurred "near the center line" 
(emphasis added). Since the southbound lane on a two-lane highway is by definition "near 
the centerline," Jakovac's conclusion does little to help the Petitioner. His conclusion that 
the crash was caused by Mr. Twitchell's "excessive speed" (which he estimated at "75 to 
78 miles per hour") would have been rebutted by a witness who said Twitchell was not 
speeding. (Siegel's Affidavit with attached Exhibit 7: Deputy Talbot's report, page one.) 
A reasonable defendant in the Petitioner's position, in deciding whether to go to trial 
armed with Judge Luster's decision, would also have faced the problem of the Petitioner's 
incriminating admissions and the blandishment of a very favorable plea agreement. He told 
Deputy Talbot that he didn't see the other vehicle (not surprising with a .279 BAC) and 
didn't remember the accident. He told Dispatcher Lumpkin that he had "killed someone," 
and he asked Mr. Ball, a good samaritan at the scene, if he (Ball) was "the person I hit." 
(Siegel's Affidavit with attached Exhibit 6: Bivins' reconstruction report.) Significantly, 
the Petitioner did not ask Ball if he (Ball) was the one that hit him. The maximum penalty 
for the Petitioner's crime is fifteen (15) years in prison. Under the plea agreement the 
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Respondent agreed to recommend a unified sentence of only six ( 6) years with only three 
(3) of that fixed, and also agreed to discuss the DUI charge. The Petitioner had reason to 
hope that he would get even less time than that, perhaps even a retained jurisdiction. 
(Brownson's Affidavit, Exhibit E.) 
A consideration of the three factors sent forth in Gardner, Campbell, and White 
must also be resolved in the Respondent's favor: (1) The Petitioner's guilty plea was 
entered with the advice of Mr. Oleson, his counsel. (2) The plea-taking procedure utilized 
by Judge Watkins complied with Boykin v. Alabama.(3) A factual basis was entered for 
the Alford guilty plea. (Siegel's Affidavit re: summary of the plea-change hearing.) An 
Alford plea of guilty is still voluntary, knowing, and intelligent provided a factual basis is 
established. State v. Harmon, 107 Idaho 73; 685 P.2d 814 (1984). 
To a great extent, all of the foregoing Brady analysis as it applies to Judge Luster's 
decision in Ellington also applies to the Supreme Court's decision in that case. 
Admittedly, the higher Court's decision has some exculpatory value, finding as it does that 
Mr. Rice gave false testimony at Ellington's trial. Since the Supreme Court's decision was 
announced over one month after the Petitioner was sentenced, however, it could have had 
no impact upon his decision to plead guilty. As with Judge Luster's decision, the Petitioner 
has failed to show, by affidavit or otherwise, that the Custer County Prosecutor or her 
agents, including Rice, knew ofthe Supreme Court's decision in the brief seven (7) day 
window between the date of decision and the date his conviction became final. The 
Supreme Court is not an agent of the Custer County Prosecutor. Likewise, the Supreme 
Court's decision is not material for the same reasons Judge Luster's decision was not 
material. Given the other extensive inculpatory evidence in the case and the favorable plea 
agreement, the Petitioner has failed to show by an objective standard that one facing that 
evidence would have eschewed that agreement and proceeded to trial. 
The Petitioner has failed to establish the "manifest injustice" that will result from a 
denial of his petition to withdraw his guilty plea. It is obvious that he pled guilty, in large 
part, to "test the weight of potential punishment" and now wants to withdraw that plea 
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having found his unified sentence of fifteen (15) years with four ( 4) years fixed more than 
he had expected. It is also obvious, whatever the lack of merit in the Petitioner's Brady 
claim, it could have been raised on direct appeal but was not. It is therefore forfeited and 
may not be considered in this post-conviction proceeding. 
II. 
In order to prevail in his second claim that his counsel Mr. Oleson was ineffective 
.~· 
/k 
and that he therefore has a right to withdraw his guilty plea, the Petitioner must first show 
that Oleson's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" in the 
context of his case investigation and his decision not to retain a crash reconstructionist. The 
Petitioner must then show that but for these alleged deficiencies there was a "reasonable 
probability that he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668; 104 S. Ct. 2052; 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984). 
Hill v. Lockhart and Bagley, supra. A court must indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 
Strickland, supra. 
"It is well established that, in reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, the Court will not attempt to second-guess trial counsel's strategic 
decisions unless those decisions are made upon the basis of inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the law, or other shortcomings ... Strategic choices 
made after incomplete investigations are reasonable if reasonable professional 
judgments support the limitations on investigation ... The duty to investigate 
requires only that counsel conduct a reasonable investigation ... A defendant's 
lawyer does not always have a duty to consult experts when the government is 
proposing to put on expert witnesses. There may be no reason to question the 
validity of the government's proposed evidence .... "(Emphasis added.) In 
assessing the reasonableness of counsel's investigation, we consider ... 
whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate 
further." Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139; 139 P.3d 741 (Ct. App. 2006). 
The Petitioner has failed to establish that Oleson's investigation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. He concedes that Oleson stated under oath that he 
spoke with Rice about the criminal case and found him to be credible. He concedes also 
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that Oleson stated under oath that he "contacted other accident reconstructionists to attempt 
to rebut Cpl. Rice's testimony and was told that if Cpl. Rice had made the determination, 
that it would be irrefutable and that it would be a waste of time and resources to attempt to 
rebut his testimony in any aspect." (Petition, page 7, paragraphs 39 and 40.) He has failed 
to establish, by affidavit or otherwise, any reason to believe that Oleson did not do what he 
swore he did. Given these conversations with Rice and the other reconstructionists, given 
the Bivins report, given the physical evidence, given the Petitioner's admissions, given the 
Petitioner's BAC and his claimed inability to remember what happened and controvert the 
evidence against him, given the favorable plea agreement, and given the Petitioner's 
apparent desire to plead guilty (Brownson's Affidavit, Exhibit E), there was absolutely no 
reason for Oleson to continue his investigation. He had no obligation to search the world 
over like some latter-day Diogenes in the apparently vain hope that he might find a 
reconstructionist to controvert Rice, Bivins, and the other evidence. A reasonable 
defendant in the Petitioner's circumstances would probably not have wanted to go to trial 
even if such a person had been found. 
III. 
In order to prevail in his third claim that Oleson was ineffective and that he therefore 
has a right to withdraw his guilty plea, the Petitioner must first show that Oleson's 
representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" when he failed to file a 
timely motion to withdraw the Petitioner's guilty plea. The Petitioner must then show that 
the motion would probably have been granted had it been timely filed. "Where the alleged 
deficiency is counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion would not have 
been granted is determinative of both prongs of Strickland." Wolfv. State, 152 Idaho 64; 
266 P.3d 1169 (Idaho App. 2011). 
The Petitioner has failed to show, by affidavit or otherwise, that Oleson knew or 
should have known of Judge Luster's or the Supreme Court's decisions in Ellington before 
the Petitioner's guilty plea became final on June 27, 2011. Insofar as Judge Luster's 
decision is concerned, Oleson had no reason to have knowledge of an unreported decision 
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by a District Judge from another jurisdiction in a case in which he was not involved. Trial 
counsel in Ellington, after all, did not become aware of Rice's testimony in Ciccone until 
after Ellington's trial. Oleson had no reasonable duty to contact every member of the 
defense bar in Idaho to inquire what experience they may have had with Rice, particularly 
in light of "(his) own personal experience with Cpl. Rice and (his) own belief that he was 
wholly credible" and in light of his conversations with other reconstructionists and their 
opinion "that if Cpl. Rice had made the determination (that the Petitioner caused the crash), 
that it would be irrefutable and that it would be a waste of time and resources to attempt to 
rebut his testimony in any aspect." (Petition, paragraphs 39 and 40.) 
There was only a seven (7) day window between the date of the Supreme Court's 
Ellington decision and the date that the Petitioner's judgment became final. Oleson had no 
reasonable obligation to monitor reported appellate decisions on a daily basis in hopes that 
one might somehow have some time-sensitive relevance to his own pending cases. 
Even if Oleson had somehow managed to file the motion to withdraw the Petitioner's 
guilty plea in a timely manner it would probably have been denied on its merits. If the 
motion had been filed before sentencing, the Supreme Court's Ellington decision would 
not have even been available for consideration by the trial Court since Ellington had not 
yet been decided. It is improbable that the trial Court would have found that Judge Luster's 
decision constituted a "just reason" for withdrawal of the plea before sentencing given its 
lack of exculpatory value and its lack of materiality as reflected by the other inculpatory 
evidence against the Petitioner, the favorable plea agreement, and Judge Watkins' 
compliance with the procedural requirements ofBoykin v. Alabama. 
If the motion to withdraw the Petitioner's guilty plea had been timely filed after 
sentencing, it is even more improbable that the trial Court would have found that the 
Supreme Court's Ellington decision created a "manifest injustice" requiring that the plea 
be set aside. The reasons set forth in Carrasco for the high post-sentencing bar are 
particularly applicable to the Petitioner's case since the sentence he actually received from 
Judge Watkins was much more stringent than the one he expected. Neither Judge Luster's 
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nor the Supreme Court's decision in Ellington is likely to produce an acquittal if the 
Petitioner is allowed to withdraw his plea and the case is tried. For this reason alone, no 
injustice would have resulted from a denial of the motion. 
Respectfully submitted this 5" day of July, 201 2( /aQQ J 
v 
Val Siegel 
Custer County Prosecuting Attorney 
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AFFIDAVIT OF VAL SIEGEL IN 
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION AND IN 
OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
Your affiant, Val Siegel, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. That he is the Custer County Prosecutor, attorney for the Respondent herein, and 
duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
2. That attached hereto is a true and correct copy of Respondent's Exhibit 1: the 
criminalist's report and affidavit pertaining to the Petitioner's BAC in the criminal case 
underlying this matter. 




3. That attached hereto is a true and correct copy of Respondent's Exhibit 2: the 
minute entry and order of the Petitioner's arraignment in the criminal case underlying this 
matter. 
4. That attached hereto is a true and correct copy of Respondent's Exhibit 3: the 
minute entry and order of the Petitioner's pretrial conference, at which he changed his plea 
to guilty, in the criminal case underlying this matter. 
5. That attached hereto is a true and correct copy of Respondent's Exhibit 4: the 
Petitioner's judgment of conviction in the criminal case underlying this matter. 
6. That attached hereto is a true and correct copy of Respondent's Exhibit 5: the 
written plea agreement signed by the Petitioner in the criminal case underlying this matter. 
7. That attached hereto is a true and correct copy of Respondent's Exhibit 6: Allen 
Bivins' crash reconstruction report in the criminal case underlying this matter. 
8. That attached hereto is a true and correct copy of Respondent's Exhibit 7: Deputy 
Talbot's report in the criminal case underlying this matter. 
9. Further your affiant sayeth nought. 
Dated: July .;;;:-, 2012 




Custer County Prosecuting Attorney 
149 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
2012. 





STATE OF IDAHO 
Residing at: c.tYLLJ.i;; 
Commission expires ':)(31/zo 11 
150 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that, on July 3.2012, I served a copy ofthe AFFIDAVIT OF VAL 
SIEGEL IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION AND IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION on the following in the manner indicated: 
Jeffrey Brownson, Esq. 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83 70 1 
ST. v. KLEIN 
Affidavit 
PAGE4 




U! C. 16 . 2C1 0 11 :27AM ----0 -( --No. 3270- P. 2----
12/03/2010 Idaho State Pollee Forensic Services 
209 E Lewis Pocatello, ID 83201 {208)232-9474 




SP60 • ISP-PATROL 
IDISP0600 
Agency Case No.: 110000816 
Crime Date: Nov 11. 2010 
Criminalistic Analysis Report • ALCOHOL TESTING 
Evidence Received lnformatron 
Evidence Received: 
















KLEIN, MARC EDWARD 
TWITCHELL. JORY W 
DOB 
RECEIVED 
DEC 1 5 2~. :0 
REGION SIX PATROL 
_________________ EVIDENCE DESCRIPTION __________________ __ 
1) Blood Toxicology Coll ection Kit obtained from Marc Edward Klein. 
_____________________ LABORATORY RESULTS __________________________ ___ 
1) Ethyl Alcohol Detected: 0.279 g/lOOcc blood± 5.94% 
This report does or may contain opinions and interpretations of tbe 
undersigned analyst based on scientific data. 
D~ 
Forensic Scientist I 
Date: 3~~d'Q}\) . 
152 
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STATE FO.:CE N:J. 327(: 
1 ?./03/20 1 0 Idaho State Police Forensic Services 
209 E Lewis Pocatello, ID 83201 (208)232-9474 




SP60 - ISP-PATROL 
IDISP0600 
Agency Case No.: 110000816 
Crime Date: Nov 11, 2010 
Criminalistic Analysis Report • ALCOHOL TESTING 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF IDAHO } 
}ss. 
COUNTY OF BANNOCK ) 
Delisa Downey, being first duly sworn 1 deposes and says the following: 
Page 2 
1. That I am a Forensic Scientist with Forensic Services and am qualified 
to perform the examination and draw conclusions of the type shown on the 
attached report; 
2. That Forensic Services is part of the Idaho State Pol1ce; 
3. That I conducted a scientific examination of evidence described in the 
attached report in the ordinary course and scope of my duties with Forensic 
Services; 
4. That the concluaion(a) expressed in that report is/are correct to the 
best of my knowledge; 
5. That the case identifying information reflected in that report came 
from the evidence packaging, a case report, or another reliable source. 
6. That a true and accurate copy of that report is attached to this 
affidavit. 




tee. ~ ::;. 2010 11 : 2/AM 
Idaho State Police 
Blood Alcohol Restitution 
As provided in Idaho Code 18-8003(2) the Idaho State Police requests restitution fi:om 
I the defendant(s), Marc Edward Klein, in the amount of $100.00 in association with 
Laboratory Report No. P20102347-l. The amount requested reflects a portion of the cost 
incurred to the laboratory during the analysis of blood samples. 
Analysis Cost 






Please present this restitution request fonn and a copy of the laboratory report to the 
court at the time of sentencing. 
Please make checks payable to: Forensic Services 
700 South Stratford Drive 
Meridian, Idaho 83642-6202 











C11 :-1 r 
Type ofToxlcoiOJily Ct~se/ Charge (mRrk ftll that may apply) 
~DUI Oomo DoRE DNJOT 0 Probation Violation 0 Se.w~l Assault DHomicide 
0 Other (specify) 
Name (latiJUintt tiut) 
Ktt, 
Origin of Sample (mark one) 
Swpect 0 Subject 0 Viclim 
Sample Colleeled by (name, rltle •nd £11 lilly): 
c f?JV 
Breath Tert Performed? 
'No DYes Results: 
DOB 
17-1/-;./o 
Phone Nllt6·~'i:? 71 
Sample Type Oucine ~lood 0 Vilreous Humor OOther 
Requested Analyais ltb.Jcohol >.l 0 Toxicology' (diVgS olher than ethanol) Oother 
List suspectM dru~ a[ld/or symptoms exhibilcd: 
Lisr currtnl pr~Jption •nd over-the QOIInter dru&lhttlllY: 
hain of Custody 
• 
1 Urine alcohol re5ull may be of q11estionable volue. •' Analysis will be'pecfo do ly up to the point of justifying tho charge. 
0 > lf a successful breath lest was obtained, blood aloohoJ Sntll)'$1$ Will not be performed without prior justification. 
Laboratory Case Number; 
h fndiviclual Dec~ued\' 
Qi1No D Yes 
Court Date 
20/0 
0 Intact . 
0 Non-intact (describe t1i~:~r"'n"r>c-.v 
Evidence Technician/Region:----------- Date=----~--
Note; By submitting the evidence to Forensic Services, the t~genty ae;ree.\ ro the terms and condUions for analyzin~: this evidence as described llt our webJl!e: http:/1 
www.lsp.state.ld.uslforensicflndrx.html 
EH 06 01Hl5 UCIIO; iOTF.3 7/06 
6 
~ : : 6 2 ', (: 1' : 2 7 AM 
CHAIN OF CUSTODY 
.11 I ~)!.,(/~ 
From: UJ,IiwUL To: · Date: U·ibffl 
F. rom: ~~To: · 1.-\;C D te: ll-t]=-t0J 
Fromr:~ o: · te: 1:9-/S~(O 
From: ____ To:_~ te:. __ _ 
156 
{ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-











Case No. CR-2010-729 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
***AMENDED*** 
The above matter came on this 151h day of December, 2010, for FELONY 
ARRAIGNMENT before Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, in the Custer County Courthouse, Challis, 
Idaho. The defendant was present along with R. James Archibald, Esq. sitting in for Justin Oleson, 
Esq. Custer County Prosecutor, Shawn Glen, Esq., was present on behalf of the State of Idaho. 
Court Reporter Jack Fuller was absent. Deputy Clerk Ruth Brmlk:er and Lori Waters, Probation and 
Parole Officer. 
The defendant waived reading the Criminal Complaint informing the defendant of the 
charge against him of COUNT I, VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER LC. §18-4006 (3) (b), a 
Felony and COUNT II, DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL (Excessive), 
I.C. §18-8004 (10 (a), a Misdemeanor. 
Judge Tingey then asked the defendant if he understood the charge. The defendant did. 
Judge Tingey explained the defendant's rights and advised the defendant as to the nature of 
the charges as well as the maximum penalties. The defendant stated that he understood. 
The Court, on behalf of the defendant entered a plea ofNOT GUILTY to COUNT I and 
COUNT II. 
Defense asked for a bond reduction with conditions. 
The State objects and gives reasons. 
The Court will take this under consideration. 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
After further consideration, the Court denied the motion to reduce bond. 
Pretrial Conference is set for February 16,2011 at 1:30PM 
Jury Trial was set for March 2, 3, 4, 2011 at 10:00 AM. 
Done and dated this 4th day of January, 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on January 4, 2011 a copy of the foregoing was 
served by the method indicated below and addressed to each of the following: 
Shawn M. Glen, Esq. Courthouse Mail 




MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
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FEB/18/20li/FRl Oi:09 PM FAX No. 
02/17/2011 15:55 FAX 208 879 6412 cus~er County Cour~s 
IN 1HE DISTRICT COURT OF 11ffi SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THB STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
CR-2010-000.0729 
State of Idaho vs.' Marc Edward Klein 
Hearing type: Pr~trial Conference 
-H~ax?ng d<l;te: 2/16/2011 
Time: 1:30pm 
Judge: bane Wa~s Jr 
Minutes Oerk: Ruth Brunker 
Defense Attorney: Justin Oleson 
Prosecutor: ·shawti Glen (County) 
P. 004/005 
~ 0002/0003 
This cause came before the Court on this 16th day of February, ZOII forth~ putpose of a 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE before the Honorable Dane Watkins, Jr., District Judge. Custec 
County Courthouse, Challis~ Ida{l~. Shawn M. Glen, Esq. apperu;ed on .behalf of the State of Idaho. 
Justin Oleson, ~· a~ed with the d~fendimt. Deputy Clerk Ruth B.ruoker was present. 
The Court asked if there was a Plea Agreement The State and the defense agreed there W3:S· 
The Coutt understands it is a non-binding plea agreement The State and defense agreed and stated 
that they as well as the def~t had signed 1he agreement The State would dismiss the Count IT 
chatge ofDriving-Dnder- the Influence, Excessive. The defendan.t would plead guilty to COUNT l 
V ~hicular Manslaughter. 
The Court read the plea agreement to the de:&ndant, explaining non-binding, who then 
acknowledged it as being the agreement he had signed. 
The defendant vvas sworn in and pled to GUILTY, to COUNT I, Vehicular Manslaughter 
I. C. § l8-4006(3)(b ), a felony. The Court found factual basis for the plea and asked the Cleric to 
enter the plea. 
The Court ORDERED an I.C.l9-25i4 Plesentence Investigation and a Substance Abuse · 
Evaluation to be completed by the Sentencing h~aring .. 
' 
FE~/18/2011/FRI 01:10PM FAX No. P. 005/005 
~0003/0003 02/17/2011 15:56 FAX 208 879 6412 CU&~er County Courts 
The Court set Sentencing for Apri120, 2011 at 1:30 p.m. The Court will~ aside one (1) 
hour for the hear:ing. · 
The defense asked the defendant to be telcasOO. on his own rocogniz:ance: The State gave-its 
objections and reasons. The Court DENIED the defendant's release. . 
Dated and done this February tl . 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that ol) February 17,2011 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served by the method indicated below and addressed to each of the following: 
Shawn M. Glen. Esq. Courthouse Mailbox 
Justin B. Oleson, Esq. PO Box 1047, Blackfoot ID 83221 
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R~ (fH BR UNKER 
ZUi l ' t. :·i~ ;;~N r:f:H?: e~STRICT COURT OF THE SEVE~TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF COSTER 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












) _____________________________ ) 
Case No.CR-2010-729 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 
The Prosecuting Attorney for Custer County, Idaho, together 
with the above-named defendant . and appropriate counsel of record 
came into_Court on the 20~ day of April, 2011, for the 
pronouncement of sentence upon the defendant. 
The defendant was fully informed by the Court of the nature 
of the charge as set forth in the Information of Vehicular 
Manslaughter, a ~elony, a violation of Idaho Code §18-4006(3) (b), 
which was committed on or about November 11~ 2010. The defendant 
was previously arraigned upon the charge and entered a plea of 
not guilty. The defendant entered a plea of guilty pursuant to 
conditions of a plea agreement. 
-· The defendant was provided the opportunity to be heard and 
present any matters deemed necessary to be considered by the 
Court~ 
The defendant was asked if there was any legal cause why 
sentence should not be pronounced and no sufficient cause was 
given. Based upon the finding of guilt, the court pronounced 
sentence as follows: 
ZT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the defendant is 
guilty of the · crime as ch.arged in the Information and in 
execution thereof, IT WAS FURTHER ORDERED, that the defendant be 
sentenced to the custody of the Idaho State Department of 
Corrections for a term of FIFTEEN (15) ye~rs, subject to a credit 
to be given for time served prior to sentencing of ONE HUNDRED 
SIXTY ONE (lGl)days. 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION -1-
\\n\ 
' ' V~/~LF4V~~ ~~.~~ rfiA .IJf:l.VVVo>r VV.L.l. 
~g.~ u00.3/0003 U4/ZL~ZU.l.l .L4:Z~ t<AA. ZUll custer county 
Of the total sentence heretofore pronounced, the defendant 
shall serve a confine~ent for a minimum period of FOUR (4) 
year(s). 
The min~um period of confinement shall be followed by an 
indeterminate period of confinement of ELEVEN (11) years. 
That the defendant shall be remain in the custody of the 
Sheriff of Custer County .for incarceration in the Custer County 
Jail pending transport. The defendant shall then be delivered to 
the custody 9f the Director of the State Department of 
Corrections. · 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any outstanding bond/bail is 
hereby exonerated. 
IT rs FURTHER ORDBBED that Defendant pay each of the sums 
indicated, in the manner and on such terms as are more 
particularly specified below: 
a. COORT. COSTS: Court costs of $150.50 per felony count 
will be paid to the clerk of the court. (I.C. 31-
3201A(b)). 
b. VICTIMS' COMPENSATION: $75.00 per felony count will be 
paid to the clerk of the court for deposit into the 
crime victims' compensation account (I .C. § 72-1025). 
[In addition, another fine of $200.00 per count is 
imposed for any conviction or finding of guilt for sex 
offense under. I.e. §§ 18-1506, 18-1507, 18-1508, 18-
1508A, 18-6101, 18-6108, 18-6605, or 18-6608.] 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant's driving privileges 
shall. be suspended for· a period of TWB~ft'r(20)yeara commencing 
after release from imprisonment. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant shall pay child 
support to the victims children until they reach their eighteenth 
(18)birthday. 
DATED this ~day of April, 2011. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION -2-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the e2~ day of April, 2011, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the following JUDGMENT OF 
CONVICTION by mailing a copy of the same, first class, postage 
pre-paid, to the following: 
Shawn M. Glen, Esq. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Justin Oleson, Esq. 
Defense Attorney 
Probation and Parole 
Lori Waters 
2048 E. 17th St. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Department of Correction 
Central Records 
1299 North Orchard, Ste. 110 
Boise, ID 83706 
Custer County Sheriff 




(x) Courthouse Mail 
(x) Mail 
(x) Fax 208 525-7015 
(x) Mail w/copy of PSI 





OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTING ATIORNEY 
CUSTER COUNTY, IDAHO 
Shawn M. Glen 
Prosecuting Attorney 
521 Main Street 
Mail: P.O. Box 630 
Challis, Idaho 83226 
Telephone: 208-879-4383 
Facsimile: 208-879-2498 
Mr. Justin Oleson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 
February 16, 20 ll 
RE: St. v. Klein, CR-201 O:..WW 
Dear Jus tin, 
Pursuant to our conversation this morning, I send you the following 
OFFER- AGREEMENT TO PLEAD GUlL TY 
Offer Expires February 16, 201 1 
I. Plea: The Defendant will plead guilty to Count I: Vehicular Manslaughter, I. C. § 18-
4006(3)(b), A Felony. 
The State will dismiss Count II: Excessive DUI, I. C. § 18-8004(1 )(a), A 
Misdemeanor. 
The State will not object to the Defendant entering an Alford plea in this matter. 
2. Sentence: The State will recommend: 
A. That the Court sentence the Defendant to prison on Count I for a unified term of 6 
years Q '%?5 #tc . 1 f " IJ y a 3 . t 1 • 1 )& 
B. That the Defendant pay child support for the victims three minor children, in 
accordance with the Idaho Child Support Guidelines. The Defendant is informed 
that child support payments authorized by the sentencing structure of I. C. § 18-
4007 (3 )(d) may NOT be paid by liability insurance; 
C. That during any time the Defendant may be released on either probation or parole. 
he submit to frequent and regular tests of his blood, breath or urine as a condition 
of his continued release; and 
\ld-l 
Mr. Justin Oleson 
Offer to Plead Guilty 
February 16, 201 1 
Page 2 
D. That the Defendant make any restitution to the victim's family, other than child 
support payments, not already covered by insurance payments. 
Defense Counsel is free to make independent sentencing recommendations to the Court. 
3. Non-binding Agreement, Suppression Issues and Appeals: This Agreement is not 
binding on the Court, pursuant to ICR 11(f)(l)(B). The Defendant agrees to waive his 
right.to appeal suppr-ession issues and the judgment of guilty pursuant to ICR ll(d). 
If the Defendant is not a citizen of the United States, agreeing to plead guilty, or 
admitting facts that constitute a crime could result in the Defendant's deportation or 
removal, or inability to obtain citizenship or legal status in the United States. 
Terms of the Offer 
This offer is contingent upon the Defendant being present for all court hearings, obeying 
all laws, complying with the terms of this agreement pending sentencing, complying with 
all court orders, and the accuracy of the Defendant's criminal history as discovered by the 
State in the Defendant's NCIC report, juvenile history, and driving record. 
Thus, if the Defendant violates any term of this Offer in any way, once the Defendant has 
signed it, the State is free to withdraw this Offer, re-file charges it had previously 
dismissed in consideration ofthe Defendant's acceptance of this Offer, or make any 
sentencing recommendations it deems appropriate. The parties recognize that each term 
is material to this Offer. 
• This Offer is withdrawn if the Defendant does not plead guilty pursuant to the offer at the 
February 16, 2011 District Court Law and ion day in Custer Coun~/7 
/17.~· 
Custer County Prosecuting Attorney 
I have read the offer, I understand it, and I accept the offer on the above-stated terms. 
' Mr. Marc Edward Klein, Defendant Date 
165 
Mr. Justin Oleson 
Offer to Plead Guilty 
February 16, 2011 
Page 3 
The Court ACCEPTS 
REJECTS 
Dane Watkins, Jr. 
District Judge 
Date I 1 




Idaho State Police 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report 
Report Information 
Report Subject: COLLISION RECONSTRUCTION 
Date of Report: November 17,2010 
Collision Location: NB US 93@ Fish Hatchery Road near MP 118.2 (Custer County) 
Investigating Officer: Master Corporal Wayne D. Scoggins 
Primary Investigation Information 
Police Agency: Idaho State Police 
Collision Date: November 11, 2010 
Police Case Number: I 10000816 
Operator (s): 
Vehicle 1: 
KLEIN, MARC EDWARD 
DOB:
Idaho OLN: UL100117A 
5575 Fish Hatchery Rd 
Mackay, ID 83251 
CP: (208) 589-0891 
Vehicle 2: 
TWIT  JORY WILLIAM (Deceased) 
DOB
Idaho OLN: FA108256K 
232 N Blaine 
PO Box 401 
.~ Arco, ID 83213 
HP: (208) 527-3685 
Page 1 
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Idaho State Police 






BALL, RYAN HILL 
DOB:
482 N 3435 E 
Lewisville, ID 83431 
HP: (208) 520-0227 
Vehicle (s): 
Vehicle 1: 
White 1988 Toyota pickup 
ID License: 7C9585 
VIN: JT4RN63A4J0202180 
Vehicle 2: 
Red 1995 Lincoln Continental 
ID License: 1 OB9598 
VIN: 1 LNLM97V7SY699795 
Mentioned Police: 
TALBOT, MICHAEL (ChiefDeputy) 
LUMPKIN, LINDA (Dispatcher) 
Custer County Sheriff's Office 
PO Box 344 
Challis, ID 83226 





Idaho State Police 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report 
Mentioned Others: 
SIMPSON, JEFF S. (Custer County Deputy Coroner) 
PO Box 1127 
Challis, ID 83226 
BP: (208) 940-1035 
Information Analysis Is Based On 
• Idaho Vehicle Collision Report 
• Photographs 
• Field Notes 
• Witnesses Statements 
• Measurements 
• Scale Diagram 
• Officer Synopsis 
• Coroner's Report 
• ISP Forensics Laboratory BAC test results (Klein) 
Synopsis of The Collision 
On November 11, 2010, at approximately 1845 hours, a two-vehicle fatality crash occurred at the 
US 93/Fish Hatchery Road intersection, near milepost 118.2, in Custer County. Mr. Klein was 
traveling north on US 93 and Mr. Twitchell was traveling south. Mr. Klein crossed the 
centerline into the southbound lane, as he was preparing to tum left onto Fish Hatchery Road, 
and collided head-on with Mr. Twitchell. 
Mr. Twitchell died because of injuries sustained in this crash. Mr. Klein was treated and 
released for injuries sustained in this collision. After being released from the hospital, he was 
incarcerated in the Custer County jail for felony vehicular manslaughter and driving under the 
influence of alcohol (excessive). 
Idaho State Police 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Re11ort 
Foundation for Conclusions 
On November 17, 2010, I received and reviewed the packet for this collision (for further 
information, refer to ISP case #II0000816 supplement 0001). 
Highway Description: 
• At this location, US 93 is a 
two-lane/ two-way/north-
south highway. 
• The shoulders are marked by 
painted solid white lines and 
the travel lanes are divided by 
painted broken yellow lines. 
• At the crash scene, the 
highway has a 2.09% 
Fig 1: US 93/Fish Hatchery Rd -Facing South 
(Taken 11112/10@ 1420) 
downgrade in the southbound direction and the left-hand curve has a 3.49% super 
elevation. It is bordered on both sides by gravel and grass and the terrain slopes slightly 
down from the road edge on both sides of the highway. 
• It was overcast and the road was dry when the crash occurred. 
• US 93 is constructed of 
asphalt, which is in good 
condition and the posted 
speed limit is 65 miles per 
hour. 
Roadway Evidence: 
The evidence referred to in this 
section runs from north to south. 
• Pre-collision skid and 
scuffinarks Fig 2: V2 Gouge Marks 
(Taken 11112110@ 1422) 
Page4 
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Idaho State Police 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis H.epor• 
Neither vehicle left any discemable pre-collision skid 
• Post-collision gouge and scuff 
marks 
The Lincoln left four gouge 
marks in the asphalt, which 
also identified the area of 
impact. The marks were 
located in the southbound 
lane on the south side of the 
intersection, near the fogline, 
and were oriented from north 
to south. There was an oil 
trail starting south of the 
gouge marks that continued to 
the southbound road edge. 
Fig 3: V2 Rotational Scuffmarks 
(Taken 11112/10) 
The Lincoln left three rotational scuffmarks starting near the road edge. The marks were 
approximately 46 feet long and ended approximately 15 feet north of the Lincoln·s final 
uncontrolled resting position on the southwest side of the intersection. 
The Toyota pickup did not leave any discemable post-collision skid or scuffmarks. 
Vehicle Description and Evidence: 
Vehicle 1: 
The white 1988 Toyota pickup was found 
at an uncontrolled rest position in the 
southbound lane, facing south, 
approximately 36 feet southeast of the point 
of impact. 
Master Corporal Scoggins did not note any 
obvious mechanical defects at the scene 
that would have contributed to this crash. 
Contact Damage 
• Bent front bumper 
Page 5 
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Idaho State Police 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report 
• Hood bent 
• Left front quarter panel bent 
• Right front quarter panel bent 
Induced Damage 
• Windshield broken (Driver's side contained a circular break and the glass was pushed 
outward indicating this was where Mr. Klein struck it with his head) 
• Left front door bent and rippled 
• Right front door bent and rippled 
• Radiator pushed in 
• Left front axle bent and broken 
Seatbelts/ Airbags 
• A fully retracted driver's seatbelt and the broken windshield on the driver's side indicates 
Mr. Klein was not wearing his seatbelt when the crash occurred 
• This vehicle is not equipped with airbags 
Vehicle 2: 
The red 1995 Lincoln Continental was 
found at an uncontrolled rest position on 
the west side of the highway, facing 
northeast, approximately 77 feet south of 
the point of impact. 
Master Corporal Scoggins did not note any 
obvious mechanical defects at the scene 
that would have contributed to this crash. 
Contact Damage 
• Front bumper broken and partially 
detached 
• Left front quarter panel peeled away 
• Left front door bent 
• Left front tire flattened and axle broken 
Induced Damage 
• Detached radiator 
• Hood bent, rippled, and broken 
Page6 
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Idaho State Police 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report 
• Oil pan bent and scratched 
NOTE: Fire department personnel removed the roof, partially cut away the driver's door, and 
the left "B" pillar in order to remove Mr. Twitchell from the vehicle. 
Seatbelts/ Airbags 
• There was no evidence EMS personnel cut the driver's seatbelt in order to remove Mr. 
Twitchell from the vehicle and there were no marks on Mr. Twitchell's body to indicate 
he was wearing his seatbelt when the crash occurred. 
• This vehicle is equipped with airbags and they deployed. 
Occupant Kinematics and Injury: 
Vehicle 1: 
-- Marc Edward Klein 
-----i 
Mr. Klein was treated and released at the Lost River Medical Center in Arco for injuries 
sustained in the crash. The following external injuries were noted from his Custer County jail 
booking photograph: 
• Two lacerations on left cheek 
• Abrasion above left upper lip 
• Small abrasion right side of forehead 
• Circular abrasion on upper forehead (consistent with striking the windshield) 
• Abrasions on top of his head 
Vehicle 2: 
Jory William Twitchell 
Master Corporal Scoggins noted and photographed the following injuries at the Lost River 





Abrasion lower right abdomen 
Laceration on top of head 
Laceration on top of left shoulder 
Multiple lacerations, abrasions, and bums starting on the upper left arm and running 




Idaho State Police 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report 
• Multiple fractures in both legs starting at the femur 
• Abrasions on the left side of face and a laceration under left jaw 
• Lacerations on left thigh, left knee, and left shin 
• Small laceration on right shin 





There was insufficient evidence at the scene to calculate either vehicle's collision speed. 
Time/Distance Analysis: 
Due to not having the collision speeds for either vehicle, a time/distance analysis was not 
performed. 
Statements: 
Marc Edward Klein 
Chief Deputy Talbot advised Mr. Klein ofhis Miranda rights after arriving at the Lost River 
Medical Center in Arco. Chief Deputy Talbot did not ask Mr. Klein any questions about the 
crash. However, Mr. Klein made the following spontaneous statements to Chief Deputy Talbot 
as he was being transported to the Custer County jail: 
Mr. Klein stated he was "fucked" and that he really screwed up this time. He also said he didn't 
see the other vehicle and didn't remember the accident. At one point, Mr. Klein said he thought 
the other vehicle was in his lane and had hit him (for further information, refer to Custer County 
Sheriff's Office case # 1 00111 7). 




Idaho State Police 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report 
Mr. Klein recognized Dispatcher Lumpkin and started talking to her about what happened. Mr. 
Klein stated he really screwed up and Dispatcher Lumpkin asked, "You did, why?" Mr. Klein 
stated he had killed someone (for further information, refer to Custer County Sheriffs Office 
case #1001117). 
Ryan Hill Ball 
Mr. Ball stated he was traveling south on US 93, at approximately 1850 hours, when he came up 
on a crash at the US 93/Fish Hatchery Road intersection, involving a white Toyota pickup and a 
red Lincoln. He stopped to check on the drivers and contacted Mr. Klein first, who was still 
sitting in his pickup. Mr. Klein stated he was alright and then Mr. Ball went to check on Mr. 
Twitchell. Mr. Ball turned Mr. Twitchell's car off and made sure there wasn't any gasoline 
leaking from the tank. Mr. Ball asked an unidentified woman, who stopped, to stay with Mr. 
Twitchell and try to keep him talking. During this time, Mr. Klein exited his pickup and was 
sitting on the side of the road when Mr. Ball went back to talk to him. Mr. Ball kneeled down in 
front of Mr. Klein and asked ifhe needed anything. Mr. Klein stated he was cold and then asked 
Mr. Ball if he was the person he'd hit. Mr. BaH advised him he wasn't and that he was there to 
help. During the conversation, Mr. Ball could smell beer on Mr. Klein's breath. Mr. Ball asked 
Mr. Klein if he'd been drinking and Mr. Klein admitted he had. Mr. Klein asked how Mr. Ball 
could tell. Mr. Ball informed him he could smell it on his breath and that there were beer bottles 
on the ground behind him. 
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Idaho State Police 
Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report 
Vehicle Dynamics: 
• Mr. Klein was traveling north on US 93 and Mr. Twitchell was traveling south. 
• The physical evidence indicates Mr. Klein crossed the centerline into the southbound 
lane, as he was preparing to turn left onto Fish Hatchery Road, and collided head-on with 
Mr. Twitchell. 
• Mr. Twitchell's vehicle rotated counter-clockwise after the collision and traveled 
approximately 77 feet south of the point of impact. His vehicle came to rest, facing 
northeast, approximately 21 feet west of US 93. 
• Mr. Klein's vehicle rotated counter-clockwise after the collision and traveled 
approximately 36 feet southeast of the point of impact. His vehicle came to rest, facing 
south, in the southbound lane. 
Causational Factors 
1. At approximately 2000 hours, evidentiary blood samples were taken from Mr. Klein at the 
Lost River Medical Center in Arco. The Idaho State Police Forensics Laboratory tested Mr. 
Klein's blood samples with test results of0.279%. 
2. Mr. Klein failed to maintain his designated lane as he was preparing to turn left onto Fish 
Hatchery Road from US 93. 
Submitted by: Corporal Allen W. Bivins 
Reviewed by: Sergeant Kevin White 
Reviewed by: Trooper Troy DeBie 
Approved by: CRPM Fred Rice 
Page 11 
\II 
Date: November 18,2010 
Date: November 23,2010 
Date: November 24,2010 
Date: November 30, 2010 
Case# 1001117.001 
c £ ·.jTER COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFf iCE 
PO Box344 
Challis, ID 83226 
208-879-2232 
On November 11, 20 I 0 at approximately 1904 hrs I, Mike Talbot, was advised of a 
multiple vehicle ac.cident at MP 119 on Hwy 93 near Mackay, Ida.h.o. Dispatch informed 
me that Deputy Tilman was on scene and needed assistance with the accident. I said that I 
would respond to the location. 
Arriving at approximately 1932 hrs, I met with Deputy Tilman and set up to help with 
traffic control. I viewed two vehicles that were involved in the accident. One was a four 
door sedan, red in color and the other vehicle was a white truck, I believe it was a Nissan. 
I was informed by Deputy Tilman that the driver of the white truck was taken to Arco for 
a blood draw. Butte County Deputies were called to assist in that blood draw. The driver 
of the other vehicle was still in the sedan as emergency personnel were in the process of 
extracting him. Deputy Tilman stated he had ISP calJed because it appeared to him that 
the driver of the sedan may not survive. I asked Deputy Tilman ifhe was going to ·give 
the crash to ISP. Deputy Tilman stat-ed yes. 
During the course of assisting Deputy Tilman, I spoke with an individual who had 
come upon the scene just after it had occurred. This individual works for Thompson 
Creek Mine as a semi driver hauling for them. Speaking with him, he stated he was 
passed by the red sedan on the north side of Willow Pass. He stated the driver ofthe 
se<ian passed him in a safe manner and was not speeding. He went on to say that when he 
arrived on scene, the driver of the white truck, later identified as Marc Klein, was out of 
his vehicle and walking around. He could smell the alcohol coming from him and even 
asked Klein if he had been drinking. I was told Klein said he had been and then asked this 
individual if he was a cop. He provided a statement to Deputy Tilman of his account after 
arriving on scene. 
At approximately 2116 hrs, I was informed that Klein was becoming a problem at Lost 




PO Box 344 
Challis, ID 83226 
208-879-2232 
was given the accident. I informed Trooper Scoggins of the problem with Klein and 
asked what he would like me to do. Trooper Scoggins instructed me to go and transport 
Klein to Challis. I called dispatch and informed them I was en route to Arco. 
I arrived at Lost River Medical and met with Butte County Deputies. I then met Klein 
and read him his Miranda rights. I informed Klein that at this point in time he was being 
placed under arrest for aggravated DUI. Klein asked to be released to go home and then 
deal with everything later. I informed Klein that would not be the case. I then stated an 
individual had died as a result of the accident and he was going to Challis to be booked 
into jail 
Several minutes later, Klein was transported to the Butte County Sheriff Office where I 
took possession of the blood draw and ofKlein. Klein was placed into handcuffs and 
transported to Challis. It was rather apparent Klein had been drinking. Klein smelled of 
an alcoholic beverage and had trouble walkiri.g. 
On the way to Challis, I asked no questions of Klein. Klein did however make several 
commen1s concerning the accident. Klein asked about his dog, a chocolate lab. He was 
concerned for its welfure. I stated I did not see the dog while I was on scene. Klein also 
made the statement that he was "fucked'' and that he really screwed up this time. Klein 
4~,~~ec:Hte~>See1he·other vehicle and doesn't remember the accident. At· one point, 
Klein said he thought the other vehicle was in his lane and had hit him. 
· · ...... Arriving at Challis, Klein was booked into jail and was given several phone calls and a 
cigarette befure being placed into cell #2. Klein did ask what the bond amount was going 
. to be severaltimes but was told the bond would be set by a judge the next day. Because 
Klein V~~'aS intoxicated, I did not fingerprint him or took booking photos. I informed Klein 
I would do these the ne>..1: morning. Klein stated he was :fine with that because he really 
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Val Siegel, ISB No. 3749 
Custer County Prosecuting Attorney 
521 Main Street 
P.O. Box 630 
Challis, ID 83226 
Telephone: 208-879-4383 
Facsimile: 208-879-2498 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
MARC EDWARD KLEIN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 









Case No. CV-2012-56 
AFFIDAVIT OF VAL SIEGEL RE: 
SUMMARY OF PLEA CHANGE 
HEARING 
COMES NOW your affiant, Val Siegel, and being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. That he is the Custer County Prosecutor, attorney for the Respondent herein, and 
duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
2. That he has listened to the entirety of the Court's audio tape recording of the 
pretrial conference in the criminal case CRF -1 0-729 underlying this matter at which the 
Petitioner changed his plea to guilty and that the following are true and correct statements 
ST. v. KLEIN 
Affidavit 
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regarding that proceeding; 
3.That the parties waived the presence of the Court reporter; 
4. That Mr. Oleson put the plea agreement on record; 
5. That the Court reviewed the written plea agreement with the defendant; 
6. That the defendant affirmed his acceptance of the plea agreement; 
7. That Mr. Oleson stated that he had advised the Petitioner of his rights and the 
consequences of pleading guilty; 
8. That the Court placed the Petitioner under oath and questioned him; 
9. That the Petitioner said he understood the nature of his crime; 
10. That the Petitioner said he understood the possible penalties for his crime, 
including imprisonment of up to fifteen (15) years; 
11. That the Petitioner said he understood that the plea agreement was not binding 
upon the Court; 
12. That the Petitioner said he had fully discussed his case with Mr. Oleson; 
13. That the Petitioner said he was fully satisfied with Mr. Oleson's representation 
and that Mr. Oleson had done everything he asked him to do; 
14. That the Petitioner said no threats or promises had been made to get him to plead 
guilty and he was pleading guilty of his own free will; 
15. That the Petitioner said he understood he was waiving his Constitutional rights to 
a jury trial, to confront his accusers, to the presumption of innocence, and his right to 
present any defenses he might have; 
16. That the Petitioner then said he wanted to plead guilty pursuant to the plea 
agreement; 
17. That Mr. Oleson and the Prosecutor presented a factual basis for the Petitioner's 
Alford guilty plea to the Court; 
18. That the Petitioner said he believed a jury would find him guilty on the evidence 
ifhe went to trial; 
Ill 
Ill 
ST. v. KLEIN 
Affidavit 
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19. Further, your affiant sayeth nought. 
Dated: July s-, 2012 





STATE OF IDAHO 
Custer County Prosecuting Attorney 
Residing at: c...Jcta LLZ S 
Commission expires ::{ 3l j lD t f) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that, on July rz012, I served a copy ofthe AFFIDAVIT OF VAL 
SIEGEL RE: SUMMARY OF PLEA CHANGE HEARING on the following in the 
manner indicated: 
Jeffrey Brownson, Esq. 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
P.O. Box2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
Phone: (208) 343-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SEVENTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
MARC EDWARD KLEIN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











CASE NO. CV-2012-056 
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO 
STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION AND OPPOSITION 
TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
In his Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition, Mr. 
Klein set forth how summary disposition in his favor was appropriate because every fact 
necessary for granting relief with at least two of his three claims for relief claims has been 
pleaded by Mr. Klein and admitted by the State. As Mr. Klein explained, his constitutional 
right to due process was violated when the State failed to disclose impeachment evidence 
regarding the credibility and reliability of Fred Rice. Mr. Klein also described how he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel because Justin Oleson, Mr. Klein~s attorney~ failed to timely 
file a motion to withdraw Mr. Klein's guilty plea. 
1 -PETITIONER ~s REPLY TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND 
OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
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In response, the State argues that it and its agents did not possess or know that Fred 
Rice had previously advanced under oath opposite opinions or that this was memorialized in a 
written decision by District Judge John P. Luster. The State further argues that Judge Luster's 
written decision is somehow not exculpatory even though it expressly calls into question Fred 
Rice's integrity. Finally, the State asserts Attorney Oleson had no reasonable obligation to file 
a motion to withdraw Mr. Klein's guilty plea in the time period before the district court lost 
jurisdiction of Mr. Klein's case and even if Attorney Oleson had timely filed the motion, it 
would not have been successful. 
A. Mr. Klein's Constitutional Right to Due Process was Violated When the 
State FaDed to Disclose Impeachment Evidence Regarding the Credibility 
and Reliability of Fred Rice 
First and foremost, the State's argument that Judge Luster's decision is not necessarily 
exculpatory is simply without merit. The State's obligation under Brady and its progeny 
unequivocally requires the disclosure of evidence impeaching the testimony of a state's 
witness. See Giglio v. United States. 405 U.S. 150 (1972). This Court can. and undoubtedly 
will; review District Judge John P. Luster's Decision on Motion for New TriaL: Newly 
Discovery Evidence in State of Idaho v. Jonathon Wade Ellington, Kootenia County Case No. 
F-06-1497. It is difficult to comprehend the State's position that Judge Luster's written 
decision is somehow not impeachment evidence regarding the credibility of Fred Rice when, 
among other things; Judge Luster states, "[t]his court would be remiss not to express some 
concern about the integrity of [Fred Rice] that has been called into question in this case. This 
is especially true when it pertains to a trained professional with the Idaho State Police." ld. at 
2 -PETITIONER'S REPLY TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND 
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12. 
With regards to the State's position that it was unaware that a district court in the State 
ofldaho had found Fred Rice had given wholly opposite opinions under oath, again, this 
argument lacks merit. The State of Idaho was the party prosecuting the criminal action against 
Mr. Klein. The duty to disclose under Brady, applies not only to evidence actually known to 
the trial prosecutor, but also to evidence known to those acting on the State's behalf. 
The State knew of this exculpatory evidence. Fred Rice was obviously aware he had 
offered wholly opposite opinions when he testified in the Ellington case in 2006. The Idaho 
Attorney General's Office, the chief law officer of the State ofldaho, was put on notice on June 
30, 2008, that Fred Rice testified to wholly opposite opinions when it was served with Mr. 
Ellington's Motion to Suspend the Appeal in State of Idaho v. Jonathan W Ellington, Supreme 
Court Case No. 33843. The Kootenai Prosecuting Attorney's Office knew that Judge Luster 
found Fred Rice incredible and unreliable in March 2009 when it was served with Judge 
Luster's decision. Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in State of Idaho v. Jonathan W. 
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53,253 P.3d 727 (2011) wherein the Court concluded Fred Rice provided 
false testimony was issued on May 27, 2011, seven days prior to Mr. Klein's conviction 
becoming final. Yet through all of this, and still today, the State has never complied with its 
obligations pursuant to Brady. 1 Any argument that the Custer County Prosecuting Attorney 
and those acting on the State's behalf, most importantly Fred Rice himself, was unaware or not 
1 The State's obligation under Brady continues past the entry of plea and sentencing and 
continues into post-conviction proceedings. Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746,749-750 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
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in possession of this impeachment material should be rejected by this Court. The State knew 
and was in possession of this exculpatory evidence. 
B. Mr. Klein Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Because Defeuse 
Counsel Failed to Timely File a Motion to Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
Though it will not be repeated here for the sake of brevity, as Mr. Klein set forth in his 
Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition, Attorney Oleson's 
performance was deficient because he failed to timely file a motion to withdraw Mr. Klein's 
guilty plea 
C. Conclusion 
For all the reasons stated above, as well as those contained in the Verified Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief and the Memorandwn in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Summary 
Disposition, the Court should grant summary disposition in favor of Mr. Klein. 
Respectfully submitted this lL day of July, 2012. 
Attorney for Marc Klein 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11_ day of July, 2012, I caused a true and correct 




to: Val Siegel, Custer County Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 630, Challis, ID 83226 
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303 W. Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
Phone: (208) 343-1000 
Facsimile: (208)345-8274 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
MARC EDWARD KLEIN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 














CASE NO. CV-2012-56 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY 
BROWNSON IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICfiON RELIEF 
I, J etfrey Brownson, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby depose and say: 
1. That I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Motion to Suspend the 
Appeal in State of Idaho v. Jonathan Wade Ellington, Supreme Court Case No. 33843. 
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This ends my affidavit. 
Je~___.-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _1_1 day of July, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy 




to: Val Siegel, Custer County Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 630, Challis, ID 83226 
JeJ/Lon 
3 • SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY BROV/NSON IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
192 
Jul 11 2012 4:27PM Nevin Benjamin,McKav&Bart 208 345 827 4 
gil'""".... . .. . -. ......... .... ··-·-· ............ .. 
; ·~ ' 
.. ' 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
SARA B. THOMAS 
{. 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. # 5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
I.S.B. # 6247 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
364 7 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
V. 








CASE NO. 33843 
MOTION TO SUSPEND THE 
APPEAL 
~ \~ ' 
Jonathan Ellington. by and through his counsel of record, the State Appellate 
Public Defender, moves this Court, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 13.2 and 32(c), 
for an order suspending this appeal pending the final disposition of the motion for a new 
trial which he recently filed in the district court. This motion is supported by the 
following statement. 
I. Legal Standard 
Idaho Appellate Rule 13.2 provides that this Court has the power to suspend 
proceedings upon a showing of "good cause." In addition, Rule 32(c) makes it clear 
that this Court has the power to grant any appropriate motion. FiLED - ORIGrNAL 
t I JUN 3 0 2008 
. . .. I . St.tl1'91l'F.n~red onATS ps_ 
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II. Relevant Facts and Procedural History 
Mr. Ellington was charged with, and convicted of, one count of second degree 
murder and two counts of aggravated battery, following a "road rage" incident in north 
Idaho. On December 4, 2006, the district court imposed an aggregate prison sentence 
of 25 years, with 12 years fixed. Mr. Ellington timely appealed. 
In his February 13, 2008 Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington argued that his 
conviction was the result of bias and prejudice, not a reasoned consideration of the 
evidence. Specifically, Mr. Ellington asserted that: (1) as part of a much larger pattern 
of trying to prejudice the jury, the State committed four distinct acts of misconduct; (2) 
the district court erred in admitting certain highly prejudicial information; and {3) the 
entire panel of prospective jurors was tainted by comments made by three of their 
peers. 
On or about June 19, 2008, the State filed its Respondent's Brief. 
On June 24, 2008, Mr. Ellington, through his trial counsel, the Office of the 
Kootenai County Public Defender, filed a Motion for New Trial in the district court based 
upon the discovery of new evidence. (A copy of Mr. Ellington's Motion for New Trial is 
attached hereto.) That new evidence tends to show that one of the State's expert 
witnesses (Fred Rice, Idaho State Police} offered testimony that was "directly opposite 
and dichotomous" to his testimony in another case, and that the State violated the 
United States and Idaho Constitutions by failing to disclose that inconsistent testimony 
to the defense prior to Mr. Ellington's trial. 
Mr. Ellington now respectfully requests that this Court suspend this appeal 
pending disposition of his motion for a new trial. 
MOTION TO SUSPEND THE APPEAL- Page 2 
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Ill. Analysis 
There are at least two reasons why, in the name of judicial economy, this appeal 
should be suspended pending the district court's disposition of Mr. Ellington's motion for 
a new trial. First. if the district court grants Mr. Ellington a new trial, the present appeal 
would be rendered moot since a new trial is precisely the relief that Mr. Ellington seeks 
through this appeal. Second, if the district court denies Mr. Ellington's motion for a new 
trial, he will likely appeal that decision and it is more efficient to simply roll that issue 
into the present appeal than to have two appeals invo1ving the same case going on at 
the same time. Mr. Ellington submits that these two efficiency concerns constitute good 
cause for suspension of this appeal under Idaho Appellate Rule 13.2. 
IV. Conclusion 
Because judicial economy would best be served thereby, Mr. Ellington 
respectfully requests that this Court suspend this appeal pending disposition of his 
motion for a new trial in the district court. 
DATEDthis30'" day of June, 200~~_) 
ERIK R. LE INEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of June, 2008, caused a true and 
correct copy of the attached MOTION TO STAY THE BRIEFING SCHEDULE to be 
hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court for: 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
700 W. STATE ST., 4TH FLOOR 
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FILED: 
J. Bradford Chapman, ISB 5101 y~~ 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defendefl'IILIV . 
PO Box 9000 
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CLERK DISTRICT. COURT 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 B£P0TY 
IN THE. DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 













CASE NUMBER CR-06-0001497 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
,. 
Comes now, the Defendant above-named, by and through your undersigned, and moves 
this Court for its Order granting him a new trial in this matter, in the interest of justice. 
This motion is brought pursuant to I.C.R. 34 and I.C. § 19-2406. This motion is based 
upon the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 
I,§§ 7 and 13 of the Constitution ofthe State ofldaho. This motion is made on the grounds and 
for the reasons that the defense has just discovered new, material, and exculpatory evidence, 
knowledge of which is (at the least) imputed to the State. At no time prior to or during trial was 
this relevant evidence material to the credibility of the State's agent, employee, and witness 
revealed to Mr. Ellington. 
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next? 
A. No,we. would look.for physical eviqert~_e. Debris can be moved,' kicked,around, like I:said, it 
sprays. 
(Ellington Trial Tr., p.l659, L.24- p.l660, L.l3.) Later, he testified similarly: 
Q. (By Mr. Verharen) In terms of the debris field that we have in this particular case, maybe I 
should get to a photograph that shows it. Number 23 as a good view of the debris field. In this 
photograph number 23 there is debris in the eastbound lane, is that right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that any indication ofwhere the actual impact occurred? 
MS. TAYLOR: Objection, Your Honor, he has already answered the question about debris fields. 
THE COURT: He has. Hopefully his answer will be consistent. You can answer the question. 
A. I see a lot of debris all over the road here, it's not going to tell me where the point of impact 
happened. I see more in the westbound lane I do in the eastbound. I see some-
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I'm going to object, he's narrative again. 
THE COURT: I think he has answered the question. · 
Q (By Mr. Verharen) Is there any way at all to put the Honda in the eastbound lane based on that 
debris field? 
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I'm going to object to that. He has talked to him about the debris 
field and he's getting into another 'theory, should have been brought up in his case in chief if he 
wanted it. 
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actul)l:Iy.hits.: ;gtd.UJid. · . ~ · ; , .. . : .. 
· So,:.we.see :!bat'the:g.lass ·isfat -.thi,s ·.pojnt. So• if'the automqbile is traveling: at any speed. at 
all, that definite.Jy:·coin~ides· with where·.the.impact is. 
(Ciccone Tr. Vot VHI;p.U hO, Ls.3"-20.) 
Understg:ned counsel for Mr. Ellington was unaware until ve.ry recently'OfMr. Rice's 
testimony in 2003, and only discovered this contradictory testimony with the assistance of the 
State Appellate Public Defender's office. It is axiomatic, or course, that the State is charged 
with all knowledge in the possession of law enforcement. A prosecutor has a constitutional 
obligation to learn of, to preserve, and to communicate with the defense about exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence in the government's possession. l{yt~:i v. ~l{~i, 514 U.S. 419, 437, 115 
S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, I 0 L.Ed.2d 
215 (1963). · A nh'W fFI~l may be ordered in a criminal case when "new evidence is discovered 
material to the defendant, and which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and 
produced at the trial." I.C. § 19-2406(7). In Mr. Ellington's case, the State was obliged to infonn 
the defense long ago that Mr. Rice's "expert" testimony is apparently malleable as a function of 
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, . ... 
. .. 
by, a.ny:reasohaqle;,view, a.mateiial.·pffect;on.th~' 
,.. ' v ~) " ' ,,, ·"': '"'"'\~ 
~· ' . ,_: ,;:, __ 4t>. :- -'' ' -~ . ' ,-_. -_ - 0 
these ~rior,idiametrically:opposed '+expert''.opiniohs~';;Mr>Ric~~i~(~:ii~oay\coJlfd·bave been. 
~ ·' ,, ... ~ ·. ',, - .. > t - ... '.-~-""' . :";; · -~· _, -_ - -
subjected tG the cru~ible -ofadversarial testing·iltsti.~~:~-bttllmi¢k.ef ~~ericanDue·Process. As~ it 
' ·{ .. ., 
was, Mr. Ellingto? was denied his. right t() a fair triatby.jury. The S6qrt'is asked 'to order a new 
trial to correct this miscarriage of justice. . 
DATED this t:9:tff.ld.day of J~ne, 2008·. 
BY: 
Attorneys for Mr. Ellington 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the ~() 
copy of the same in the interoffice mailbox on the. 
Kootenai County Prosecutor 
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was personally served by placing a 
d.· . ·June, 2008, addressed to: 
